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SUMMARY
This thesis starts with a critique of existing sociological
and criminological studies. The major argument here is that,
although interactionist studies are an improvement upon their
positivist counterparts, they suffer from the inherent weak-
nesses contained in their astructural bias. Thus, although
observational studies have been able to describe the effects
of the process of interaction within the courtroom, they have
been unable to explain why magistrates' justice is charact-
erised by a relative lack of due process. In the main body of
the thesis, we offer a structural analysis of the functions of
magistrates' courts through an examination of the historical
development of the magistracy culminating in its transform-
ation in the middle of the nineteenth century. We show that
the magistracy was created in its modern form as a lower court
of summary justice specifically to act as an efficient method
of punishing petty offenders with a conscious disregard for
rights of due process. This did not simply reflect the
interests of the industrial bourgeoisie but rather it was a
product of the class struggle resulting from the particular
formation of British capitalism, in which the gentry retained
a powerful position. The central argument is that the
particular form of justice that is administered in the lower
courts of England and Wales reflects the compromise that was
reached between these two sections of the ruling class in the
period in which the modern magistracy was forged.
INTRODUCTION
This thesis began as an M.A. dissertation based upon a short
observational study looking at the decision making process in
magistrates' courts. At the time of conducting this research,
it was intended that this would serve as a pilot study,
leading to a similar, but longer and more thorough, study as
the research base for this Ph.D.. However, the limitations of
such a project soon became apparent. Not only was there little
new to say about the nature of interaction within the
courtroom and its effects upon magistrates' sentencing decis-
ions and the characteristic features of magistrates' justice
but, more importantly, the assumptions implicit within the
framework of the observational study, that the legal inequal-
ities in magistrates' courts resulted solely from the 'devia-
tions' produced by court personnel - became increasingly
difficult to accept. When sitting in the courtroom, even for a
relatively short period, one could not help being impressed by
the fact that the nature of the proceedings inside the court-
room was strongly influenced by external factors. Not only
were they restricted by the organisational practices of other
institutions such as solicitors, probation officers and
particularly the police, but also the vast majority of defend-
ants were working class. This raised questions about the
structural position of the magistrates' court and its role in
punishing working class illegality that could not be
adequately addressed through an observational study. Although
it was possible to observe magistrates and other court
personnel intimidate defendants and sentence on the basis of
prejudices, for example, against the unemployed and in favour
of the 'respectable' working class, this did not explain why
working class petty crimes were dealt with in this way. By
looking only at the exercise of discretionary power and the
informal, routine arrangements developed by court personnel, I
had taken the existence of the magistrates' courts for granted
without asking why they existed in a form that enabled them to
dispense such 'rough justice'. It was the realisation of this
failure both in my own pilot study, and in the methodological
and theoretical framework of observational studies of magist-
rates' courts, which led to the change of emphasis, in this
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thesis, towards an attempt to explain, not just the content of
magistrates' justice but also, its form.
The structure of this thesis reflects these developments in my
thinking about magistrates' courts and the way in which they
dipense "justice". Thus, in Chapters One and Two, we offer an
appraisal of the achievements of interactionist studies in
observing the process of social interaction which produces the
discrepancies in sentencing rates and in further identifying a
number of features of magistrates' justice which are barely
hinted at in the official statistics. Having acknowledged
their superiority over their positivist counterparts, we elab-
orate on our critique of a methodological position which
provides a thorough description of proceedings in the magist-
rates' courts but does not allow an adequate explanation of
its form. In developing this critique of the interactionist
approach, we draw on the work of Doreen McBarnet who has shown
that many of the features of magistrates' courts which are
presented as the product of informal practices by court
personnel are, in fact, reinforced by the structure of the
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legal system and legal policy. However, we will see that,
although her work constitutes a significant advance upon other
studies in that it offers a structural analysis of magist-
rates' courts, she still does not explain why they function in
this way.
This then leads us into the core of the thesis. In order to
address the question of why magistrates' courts have emerged
as a form of 'crime control' with little regard for the
niceties of 'due process' that exist in the higher courts, we
have examined the historical development of the English
magistracy, focussing particularly on the moment in the
mid-C19th when it was transformed from a powerful, all-embra-
cing organ of local government into a lower court of summary
justice, dealing with the bulk of criminal cases. However,
before moving on to this analysis, we will pause firstly, in
Chapter Three, to evaluate a number of historical approaches
which bear upon our task and, secondly, in Chapters Four and
Five, to consider the earlier development of the magistracy.
Unlike the analysis of the Cl9th developments that follows,
our discussion of the history of the magistracy from the Cl2th
to the Cl8th is not based upon primary research, but rather it
constitutes a reinterpretation of the material offered in more
conventional histories of the magistracy. For this reason, the
arguments presented in this section are the most tentative
part of our overall thesis. Nevertheless, this examination of
the earlier history will serve to both highlight the import-
ance of the county magistracy as the power base of the gentry
and the nature of the legal and political forms that they
developed.
In Chapters Six, Seven and Eight, we will examine, in detail,
the changes that occurred during the Cl9th and we will see
that this transformation of the magistracy was influenced by
its earlier history. We have divided this discussion into
three parts. In Chapter Six, we will look at the process
through which magistrates lost their control over local
government, in Chapter Seven, we will examine their replace-
ment in the maintenance of order by the new police and, in
Chapter Eight, we will analyse the reform of the system of
prosecution which resulted in the emergence of magistrates'
courts as courts of summary justice, dealing with a wide range
of minor offences. Although we have drawn upon the conven-
tional histories of the magistracy and the legal system, and a
number of other secondary sources in developing the analysis
in this part of the thesis, the arguments presented are based
largely upon a study of the Cl9th Parliamentary Debates on the
series of Bills that were introduced on each of these issues.
A close reading of this material has enabled us to identify
the mannner in which the legal and political forms that
emerged from the transformation of the magistracy represent a
series of compromises resulting from the class struggle
between the nascent bourgeoisie and the gentry. We will see
that, because the gentry retained their parliamentary strength
for most of the Cl9th, they were able to alter the nature of
the new forms that were developed with the rise of industrial
capitalism.
Although there have been further developments in the structure
of the magistracy, in the late 19th century and in the 20th
century, which are not fully discussed in our analysis, they
do not amount to anything like the fundamental transformation
that occurred in the mid-C19th. This is not to say that there
is nothing of interest to study after 1888. On the contrary,
there is almost certainly another thesis to be written on the
subsequent period, covering such things as the nature of
recruitment, the political use of magistrates in, for example,
the 1984-85 miners' strike, the relationship between magist-
rates' courts and the police, and the further erosion of due
process, particularly in juvenile courts. However, our concern
is to offer an analysis of the historical process that
resulted in the creation of the English magistracy in its
modern form. This was completed, in its essentials, in the
middle part of the Cl9th and we have, therefore, restricted
ourselves to a detailed examination of the changes that
occurred during this period, and the nature of the class
struggle that gave rise to the particular form of summary
justice that emerged.
CHAPTER ONE
POSITIVIST AND INTERACTIONIST STUDIES 
OF MAGISTRATES' SENTENCING DECISIONS 
Introduction 
Studies of sentencing practices in magistrates' courts can be
broadly divided into two opposing camps - positivist and
interactionist. We will outline the main epistemological and
methodological assumptions of both approaches and critically
examine the contributions made to our understanding of
judicial sentencing decisions by major studies on each side of
the divide. Our central argument will be that, whilst the
interactionists are better able to describe the processes
inside the courtroom which underly sentencing decisions, they
suffer from inherent limitations which render them unable to
question the structure within which these decisions are made.
Positivism and the Interactionist Critique 
When we classify a study as positivist we are referring to a
set of assumptions (whether implicit or explicit) which
underly the research. The most fundamental of these assump-
tions are, firstly, that the social world is essentially
similar to the natural world and, secondly, following from
this, that the techniques of measurement and analysis dev-
eloped for the study of the natural world can be used to study
social phenomena.(1) Positivist social science assumes that,
just as we can measure the mass, temperature, velocity, etc.
of physical objects and develop laws about the relationship
between them, so social phenomena can be measured through
official statistics, questionnaires, etc. and that the data
can be used to formulate lawlike statements about the
relationship between social variables in the same way as the
natural sciences are able to formulate laws about the
behaviour of physical objects.(2)
Interactionist sociology in all of its different forms is
united in rejecting these assumptions. The common starting
point for all interactionists is that human beings are
reflexive, that they are continually trying to make sense of
their environment and, that, in this way, the social world is
socially constructed.
The term "symbolic interaction" refers, of course,
to the peculiar and distinctive character of
interaction as it takes place between human beings.
The peculiarity consists in the fact that human
beings interpret or "define" each other's actions
instead of merely reacting to each other's actions.
Their "response" is not made directly to the actions
of one another but instead is based on the meaning
which they attach to such actions. Thus human inter-
action is mediated by the use of symbols, by inter-
pretation, or by ascertaining the meaning of one
another's actions. This mediation is equivalent to
inserting a process of interpretation between
stimulus and response in the case of human
behaviour.
H. Blumer Society As Symbolic Interaction p.180
Many phenomenological sociologists would take issue with the
latent behaviourism in Blumer's statement but it does,
nevertheless, capture the emphasis that all interactionists
place upon "meaning" in the social world. Interactionists
argue that it is because the social world is inherently
meaningful and not "thing-like" that the methods used in the
-
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natural sciences are not applicable to the study of social
phenomena. This argument is summed up in the following extract
from a paper written by one of the mentors of interactionist
sociology.
This state of affairs is founded on the fact that
there is an essential difference in the structure of
the thought objects or mental constructs formed by
the social sciences and those formed by the natural
sciences. It is up to the natural scientist and to
him alone to define, in accordance with the
procedural rules of his science, his observational
field, and to determine the facts, data and events
within it which are relevant for his problem or
scientific purpose at hand. Neither are those facts
and events preselected, nor is the observational
field preinterpreted. The world of nature, as
explored by the natural scientist, does not "mean"
anything to molecules, atoms and electrons. But the
observational field of the social scientist - social
reality - has a specific meaning and relevance
structure for the human beings living, acting and
thinking within it. By a series of commonsense
constructs they have preselected and preinterpreted
this world which they experience as the reality of
their daily lives. It is these thought objects of
theirs which determine their behaviour by motivating
it. The thought objects constructed by the social
scientist, in order to grasp this social reality,
have to be founded upon the thought objects con-
structed by the commonsense thinking of men, living
their daily life within their social world. Thus,
the constructs of the social sciences are, so to
speak, constructs of the second degree, that is,
constructs of the constructs made by the actors on
the social scene, whose behaviour the social
scientist has to observe and to explain in
accordance with the procedural rules of his science.
A. Schutz Concept and Theory Formation in the 
Social Sciences pp.11-12
This is the core of the interactionist argument i.e., to the
extent that natural scientists are dealing with inanimate
objects they are able to devise very precise methods of
measurement for a wide range of phenomena but, by the same
token, it is precisely because social scientists are not
dealing with inanimate objects but reflexive subjects that,
they are not able to utilise the same techniques. It is for
this reason that interactionists have been so critical of the
use of official statistics, questionnaires and experimental
method in the social sciences. Although, they recognise some
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uses for this data, they object to the uncritical use of these
techniques. Thus, as one of the most widely read inter-
actionist critics of positivist methods in social science has
said:
The study of social structure by collecting facts
such as births, deaths, age, marital status, and
divorce does not pose a serious measurement problem.
• • • When sociologists become interested in
accounting for and interpreting the trends in
fertility within and between cultures, the examin-
ation of social facts per se can provide useful data
for clarifying and pointing the way to the kinds of
social action inherent in a particular kind of
society...
A. Cicourel Method and Measurement in Sociology
p.195
Positivist Studies 
It follows from the above that official statistics (and
possibly questionnaires) may be useful as a point of departure
- they can pinpoint problems that may bear further
sociological investigation - but they are inappropriate tools
with which to examine social action in any particular
situation. This is precisely the case in the study of magist-
rates' sentencing decisions and the major difficulties with
the positivist studies stem from their failure to appreciate
this fact.
The major contribution of these studies has been to
demonstrate the differences that exist in sentencing rates,
both between different courts and within the same court. From
even the most superficial examination of court statistics they
have been able to demonstrate that certain groups are treated
differently by the courts,(3) and that some courts dispense
quite different treatment to others. The latter point is
illustrated by Vilhelm Aubert's study of 5 military courts in
Norway dealing with conscientious objectors who had refused to
do military service in which he found that the acquittal rates
varied from 54% in "Northern" court to 3% in "Western"
court.(4) The same point is illustrated by Roger Hood's
influential study of magistrates' courts in Britain, which
began by looking at imprisonment rates for 12 magistrates'
courts in different parts of the country for the years
1951-1954. He found that in one year they varied from 3% in
the most "lenient" court to 55% in the most "severe" court and
that, on average for the four-year period they varied from 8%
to 47%.(5)
However, although this information provided by the official
statistics is interesting, it is only the starting point for
an analysis of sentencing decisions in magistrates' courts. To
document such widespread differences in sentencing begs the
question of why these differences exist. Positivists have
approached this question in a number of ways. Edward Green(6)
takes the court statistics at face value and assumes that any
differences therein reflect actual differences in the amount
of criminality dealt with by the courts under study. He
studied a non-jury prison court of the Philadelphia Court of
Quarter Sessions during 1956-1957 in an attempt to determine
the relative importance of both legal and non-legal criteria
on sentencing decisions. He looked at sex, age, race, place of
birth, the personal characteristics of the judge and the
prosecuting attorney, and, the plea and he concludes that none
of these factors had an important effect on sentencing disp-
arities. Rather:
The results of the investigation of the influence of
legal and non-legal factors upon the severity of the
sentences offer the reassurance that the delib-
erations of the sentencing judges are not at the
mercy of passions and prejudices but rather mirror
the operation of rational processes. The criteria
for sentencing recognized in the law, the nature of
the offence and the offender's prior criminal
record, make a decisive contribution to the deter-
mination of the weight of the penalties; and in
applying these criteria, the judges display a sensi-
bility for the relative importance of each. The
marked variations in sentencing according to age,
sex, and race are due to differences in criminal
behaviour patterns associated with these bio-social
variables, not to hidden prejudice.
The findings concerning the differences in
sentencing among the various judges are not clear in
their implications. Although they reveal wide dispa-
rities, they show also an impressive degree of
uniformity. Undoubtedly, individual differences in
social background, personality, and penal phil-
osophy sensitize the various judges differently to
cases of a similar kind; but without specific infor-
mation on these factors for each judge, the precise
nature and extent of their influence is prob-
lematic. It appears, however, that whatever procliv-
ities they generate are appreciably checked by the
legal criteria.
E. Green Sentencing Practices of Criminal Court
Judges p.437
This unquestioning acceptance of the official statistics is a
good example of the kind of crude positivism to which the
interactionist critique is directed.(7) What Green ignores is
the fact that official statistics (in this case sentencing
rates) are actually social constructions composed of a series
of decisions made by individual officials (in this case
judges). These officials have discretionary powers and the way
in which they use them will be determined by the meaning that
they attribute to the actions and the actors that they are
asked to adjudicate upon. If this is true for each individual
case, then, the official statistics - which are nothing more
than the summation of these cases - must also be determined in
the same way. Green completely misses this point and his
uncritical acceptance of the court statistics leads him into a
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ridiculously tautological argument. He says that sentencing
differences on the basis of age, sex, race, etc. are justified
because they correspond to real differences in criminality but
he takes as his measure of criminality the court statistics
which are nothing more than a compilation of the judges'
decisions that he is supposed to be studying.
It may be suggested that, because Green so clearly accepts the
legal ideology, he is an easy target. This is probably true
but a similar case can also be made against both Aubert and
Hood(1962) who attempt to demonstrate the existence of
extra-legal criteria. Aubert also considered the possibility
that the differences in acquittal rates revealed by his study
reflected differences in the nature of defendants appearing
before the various courts but he rejected it because the two
courts in his study with the highest conviction rates also
exhibited a wide variation amongst the judges within those
courts. He argued that if there were differences in the degree
of criminality then this should affect all judges within the
same district in a similar manner and, therefore, the fact
that this was not the case suggests that the differences in
acquittal rates cannot be explained in terms of differences in
criminality.(8) However, he cannot actually demonstrate this
because the court statistics simply do not tell us why judges
(or magistrates) behave in a particular manner. There are a
wide variety of possible explanations for this finding some of
which are consistent with the accepted legal criteria (eg.
variations in the caseloads of different judges) whilst others
are not (eg. variations in judges' attitudes) but official
court statistics provide no means by which to examine the
various possibilities.
Whereas Aubert recognised this limitation and did not attempt
to go further, Hood, who did not have access to the dispos-
itions of individual magistrates, devised his own measure of
"criminality" using a complicated composite of the personal
circumstances of the defendants appearing before the
courts.(9) When he correlated his results with imprisonment
rates he found that there was no significant relationship
between the two.(10) It would apppear to follow from this that
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magistrates' sentencing decisions must be based upon
extra-legal criteria. However, despite the ingenuity of Hood's
device, we can only accept conclusions drawn from this
technique if we are prepared to accept the court statistics
uncritically. This is because Hood's measure of criminality is
itself derived from the court statistics. The information that
he collected on the eight characteristics of the defendants
was all taken from the court records. (Ii) This /eads Hood into
the absurd position in which his conclusions contradict the
assumptions behind his methodology. By using the court
statistics to compound his measure of criminality, Hood is
accepting them at face value and assuming that they do in fact
represent the level of "criminality" in the area. However, if
we accept his conclusion that magistrates' sentencing
decisions are based upon extra-legal criteria, then the court
records - which are the accumulation of these decisions -
cannot provide an unambiguous measure of the degree of
criminality and, therefore, Hood cannot substantiate his
argument that differences in sentencing decisions are due to
non-legal factors.
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We can see then that positivist methodology presents
considerable difficulties for researchers who wish to address
themselves to the relatively straightforward question of
whether differences in sentencing rates are due to legal or
extra-legal factors. If the limitations of positivist method
do not even allow broad statements of this nature then, when
we come to the problem of determining the nature of the
extra-legal factors behind sentencing decisions, it is totally
inadequate. It is to Aubert's credit that he acknowledges this
limitation. One of his most important findings was that
defendants who objected to military service on religious
grounds were almost certain to be acquitted (even though this
criterion had only been adopted informally by the judges).
His research also revealed that, in the two courts with high
conviction rates, the number of defendants pleading on the
basis of religious beliefs was low. The obvious conclusion to
be drawn from this would be that the high conviction rates
were due to the relative lack of religious beliefs, but Aubert
sounds a note of caution and, in doing so, illustrates the
problems involved in drawing even such apparently straight-
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forward inferences from the court statistics.
We must in any case allow for the possibility that
the relationship may, in fact, be the following:
When so many objectors before the Southern and
Northern courts are characterised as nonreligious,
it may be that the courts have found them guilty on
other grounds but relied on the argument of lack of
religious belief, since it can reasonably be invoked
to indicate the absence of sufficiently serious
beliefs against doing military service.(12)
V. Aubert Conscientious Objectors before Norwegian
Military Courts p.209
Aubert would like to offer an explanation of sentencing
patterns but to do so he has to address the question of why
the judges took the set of decisions that gave rise to the
court statistics but this is a question about the motivation
of the sentencers and the meaning that they attach to events
and behaviour within the courtroom and as such it cannot be
answered from the court statistics.
In the above passage, Aubert is acknowledging this problem -
one of the most fundamental problems confronting positivist
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studies of law courts - but he appears to be resigned to it.
Hood(1972), on the other hand, attempted to overcome the
problem by devising a battery of tests designed to measure
magistrates attitudes and the meanings which they attached to
motoring offences. Here again we can bear witness to Hood's
ingenuity but, as we will discover, his tests tell us little
about the sentencing behaviour of magistrates. His attempt to
measure the non-legal factors had begun in his earlier study
when he devised his own composite measure of the social
structure of the various areas.(13) Using this device, he
found that the group of courts with high imprisonment rates
tended to have:
...a less dense population, less overcrowding, fewer
men in social classes IV and V, more men aged twenty
to twenty-four educated over the age of seventeen,
and smaller populations (when considered as isolated
urban areas). These towns are older communities,
have known traditions of peaceful living, and are
the home of small light industries. In general
descriptive terms they are more residential, with a
higher proportion of middle-class inhabitants and a
generally parochial air. These towns may have a
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greater	 consciousness of community' than large
urban areas as well as a 'common conscience' which
highly respects private property.
R. Hood Sentencing in Magistrates' Courts p.75
If we ignore his assertions about the nature of community in
these towns, Hood's use of the census data in this way is
relatively unproblematic. However, it is subject to the limit-
ations of positivist studies that we have already identified.
In this case, the data implies that there may be a relation-
ship between magistrates' social backgrounds and their
attitudes towards crime but it does no more than suggest
possible avenues for research. This data did not enable Hood
to say much about this relationship because it did not provide
any information about magistrates' backgrounds or opinions.
In an attempt to overcome these limitations, in his second
study of sentencing decisions in magistrates' courts he
abandoned the official statistics in favour of his own devices
designed to examine the process behind magistrates sentencing
decisions in detail.(14) This study employed three main tech-
niques. Firstly, Hood attempted to measure the personal
characteristics of the magistrates in his sample. To do this
he used an interviewing programme, two self-completion
questionnaires and an Eysenck Personality Inventory. The first
questionnaire, which asked the magistrates to rank a list of
nineteen offences (eight motoring and eleven others) in order
of seriousness, was designed to measure their perceptions of
the seriousness of motoring offences. The second question-
naire presented the magistrates with four stereotyped views of
offenders and asked them to say, for each of seven motoring
offences, what proportion of offenders fell into each stereo-
type.(15) The Eysenck Personality Inventory was supposed to
measure two aspects of the magistrates personalities - intro-
verted / extraverted and stable / neurotic. Secondly, he sent
copies of the same selection of eight printed cases to a
sample of magistrates, together with a questionnaire asking
them how they would have dealt with the case. They were asked
n ...to decide on the appropriate penalty, to give their
reasons for it and to say whether they wanted more information
about the offender, whether they would have retired to
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consider the sentence, to what extent they thought their
decision reflected what their colleagues would have done, and
lastly to rate how serious 'of its kind' the case was."(16)
Thirdly, Hood arranged conferences at six magistrates' courts
where the magistrates were divided into groups of twos and
threes in order to participate in the 'information game' that
he had devised. The groups were presented with a hypothetical
case and were asked to adjudicate upon it. Their decision was
then recorded, a specific item about the offence or the
offender was changed and the magistrates were once again asked
to adjudicate upon the case. This process was repeated several
times. The aim of this experiment was to enable Hood to
examine the reactions of magistrates to small differences in
the nature of the case and thus to study the sentencing
process in fine detail.
The weaknesses of the Eysenck Personality Inventory have been
documented many times(17) and there is nothing for us to add
except possibly suprise that Hood appears so oblivious to its
shortcomings. Rather, we will concentrate our attention on the
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other techniques that he used to obtain his data. Firstly, let
us look at the questionnaire in which he asked magistrates to
rank nineteen offences according to their seriousness. Even if
we accept that it is possible to rank this number of items
meaningfully (which is doubtful), what the data produced from
this test tells us is simply that, for each individual
magistrate, she/he perceives the offence ranked 1 as being
more serious than that ranked 2 and that this, in turn, is
perceived as being more serious than that ranked 3, and so on
until the offence ranked 19 is perceived as being the least
serious. In other words, the data only provides information
about the relative perception of the seriousness of these
offences. It does not provide information of an absolute
nature. We cannot assume, for example, that the difference
between rank 1 and rank 2 is equal to that between rank 2 and
rank 3. Nor can we assume that the rankings of one magistrate
can be equated with those of any other magistrate. There is no
reason whatsoever why, because two magistrates have given an
offence the same ranking that, they should both perceive it as
being equally serious. It may be that one person believes that
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all crime is very serious whilst another sees all crime as
trivial. It would therefore be wrong to assume that, because
they both rank shop lifting sixteenth on their list, they
attached equal seriousness to this offence but this is exactly
what Hood does when he collates the rankings of individual
magistrates to produce a mean ranking which he presents as the
collective view of his sample. We should therefore view any
results produced from this technique with caution.
The other questionnaires used by Hood did not involve this
ranking technique and are not, therefore, subject to the same
criticisms. However, this is not to say that they are not
problematic. When he sent questionnaires to the magistrates
asking them to adjudicate on a number of hypothetical cases,
Hood believed that this enabled him to hold constant all
details about the offence and the offender "...the only
variables being those associated with the magistrates making
the decisions."(18) In other words, he believed that he was
providing "pure" data on the sentencing behaviour of indiv-
idual magistrates (which could later be correlated with his
data on the various aspects of their personalities).
Unfortunately there are a number of serious flaws in the logic
of Hood's methodology here.
Firstly, the meaning of sentencing decisions is problematic
and it cannot simply be assumed that some sentences are more
severe than others.(19) This does not necessarily invalidate
Hood's research technique - it may be possible to include
items on the questionnaire which provide the information
required to check whether or not there is any reason to
suppose that sentencing decisions have any special meanings.
Nevertheless, the fact that Hood did not attempt to explore
this possibility weakens the plausibility of his data.
Secondly, Hood's assumption that, by giving all of the magis-
trates in his sample the same details about the offence and
the offender, he was able to hold these variables constant can
only apply if the magistrates perceive these details in the
same way but this is unlikely to be the case. There are a wide
range of possible ways in which the magistrates may interpret
the details with which Hood furnished them. At one extreme,
some of the magistrates may read these details as describing a
serious offence committed by a hardened offender whilst, at
the other extreme, others may perceive a trivial incident
committed by a "normal" person. The crucial point is that Hood
assumes that everybody will interpret the raw material in the
same way and, as a result, his method does not even attempt to
measure these understandings.
Thirdly, Hood's questionnaire also assumes that the magis-
trates will respond in the same way as they would in "real
life" and this too is a dubious assumption. When the magis-
trates in Hood's sample made their response to his question-
naire it is inevitable that they will have attempted to "make
sense" of that particular situation by asking themselves
questions such as "what is the study really getting at ?". In
answering this question, it is possible that their under-
standing may have differed significantly from that of Hood
although, insofar as his respondents were likely to share a
similar social and cultural background to Hood, this seems
unlikely.(20) However, as Phillips has pointed out, in his
text on research methods, those people who are best able to
understand the researcher's questions are also better able to
manipulate their answers.(21) This may take the form of
deliberate sabotage although our own commonsense under-
standing suggests that this is also unlikely to have been a
serious problem in Hood's study. Much more likely is the
possibility that the magistrates will attempt to create the
impression that they act responsibly in their magisterial
capacity.(22) Exactly how this will affect their responses
will depend upon what they consider to be responsible practice
but we can suppose that it might include such things as
weighing the evidence carefully, giving proper consideration
to the nature of the offence and the offender, etc.
Thus, despite the apparent scientific nature of Hood's
questionnaire, this technique does not enable him to measure
magistrates' sentencing behaviour. Even if this method of
research produced the results that Hood claims, it would still
be inadequate because the magistrates' sentencing decisions on
these hypothetical cases are taken out of the context of the
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courtroom. When we examine the interactionist studies we will
see that a complex drama is enacted inside the magistrates'
courts and that the sentence is a product of this drama. Thus
any attempt, such as Hood's, to study magistrates' sentencing
decisions in isolation from the courtroom drama can never be
more than a partial study. The third stage of Hood's research,
in which he assembled magistrates at conferences, could
possibly be seen as a response to this problem. At these
conferences he attempted to recreate courtroom conditions
insofar as he grouped the magistrates into twos and threes.
However, this part of the research programme is subject to
many of the same criticisms as his use of questionnaires. Hood
believed that the 'information game' that he had devised for
the occasion would enable him to isolate specific variables
whilst keeping all else constant, thus enabling him to study
the sentencing process in minute detail.(23) However, once
again, he has ignored the fact that human subjects are
reflexive and that they will attempt to form their own under-
standing of the situation. In the case of Hood's 'information
game' it is not difficult to imagine how this might have
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affected his results. Even if we are prepared to allow that
the magistrates' adjudications on the original case were a
reliable reflection of the way in which they would have acted
in the courtroom, it is too much to expect that their adjudic-
ations on subsequent rounds of the 'game' would not have been
influenced by their awareness of what was being examined. This
part of Hood's study is similar in nature to a laboratory
experiment and, as such, it is subject to the same problems -
i.e., demand characteristics. A number of studies have noted
that subjects in laboratory experiments are affected by their
understanding of the purpose of the experiment and that they
behave in ways that they believe will help the researcher to
get the desired results.(24) In Hood's study, in which only
one item of the case was altered on each round of the 'game',
the magistrates could not help being aware of what was being
studied and so, if we assume that magistrates are similar to
other human subjects, they too are likely to respond in a way
that they believe will help Hood's research. In particular
they will be likely to alter their sentences as the game
progresses even if this is not what they would have done in
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the courtroom.
Once again then we see that Hood's research programme has
failed to supply the kind of quantifiable data on magis-
trates' sentencing behaviour that he wants to be able to
offer. We cannot help being impressed by the ingenuity with
which Hood has devised his own research tools in his attempt
to gather this data but all of his efforts are frustrated by
the fact that he consistently fails to realise that the nature
of the social world will not allow him to successfully perform
this task. Hood has failed to realise that data on such things
as magistrates' attitudes cannot be obtained through the use
of quasi-scientific research techniques because such methods
are inappropriate for use when studying thinking subjects who
interpret events and situations including the very research
methods that Hood and other positivist researchers use to
study them. If we wish to examine magistrates' decision
making, we must accept that we will not be able to achieve the
same degree of precision that natural scientists often enjoy
and look for alternative methods of study more suited to the
nature of our subject matter.
Interactionist Studies Of Law Courts 
Interactionist studies of law courts have been designed to
overcome the sort of problems that we have identified with
Hood's methods. Whereas Hood has tried to study magistrates'
sentencing	 decisions	 'scientifically'	 in	 controlled
conditions, interactionists have entered the courtroom to
study magistrates in action. We have chosen to illustrate the
interactionist position through the example of Emerson's study
of a juvenile court in a large city in the northern United
States.(25) Because it was carried out in the U.S.A., it is
concerned with judges' rather than magistrates' sentencing
decisions but his findings have been confirmed by a number of
less extensive British studies and the broad pattern of
Emerson's findings applies equally to magistrates' courts.
(26)
In the court studied by Emerson, the judge heard complaints
for delinquency (usually brought by the police) and he/she had
to decide: (a) whether the youth was "delinquent" or "not
delinquent", and (b) what subsequent action to take (i.e. what
sentence to pass). In 1966 (the year in which Emerson
conducted his research) only 7% of all complaints led to a
finding of "not delinquent" and Emerson therefore decided that
the major focus of his study ought to be the judges'
dispositions.(27) On the basis of his courtroom observations
(from January 1966 to May 1967) together with informal
interviews with court personnel, he concluded that the most
important criterion underlying the judges' dispositions was
the identification of "trouble". Emerson found that trouble
was regularly identified under two sets of conditions:
Firstly, when the defendant was charged with a serious offence
there was an automatic assumption of trouble, and; Secondly,
when certain patterns of behaviour and social circumstances
that were felt to precede serious delinquent or criminal
activity were present, even if the current activity was
trivial. Emerson suggests that under both conditions "trouble"
is essentially a predictive construct.
The fact that a youth has committed a serious
offence is of particular interest to the court
partly because it suggests that he may well do it
again; such a delinquent has shown himself to be the
sort of person who might so behave. When current
behaviour is minor or trivial but the court feels
'trouble' is present, it is judging that such
conduct, in light of attendant circumstances, is
'symptomatic' of involvement in a delinquent career.
R. Emerson Judging Delinquents p.87
Emerson goes on to argue that this search for trouble leads to
a focus away from what actually happened towards a consider-
ation of the question "what is the problem here ?". Following
Matza,(28) he argues that the facts of the case become
unimportant and that explanations are sought for, instead, in
the character and background of the individual offender.
According to Emerson, the court distinguished three types of
moral character - "normal", "criminal", and "disturbed" -
which he describes as types of typical delinquency.(29) Those
offences which appeared to be consistent with conventional
lifestyles were likely to be considered "normal" and dealt
with more leniently, whereas those offences which did not have
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this appearance were likely to be seen as "criminal" or
possibly "disturbed".
To consider a concrete example, the court recognises
three distinct social events as possible occurrences
within the formal offense category of 'assault'. On
the basis of the implied moral character of the
actors involved, these can be termed typical normal,
criminal and disturbed assaults. First, a typical
normal assault involves a 'fight' and highlights the
following features of the delinquency situation: the
scene is usually a street; the combatants are
children, usually boys but sometimes girls; fists or
weapons picked up in the heat of the battle are the
rule; both parties appear to have contributed to the
incident. In such cases, while there may be fairly
serious injury, the 'offense' itself is considered
minor, growing out of an often childish disagreement
between the youths well known to each other.
'Fights', then are perceived as natural incidents
usually involving normal actors.
Second, an assault may involve circumstances that
indicate criminal character. Such criminal assaults
involve attacks on strangers and nonpeers with
robbery as the apparent motive. Criminal assaults
are typically 'muggings' where a lone male, often a
drunk or homosexual, is grabbed, roughed up, and
relieved of his money by a small group of older,
tough delinquents, in a public but deserted area.
Criminal assaults are often described as "vicious";
they are regarded as extremely serious, for
potentially they involve murder.
Third, typical disturbed assaults occur without
apparent robbery motives, but generally in similar
settings. The victim, previously unknown and not
robbed, is assaulted for no apparent "reason'. Here
the	 violence may	 be	 interpreted	 as	 an irrational
outburst of aggression	 or	 hostility. Disturbed
assaults too indicate viciousness,
	 often even more
dangerous because of its gratuitous and unmotivated
nature. (30)
R. Emerson Judging Delinquents pp.109-110
This observation that judges divide defendants into three
distinct groups is interesting in itself . However, of more
fundamental importance is the fact that Emerson is not only
able to say that non-legal criteria are an important influence
on judicial sentencing decisions in the lower courts but also
that he is able to say something about the nature of these
criteria and how they work. Underlying his observations about
the judges" identification of "trouble" is the more funda-
mental observation that sentencing decisions are determined by
the subjective classification of defendants on the basis of
their "moral character" rather than the crime per se. Emerson
shows how the judges attempted to establish the moral
character of the defendant from the variety of cues that they
picked up in the courtroom. Sometimes these cues were
"obvious" - as in the case of the 16 year old boy accused of
breaking into a church social centre who was caught on the
roof at night with wirecutters and other tools in his
possession.(31) At other times the judges found their clues
about the moral character of the defendant in minor details
about the case. Consider the following case from Emerson's
research notes.
Two older girls who had run away from home and been
caught shoplifting in a department store claimed
they had spent the night in a doorway. The judge
seemed reluctant to accept the story, and asked the
arresting officer if the girls had been 'clean'
when he caught them. The policeman said no, and
added that the blond girl had been wearing eye
make-up and had her hair done up.
R. EMERSON Judging Delinquents p.112
When commenting on this case, Emerson says:
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Here it can be noted that a typical normal runaway
by girls involves staying away from home and living
on the streets for a day or two following a family
argument. This fades into a more criminal-like
runaway, where the girls become involved in prost-
itution. Hence it becomes critical to determine
where the runaways spent the night, and the court
routinely questions runaways about this and other
topics pertaining to living 'on the streets'. The
answer here that the night was spent in a doorway
arouses the judge's suspicion. He then attempts to
gauge the nature of this runaway's episode by asking
the police officer about the girls' appearance at
the time of the arrest (on the assumption that had
they indeed stayed in some doorway they could not
stay 'clean', while if they had been in an apartment
somewhere they would have). The policeman's answer
is ambiguous in this respect, since he reports that
they were clean, but that one girl was heavily made
up,	 a	 possible	 indicator	 of	 prostitution.
Nonetheless, the circumstances of this inquiry
clearly suggest how one minute aspect of a report
may shape the perceived nature of a delinquent act
(i.e., determine the class of typical delinquency in
which it will be placed).
R. Emerson Judging Delinquents p.112
The importance of a wide variety of 'cues' - such as language,
physical appearance, and, the general presentational style of
the defendant - in influencing the way in which judges and
magistrates interpret any particular case has been confirmed
by other interactionist studies.(32) Although they differ over
the details of Emerson's analysis a number of them have
reported that magistrates categorise defendants in ways
similar to those suggested by Emerson(33) and they all confirm
his conclusion that interpersonal interaction in the courtroom
is of paramount importance in the determination of sentencing
decisions.
In addition to these observations about the ways in which
judges and magistrates classify defendants on the basis of
subjective criteria, interactionist studies have also been
able to comment on the influence that other court personnel
may have upon sentencing decisions. Because of their presence
inside the courtroom, they cannot help noticing the complex
drama that is enacted and the effect that this has on the
final outcome of any particular case. Emerson, for example, is
able to show that the evaluation of the defendant's moral
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character is the end product of a complex process of inter-
action in the courtroom involving all of the court personnel
who are attempting to portray an image of the defendant
consistent with the disposition that they are aiming for.
Moral character is not passively established. It is
the product of interaction and communicative work
involving the delinquent, his family, enforcers,
complainants generally, and the court itself.
Specific versions of moral character must be
successfully presented if they are to be adopted by
others. Officials, who play the dominant role in the
process, both directly communicate their opinions of
the moral character of the youth involved and more
indirectly make selective reports of incidents and
information pertinent to the court's evaluation of
this character. In general, the version of the moral
character finally established is negotiated from
among these presented 'facts', opinions, and
reports. (34)
R. Emerson Judging Delinquents p.101
We can see then that the methodology adopted by the interact-
ionists enables them to study the judicial sentencing process
much more fully than their positivist counterparts. However,
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whilst it is important to recognise their achievements, it
would be wrong to assume that they are entirely unprob-
lematic. On the contrary, there are a number of major
limitations to the use of interactionist studies. We have
already seen that positivist studies are actually better
equipped to provide certain kinds of factual information but
there are also certain standard criticisms that can be
levelled against any interactionist study. In particular it
has been suggested that their results are not objective
because they are based upon the subjective interpretations of
the researcher. The point here is that, if the social world is
inherently meaningful as the interactionists claim then, how
can the researcher "know" the meanings which (in this case)
magistrates	 attach	 to	 their	 actions.	 Interactionist
sociologists have responded to this criticism in different
ways according to their own particular style of research.
Howard Becker, for example, argues that a good participant
observation study could be reproduced by another researcher
and that it is, therefore, objective research.(35) Alfred
Schutz and some ethnomethodologists, on the other hand, argue
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,that the problem can be overcome by using 'epoche' - a process
in which the researcher is supposed to suspend his/her
commonsense assumptions about the particular part of the
social world being studied.(36) The problem with both of these
arguments is that they seem to contradict their own
assumptions about the nature of the social world - i.e., they
seem to be suggesting that, although the social world is
socially constructed and inherently meaningful, this does not
apply to sociologists who are somehow able to extricate
themselves from the entanglement of social constructions to
witness them from a distance.
It is not our intention here to become embroiled in what has
been both a passionate and complex debate about the merits of
interactionist methods as opposed to those used by
conventional' sociology. Rather, what we want to suggest is
that this debate has served to obscure a more fundamental
weakness that is inherent in both positivist and inter-
actionist studies of magistrates' sentencing decisions. The
hostile debates that have taken place between interactionists
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and positivists have helped to create the impression of almost
total opposition between the two camps but if we look beyond
this methodological argument to the assumptions of both groups
about the structure of society we reveal a more fundamental
unity between them. Thus, although interactionist studies may
tell us more about the processes that underly magistrates'
sentencing decisions they, like their positivist counter-
parts, are restricted by the astructural bias which, is
inherent in their epistemological position. Thus, a leading
interactionist writes:
These respective concerns with organization on the
one hand and with acting units on the other hand set
the essential difference between conventional views
of human society and the view of it implied in
symbolic interaction. The latter view recognises the
presence of organization in human society and
respects its importance. However, it sees and treats
organization differently. The difference is along
two major lines. First, from the standpoint of
symbolic interaction the organization of a human
society is the framework inside of which social
action takes place and it is not the determinant of
that action. Second, such organization and changes
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in it are the product of the activity of acting
units and not of 'forces' which leave such acting
units out of account. . • •
From the standpoint of symbolic interaction, social
organization is a framework inside of which acting
units develop their actions. Structural features,
such	 as	 , culture
,
 ,	 'social	 systems',	 'social
stratification', or 'social roles', set conditions
for their action but do not determine their action.
People - that is, acting units - do not act toward
culture, social structure or the like; they act
toward situations. Social organization enters into
action only to the extent to which it supplies fixed
sets of symbols which people use in interpreting
their situations.
H.	 Blumer	 Society As	 Symbolic
	 Interaction
pp.189 -190
In this passage, Blumer offers a clear rationalization for a
sociology that is prepared to accept the existing social
structure as given in order to study the ways in which indiv-
iduals interact with one another. This kind of committed
individualism can be seen in many of the studies of
magistrates courts. One particularly good example is provided
by Max Atkinson and Paul Drew who preface their book by saying
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that they are only interested in the organization of talk in
the courts and with the ways in which the participants manage
the business of the courts within the constraints imposed by
that organization.(37) They argue in favour of Garfinkel's
ethnomethodology because it showed that:
The basic theoretical question was no longer to be
the obstinately unanswerable one of WHY in principle
social order is as it is (or claimed to be). Rather
it was to become that of HOW for practical purposes
are particular manifestations of social order
achieved?
M. Atkinson & P. Drew Order In Court p.21
Atkinson and Drew represent an extreme position within the
spectrum of interactionist sociology and there are many inter-
actionists who would dispute their claim that questions about
why the social order is the way it is are irrelevant.(38)
However, although Atkinson and Drew take the logic of the
interactionist position to its extreme it is, nevertheless,
the logic of interactionism. All interactionist studies
confine themselves to studying the interactive processes that
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take place within the courtroom whilst taking the wider
structure in which it is located for granted. By doing this
they have consistently ignored questions about the structural
position of the magistrates' court. This does not mean that
these studies are invalid but it has meant that, although we
have learnt a great deal about the ways in which magistrates
exercise their discretionary sentencing powers, there has been
precious little analysis of why these courts exist in this
particular form.
Summary
In this chapter we have seen that those researchers who have
attempted to study the judicial sentencing process through
positivist methods have failed because of the inherent limit-
ations in their methodology. They have been able to use court
statistics to point to wide variations in sentencing rates
but, although they have often correctly suspected that these
are the product of extra-legal criteria, they have been unable
to demonstrate this successfully. Interactionist studies have
been able to overcome these difficulties by devising
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alternative methods based upon the observation of behaviour in
its context. The presence of interactionist researchers inside
the courtroom has enabled them to demonstrate, not only the
existence but also, the nature of the extra legal factors that
determine sentencing decisions. In addition they have been
better placed to examine the interactive process between court
personnel through which sentences are reached. Whereas
positivist studies have tended to assume that magistrates
simply hear the evidence and then adjudicate upon the case,
interactionist studies cannot help noticing the complex drama
that is enacted within the courtroom and the effect that this
has on the final outcome of any particular case.
However, despite the achievements of the interactionist
studies, we have seen that they are not as radically differ-
ent from their positivist counterparts as the methodological
debate has tended to suggest. Although they are better able to
study the process that occurs inside the courtroom, they too
accept the structural framework of the legal system in general
and the magistrates' court in particular. In the following
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chapter, when we look at the contribution that observational
studies have made to our understanding of the broader nature
of magistrates' justice, we will develop this argument further
and present the case for a structural analysis of the magist-
rates' courts more fully.
CHAPTER TWO 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN MAGISTRATES' COURTS 
Observations Of Magistrates' Justice 
In Chapter One we have restricted ourselves to a discussion of
magistrates' sentencing decisions. This was a necessary limit-
ation arising largely out of the nature of positivist studies.
Because of their heavy dependence upon official statistics,
they have only been able to study those details of court
proceedings which are officially recorded. Although we have
seen that there are important aspects of the sentencing
process which do not show up clearly in court statistics,
there are other dimensions of the internal workings of the
court which are barely hinted at and about which positivist
studies have said virtually nothing. These limitations are
summarised by Mileski when she says:
The court, like many formal organizations, has no
interest in maximising outsiders' access to infor-
mation about its ongoing activities. In consequence,
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certain of its operations go unrecorded. The
courtroom clerk, for example, does not make a
notation of each time the judge scowls at a
defendant or appears incredulous at a defendant's
account of his behaviour. Furthermore, plea-
bargaining encounters are conspicuously omitted.
Something similar to the 'blue curtain' that hangs
about police departments surrounds the court and
creates an intelligence problem for the outsider who
would use what the court writes down about itself.
M. Mileski Courtroom Encounters 	 p.475
Interactionist studies, because they have eschewed official
statistics in favour of observational methods, have been able
to peer behind this curtain and in doing so they have observed
a number of features of magistrates' justice which could not
have been revealed from a positivist study. In addition to
witnessing the fact that the vast majority of defendants in
magistrates' courts are working class(1), interactionist
studies have also been able to tell us a good deal about the
ways in which "justice" is routinely administered. A number of
studies have commented on the speed with which cases are dealt
with in the lower courts(2) whilst others have described ways
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in which magistrates' courts degrade and coerce defendants. A
particularly good example of the latter is provided by Pat
Carlen's study of a London magistrates' court. On the basis of
her observations she was able to show how routine procedures
in the courtroom may serve to debilitate defendants.
In magistrates' courts, where the vast majority of
defendants do not have a solicitor as a
'mouthpiece', defendants are set up in a guarded
dock and then, at a distance artificially stretched
beyond the familiar boundaries of face-to-face
communication, asked to describe or comment on
intimate details of their lives; details which do
not in themselves constitute infractions of any law
but which are open to public investigation once a
person has been accused of breaking the law. . ..
Further, during such sequences of interrogation,
defendants' embarrassed stuttering is often
aggravated by judicial violation of another
taken-for-granted conversational practice. For in
conversational social practice the chain-rule of
question-answer sequence is also accompanied by the
assumption that it is the interrogator who demands
an answer. In magistrates' courts, however,
defendants often find that they are continually
rebuked, either for not addressing their answers to
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the magistrate or for directing their answers to
their interrogators in such a way that the
magistrate cannot hear them. As a result, defendants
are often in the position of having to synchronise
their answers and stances in a way quite divorced
from the conventions of everyday life outside the
courtroom. . • •
For defendants who often do not immediately
distinguish between magistrate and clerk, for
defendants who do not comprehend the separate
symbolic functions of dock and witness box, for
defendants who may have already spent up to three
hours waiting in the squalid environs of the
courtroom, the surreal dimensions of meaning,
emanating from judicial exploitation of courtroom
placing and spacing, can have a paralysing effect.
P. Carlen Magistrates' Justice pp.23-24 (original
emphasis)
In the above passage Carlen is pointing to the fact that court
procedures which are familiar to regular court personnel may
contravene normal patterns of communication resulting in
confusion, bewilderment and possibly humiliation for the
defendant.(3) A little later she shows how the defendants'
presentational style may be further cramped by the battery of
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commands to which they were continually subjected.
All defendants are escorted into the courtroom by
the policeman calling the cases. Once the defendant
is in the dock the escort acts as a kind of personal
choreographer to him. He tells him when to stand up
and when to sit down (often in contradiction to the
magistrate's directions!), when to speak and when to
be quiet, when to leave the dock at the end of the
hearing. During the hearing the policeman can tell
the defendant to take his hands out of his pockets,
chewing-gum out of his mouth, his hat off his head
and the smile off his face. Thus even at the outset
a series of physical checks, aligned with a battery
of commands and counter-commands, inhibits the
defendant's presentational style. Once he is in the
distraught state of mind where he just 'wants to get
it over', judicial fears that he might slow down the
proceedings by being 'awkward' are diminished.
P. Carlen Magistrates' Justice p.29
In her work, Carlen has concentrated on the ways in which the
courtroom environment may intimidate defendants but, as
McBarnet has shown,(4) even when defendants are not intim-
idated in this way, courtroom procedures can still debilitate
defendants. McBarnet cites a number of cases from her research
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notes in which defendants were effectively prevented from
representing themselves in court because they did not under-
stand	 the	 formalities	 involved	 in	 conducting	 a
cross-examination(5) and others in which unrepresented defend-
ants were hampered in the presentation of their case by the
interruption and criticism from magistrates.(6) She also found
that competence on the part of defendants to conduct their own
cross-examination was likely to provoke suspicion i.e., it was
seen as evidence of criminality.(7)
Various studies have shown that the vast majority of
defendants in magistrates' courts are not represented(8) and,
therefore, these problems are likely to be commonplace but
those defendants who are legally represented also face
problems. Although they ought to benefit from the legal
competence and professional status of a solicitor or lawyer,
it has been found that defence solicitors may conspire with
the prosecution in what Blumberg describes as: "a large
variety of bureaucratically ordained and controlled 'work
crimes', short cuts, deviations, and outright rule violations
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adopted as court practice in order to meet production
norms."(9) The form that these court practices take includes
informal "chats" beforehand, tacit agreements that neither
defence counsel nor prosecutor should be too zealous in the
presentation of their case and the various forms of
plea-bargaining. (10)
When we put these findings together with the large numbers of
people dealt with by magistrates' courts,(11) the findings of
these observational studies raise seriOus questions about the
kind of justice that is being administered in English
magistrates' courts. The finding that so many people are
pleading guilty,(12) being sentenced and, in many cases being
sent to prison without the benefit of legal representation by
courts which coerce defendants does not fit with conventional
beliefs about the role of the trial in the British legal
system which usually involve the notion of two equal parties
battling before an independant judge. Observers of proceedings
in the magistrates' courts have consistently reported that
these beliefs do not match reality, and a number of them have
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commented on the "rough and ready kind of justice"
administered in the magistrates' courts.(13) However, although
these studies have been able to describe the nature of
magistrates' "justice", their observational methods have made
it difficult to explain them. This dilemma
	 is well
illustrated in Carlen's work. Having described some of the
ways that magistrates' courts degrade and coerce defendants
she wants to offer an explanation of why this situation
exists. She says:
For the defendant, it is not the world of Lucky Jim
which is actualised in the language and process of
the law but the legal reality of a systematically
criminalised and ideologically professionalised
capitalist society.
P. Carlen Magistrates' Justice p.95
Whilst we might sympathise with Carlen's insistence that we
must understand magistrates' courts and their administration
of justice in relation to their position in capitalist
society, she does not succeed in demonstrating this relation-
ship. The above remarks, together with other comments in a
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similar vein which are scattered throughout her book, are
mainly rhetorical. Here is a good example of an inter-
actionist with radical aspirations trapped within the limit-
ations of an observational study. Sitting in a courtroom for
six months enabled her to gather data on the interactive
processes that occur in magistrates' courts but this data
cannot be used to address questions about the structural
position of the magistrates' courts themselves. Such questions
must be addressed before the study commences and if - as has
invariably been the case with interactionist studies of magis-
trates' courts - they are not, the research is forced to take
the role of the magistrates and their courts for granted. Once
the study is underway, the researcher (as in Carlen's case)
may wish to question taken-for-granted assumptions about the
nature of the justice dispensed, but the data yielded from the
study can only describe the characteristics of the justice
that is administered in magistrates' courts - it cannot
explain why they take this form.
In fact, most researchers who have commented on the nature of
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magistrates' justice have not attempted to relate it to the
broader structure of society. Rather, their explanations have
been in terms of the "bureaucratic" pressures that exist in
the magistrates' courts and the informal practices which
regular court personnel have developed in order to cope with
them. Thus, the high proportion of guilty pleas has often been
explained in terms of the pressure which court personnel exert
on defendants to plead guilty. It is pointed out that when the
defence counsel and the prosecution strike a bargain to reduce
the sentence in return for a guilty plea they both stand to
gain from the transaction. The prosecution gain in so far as
the courts are able to process more cases and the defence
solicitors gain because guilty pleas shorten the length of the
'trial' thus enabling them to deal with more cases in each
session which, in turn, enables them to increase their
income. (14)
Although plea-bargaining has recieved considerable attention
in recent years, there are other dimensions to the operation
of organisational efficiency in the magistrates' court. For
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example, Bottoms and McLean suggest that opposition to bail is
often based on police convenience in pursuing enquiries rather
than reasons	 associated with the	 administration	 of
justice.(15) The Release Lawyers Group further suggest that
organisational pressures affect the way that the everyday
business of the magistrates' court is conducted.
Where cases are dealt with by magistrates' courts,
overburdened lists frequently cause both the bench
and the clerk to try to hurry things along. Most of
us can recall occasions when our questions to
witnesses, submissions or addresses to the court
have been cut short by impatient magistrates or
their equally impatient clerks. Evidence of the
cursory way in which some of the lower courts
conduct their business can be found in the Cobden
Trust Report 'Bail Or Custody' (King 1971) where the
average time for bail applications was found to be
three minutes, and where many unrepresented def-
endants were ushered away to prisons or remand
centres without having uttered a single word in
court. We have experienced cases where magistrates
have refused requests for short adjournments to
enable the defendant to find vital witnesses. One of
the solicitors among us reports an incident when,
after waiting until 1 o'clock to be heard, he and
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his client were hurried into a back court and he was
told by the clerk that he had "15 minutes flat" for
the case to be heard. On another occasion at the
same court the magistrate passed sentence on the
accused before he had heard any plea of mitigation
from her lawyer."
The Lawyers Release Group	 Guilty Until Proved
Innocent p.19.
Observational studies of magistrates' courts have provided us
with ample evidence of the ways in which regular court
personnel routinely adopt informal procedures in order to make
the administration of 'justice' more 'efficient'. In doing so,
they have demonstrated the importance of bureaucratic
pressures but there is a major problem with this kind of
explanation residing in the distinction that they make -
either implicitly or explicitly - between the Due Process
Model and the Crime Control Model of the criminal process.
These terms derive from an article by the American jurist
Herbert Packer.(16) In the article, he describes the Due
Process Model as an 'obstacle course' resulting from the
belief that penal sanctions are seen as the heaviest
- 56 -
deprivation that a government can inflict upon individuals.
"The aim of the process is at least as much to protect the
factually innocent as it is to convict the factually
guilty."(17) Thus, the criminal process must be subjected to
controls and safeguards involving the assumption of innocence
and the undesirability of error. It is not sufficient to show
that, in all probability, the defendant did factually what
he/she is said to have done:
Instead he is to be held guilty if and only if these
factual determinations are made in procedurally
regular fashion and by authorities acting within
competences duly allocated to them. Furthermore, he
is not to be held guilty, even though the factual
determination is or might be adverse to him, if
various rules designed to safeguard the integrity of
the process are not given effect.
H.Packer Two Models of the Criminal Process p.16
The Crime Control Model, on the other hand, resembles a
conveyor belt. It operates on the presumption of guilt rather
than innocence and starts from the belief that "the repression
of criminal conduct is by far the most important function to
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be performed by the criminal process".(18) In order to achieve
this goal, "primary attention must be paid to the efficiency
with which the criminal process operates to screen suspects,
determine guilt, and secure appropriate dispositions of
persons convicted of crime."(19) Thus, Packer points out that
this model places a high premium on speed and finality.
Speed,	 in turn, depends on informality and
uniformity; finality depends on minimizing the
occasions for challenge. The process must not be
cluttered with ceremonious rituals that do not
advance the progress of a case. Facts can be
established more quickly through interrogation in a
police station than through the formal process of
examination and cross-examination in a court; it
follows that extra-judicial processes should be
preferred to judicial processes, informal to formal
operations. Informality is not enough; there must
also be uniformity. Routine stereotyped procedures
are essential if large numbers are being handled.
The model that will operate successfully on these
presuppositions must be an administrative, almost a
managerial, model. The image that comes to mind is
an assembly line or conveyor belt down which moves
an endless stream of cases, never stopping, carrying
the cases to workers who stand at fixed stations and
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who perform on each case as it comes by the same
small but essential operation that brings it one
step closer to being a finished product, or, to
exchange the metaphor for reality, a closed file.
H.Packer Two Models of the Criminal Process p.11
Packer concludes his article by asserting that although the
criminal process in the U.S.A. is based on a Crime Control
Model it is moving towards a Due Process Model. Those British
researchers who have utilised Packer's ideas have generally
arrived at the opposite conclusion about the English system -
i.e. that the rules of due process are being undermined by
bureaucratic, crime control considerations. By describing the
various informal practices that are routinely adopted in
police stations and courtrooms and pointing to the
bureaucratic motives which underly them, these authors
invariably create the impression that, in doing this, court
personnel are deviating from due process.
The basic problem with this kind of astructural and
ahistorical analysis is that it simply asserts the belief that
the English legal system is based on due process. This is true
- 59 -
even for the most sophisticated of these authors. For example,
in their concluding chapter, Bottoms and McLean discuss
Packer's article and suggest that the early stages of the
criminal process - i.e. those controlled by the police - fit
with the Crime Control Model. However, in order to explain the
later stages they introduce a third model - the Liberal
Bureaucratic Model. This model rejects the view that
repression of criminal conduct is the most important function
of the criminal process, but it also suggests that the formal
adjudicative processes must have a limit. In other words, this
third model involves a compromise between the obstacle course
of the Due Process Model and a recognition of the necessity of
dealing quickly with cases in the lower courts. The
introduction of this third model is an interesting innovation
in that it highlights the subtle differences between police
and magistrates' courts, but it does not avoid the common trap
of reifying the Due Process Model. Bottoms and McLean's use of
the Liberal Bureaucratic Model still involves the implicit
assumption, inherent in virtually all observational studies,
that the English legal system is based on due process.
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Towards A Structural Analysis Of Magistrates' Courts 
The astructural bias of interactionist studies and their
tendency to overstress the autonomy of court personnel has
also been noted by Doreen McBarnet. Like us, she acknowledges
the fact that the "microsociological side of the coin is both
valid and important" but she correctly stresses that "it is
not the only one."
There is a tendency to present formal rules and
actual behaviour as mutually exclusive, but reality
is never quite so simple. Just because people co not
act out their roles to the letter, may "make" rather
than "take' them, it does not follow that they do
not act them out at all. One does not need to fall
into naive role theory where 'ought" and 'is" are
assimilated to recognise that people are constrained
in socially - and legally - defined situations. The
judge observed summing up:
"I have no alternative but to find you guilty as
charged."
or even more poignantly:
"With great regret I must find this case not
proven."
,is not merely exhibiting Sartre's mauvais foi' but
reminding us that if he is no norm-following
homonculus, neither is he a free agent in the court.
D.	 McBarnet	 Pre-Trial	 Procedures	 and	 the
Construction of Conviction pp.176-177
In her work McBarnet has documented these links between the
formal rules and actual behaviour. Thus, she shows how the
formal law militates against pleas of not guilty. She notes
that a plea of not guilty can present practical problems for
the defendant (eg., loss of earnings, arranging time off work
whilst not wishing the employer to discover the real reason
for one's absence). Defendants who manage to overcome these
problems are not eligible for compensation if they are subse-
quently found not guilty. "On the contrary, there is provision
in England, though it is rarely exercised, for the costs of
the prosecution to be awarded against a defendant who is found
guilty after pleading not guilty and wasting the courts
time."(20) She also points out that, whereas the prosecutor
can accept the change to a guilty plea at any time without
explanation, there are structural obstacles to altering a
guilty plea to one of not guilty. This is only allowed at the
discretion of the court if an adequate case is made by the
accused. (21)
Thus, McBarnet is able to show that the actions of police
officers and solicitors in encouraging defendants to plead
guilty are not a straightforward deviation from the due
process of law. The formal law itself places the defendant
under pressure to plead guilty. McBarnet goes on to show that
a similar situation exists when it comes to the presentation
of the case. The mere fact that the accused is defending
against, rather than instigating, the charge means that the
defence has to be constructed within the framework of relevant
issues (in both common sense and legal terms) set up by the
charge.(22) The prosecution are empowered to alter the charge
before the trial which means that the defendant may arrive in
court without knowing either the charge or the case against
him/her. However, McBarnet points out that the same rules do
not apply to the defence case which is governed by the
doctrine of "no suprise". This is particularly true in the
case of special defences (eg., alibis, self-defence, insanity,
and, incrimination of a specific person) when the prosecutor
must be given prior notice.(23) The fact that the prosecution
is backed by the resources of the state also means that the
prosecution has an advantage in the collection of evidence.
Although there is some exchange of evidence, the defence does
not have a right of access to prosecution evidence and, as a
result: "Information is thus filtered into as unambiguous
account as possible, and points that raise doubts, useful to
the accused but available only to the police may never come to
light." (24)
Because of these structural factors, McBarnet suggests that
"even with the best of lawyers and unlimited funds the accused
could not stand in the same position as the crown."(25)
Nevertheless, as she shows elsewhere, the ability to afford
good legal representation can make a difference. Lawyers and
solicitors are trained in the techniques of cross-examination
whereas the vast majority of defendants are ignorant of the
niceties of courtroom procedure. This technical competence
combined with the fact that magistrates are likely to show
more respect towards their professional status(26) means that
solicitors or barristers are likely to be more effective in
the presentation of a case. However, legal representation is
still the exception in magistrates' courts and thus, not even
this limited degree of protection is afforded to the majority
of defendants.
The fact that so few people have legal representation in
magistrates' courts has frequently been explained in terms of
magisterial discretion in the allocation of legal aid.
However, as McBarnet points out:
This is not just the product of magisterial
discretion - as suggested by those who note that
applications are decided on by magistrates and
concentrate on the variations between them.
Selective criteria are set down by the Home Office
in a circular of 1972 (No.237) which stated that
legal aid should be provided according to the
likelihood of the defendant being sentenced to
imprisonment. This means that legal aid is more
likely to be awarded in the higher courts where the
scale of punishments is more severe. What this
ignores though, is that previous convictions have a
cumulative effect that increases the likelihood of
imprisonment even on summary offences, so that it is
important even by the criteria laid down for even
first offenders on petty charges to be represented.
D.	 McBarnet	 Pre-Trial	 Procedures	 and	 the
Construction of Conviction p.188
This tendency of the formal law to deny legal aid to
defendants in magistrates' courts is no accident. The Widgery
Committee on legal aid insisted that a professional lawyer was
necessary in the higher courts on the grounds that:
A layman, however competent, can rarely be relied on
to possess the skill and knowledge necessary to put
forward the defence effectively tried on indictment
without the guidance of a lawyer.
The Widgery Committee, 1966, p.79 Quoted in D.
McBarnet Conviction p.125
The same Committee denied that a professional lawyer was
normally necessary in the lower courts "implying that points
of law, tracing and interviewing witnesses, or engaging in
expert cross-examination were not normally involved."(27) Such
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a distinction could only be valid if the rules of procedure
were essentially different, but this is not the case.
The trial, and with it the method of proof and the
criteria of proof, remain exactly the same. There is
the same adversarial structure, the same structure
of proof by examination, cross-examination, the sage
requirement of direct witnesses to provide that
proof, the same rules of evidence, and the same
requirement that the procedures be rigidly adhered
to. These are not layman's courts but highly
legalised proceedings.
D. McBarnet Conviction p.125
Thus, the failure to provide legal representation an the
magistrates' courts does not result purely from the exercise
of discretion, nor does it reflect procedural differences
between these courts and the higher courts- 	 ather, it
reflects a clear legal policy to maintain the particular form
of 'justice' that is administered by magistrates courts.
Although we have concentrated on the lack of legal represent-
ation, McBarnet cites a number of further examples to show how
the formal law reinforces the informal practices that have
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been identified by observational studies. The importance of
her work on magistrates' courts is twofold. Firstly, she
provides a thoroughgoing critique of interactionist studies by
showing that their assumptions about the nature of the formal
law are based upon a mistaken presumption of due process. She
shows that the distinction that is invariably made between due
process and crime control is a false dichotomy.
Actually examining the rules of due process in
statutes and precedents indicates that they are not
dichotomies at all. Judges and politicians may deal
in the rhetoric of civil rights and due process, but
the actual rules they create for law enforcement and
the policies they adopt on sanctioning police
malpractices are less about civil rights than about
smoothing the path to conviction, less about due
process than post-hoc acceptance of police
activities as justifying themselves. Thus a good
many of the practices in criminal justice described
as informal perversions of the formal rules are in
fact allowed, facilitated or upheld in the formal
rules of statute and precedent.
• • • In short the dichotomies organising criminal
justice research are false. The operation of the law
is not a subversion of the substance of the law but
exactly what one would expect it to produce; the law
in action is only too close a parallel to the law in
the books; due process is for crime control.
D. McBarnet False Dichotomies In Criminal Justice 
Research pp.30-31
Secondly, she highlights the fact that the English legal
system is composed of two distinct tiers which take signif-
icantly different forms.
One, the higher courts, is for public consumption,
the arena where the ideology of justice is put on
display. The other, the lower courts, deliberately
structured in defiance of justice, is concerned less
with subtle ideological messages than with direct
control. The latter is closeted from the public eye
by the ideology of triviality, so the higher courts
alone feed into the public image of what the law
does and how it operates. But the higher courts deal
with only 2 per cent of the cases that pass through
the criminal courts. Almost all criminal law is
acted out in the lower courts without traditional
due process. But of course what happens in the lower
courts is not only trivial, it is not really law. So
the position is turned on its head. The 98 per cent
becomes the exception to the rule of 'real law' and
the working of the law comes to be typified not by
its routine nature, but by its atypical, indeed
exceptional, High Court form. Between them the
ideologies of triviality and legal irrelevance
accomplish the remarkable feats of defining 98 per
cent of court cases not only as exceptions to the
rule of due process, but also of no public interest
whatsoever. The traditional ideology of justice can
thus survive the contradiction that the summary
courts blatantly ignore it every day and that they 
were set up for precisely this purpose.
D. McBarnet Conviction p.153 (my emphasis)
McBarnet's achievement has been to show us that the English
legal system has been constructed in a way that has
deliberately created lower courts designed for speed and
'efficiency' without regard to the spirit of legality.
However, her work leaves unanswered the question of why
magistrates' courts have taken this particular form. McBarnet
raises this question when concluding an early article. She
says:
The gap between rhetoric and reality is not just one
between formal equality and situational inequality,
between the law in the books and the law in action,
but a gap between the rhetoric of justice and the
reality of criminal procedure: it is a gap within 
the law in the books, which has to be traced not to
the petty administrators of the law but to the
people with the power to make it - the judicial and
the political elite of the state. In this way
criminal procedure provides a direct entree into the
politics of law.
D.	 McBarnet	 Pre-Trial	 Procedures	 and	 the
Construction	 of	 Conviction	 p.199	 (original
emphasis)
In this passage McBarnet recognises the importance of under-
standing the judicial policy making process that has created
the modern form of the magistrates' court but her thoughts on
this issue are extremely vague. In concluding a later article
on the police, she clarifies her position a little:
If the contradictions between rhetoric and practice
in law enforcement cannot simply be explained away
as the unintended consequences of petty officials,
then we are faced with the contradictions within the
core of the state between the ideology and the
structure of the law. ... Probing how and why
notions like legality and justice are constructed
currently and historically provides a case study in
the wider issue of the sources and mechanics of
dominant ideology.
D. McBarnet The Police and the State p.213
Here again McBarnet recognises the importance of the question
of why magistrates' courts have taken their particular form
but her thoughts are still not clearly formulated. McBarnet
returns to this theme again in concluding her 'False
Dichotomies' article where she says:
But bringing the law in as an explanatory factor in
the operation of criminal justice is not enough. We
must examine the assumptions and purposes underlying
criminal justice itself in terms of its social,
historical and political basis, in relation to
class, power, interests and ideologies; in short, we
must apply the questions and concepts hitherto
reserved for the analysis of specific laws to the
legal system per se.
D. McBarnet False Dichotomies in Criminal Justice 
Research p.31
This is her clearest statement of the importance of devel-
oping an analysis of why magistrates' courts have taken their
particular form but, as in here other articles, it is only
raised in the form of a conclusion. She tells us where to look
for an answer to this question - i.e., in the historical
development of the magistracy - but she has not addressed
herself to it in any systematic way. In her book she does
include a four page history of summary jurisdiction but this
is not sufficient to adequately outline the development of
magistrates' courts as a court of summary justice let alone
analyse this phenomenon. If we are to understand why the
magistrates' court has evolved as the second tier of the legal
system dealing with the vast bulk of criminal cases in a
manner which compromises the spirit of legality to allow for
an administratively efficient means of crime control, we must
analyse the transformation of the magistracy that took place
in the mid-C19th in much more detail. McBarnet has demon-
strated that the nature of magistrates' justice is a product
of the structure of the legal system rather than merely
resulting from the actions of court personnel, but to answer
the question of why this is the case, we have to examine the
Cl9th origins of the modern form of the English magistracy.
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Summary
In this chapter we have seen that observational studies have
been able to gather information on more than just sentencing
decisions and that they have exposed some important features
of the nature of magistrates' justice such as: the speed of
trials, the high number of guilty pleas and the general
coercive nature of the magistrates' court. However, although
they have been able to describe the ways in which legal
proceedings within the magistrates' court diverge from the
spirit of legality, the fact that they have contained them-
selves within the courtroom has led them to explain the
inequalities that they have observed as 'irregularities' or
deviations from what they have supposed to be the true nature
of British justice. We have seen, through our examination of
McBarnet's work, that this dichotomy between formal equality
and situational inequality is, in fact, false and that the
procedural rules that govern the administration of proceedings
in magistrates' courts actually reinforce many of the
'irregularities' that have been assumed to result from the
exercise of discretion by court personnel.
However, although she raises the question many times, McBarnet
has not explained why magistrates' courts have taken the form
of crime control rather than due process. This is the
historical question that lies at the centre of this thesis
but, before we embark upon our survey of the development of
the English magistracy, we will first consider, in the
following chapter, some of the historical approaches that
might inform our analysis.
CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN THE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE ENGLISH MAGISTRACY
Conventional Histories Of The English Magistracy
A number of histories of the magistracy have already been
published and it may be asked "why do we need another?" The
answer to this question lies in the nature of these histories.
Almost without exception, these conventional histories have
confined themselves to a description of the development of the
magistracy. Thus, although we have drawn upon the information
that such studies have generated, they do not directly address
the question of why magistrates' courts have emerged in their
particular form. Indeed, they have not questioned the nature
of justice administered in magistrates' courts, but have
simply taken it for granted that they conform to the
principles of due process. This assumption appears to be so
deeply ingrained in their work that it is rarely made explicit
but it can be seen in the following passage from Bertram
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Osborne's concluding remarks about the 1848 Summary
Jurisdiction Act. He says:
One of the most noteworthy results secured by the
co-ordinated, simplified and more orderly
proceedings of the Justices, was to make possible
the tremendous expansion of summary jurisdiction
which developed during the nineteenth century, and
still continues. In a recent year, out of a total of
over 800,000 convictions for the whole country all
but 21,000 were dealt with in Petty Sessions. It is
fair to say that this astonishing achievement, could
hardly have been accomplished but for the
outstanding efforts of the architects of the 1848
legislation. Perhaps they builded better than they
knew.
B. Osborne	 Justices	 Of	 The Peace	 1361-1848 
pp.227-228 (my emphasis)
In this passage what emerges is simply an admiration of this
legislation and the fact that it enabled magistrates' courts
to make the transition to courts of summary jurisdiction.
There are no questions raised about the nature of the summary
justice that is administered in magistrates' courts and we
must assume, from the general tone, that Osborne does not see
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this as problematic. Neither he, nor any of the other conven-
tional histories of the English magistracy question the nature
of summary jurisdiction in magistrates' courts. Given that
this is the case, we should not expect them to offer an answer
to the question of why magistrates' courts have taken their
particular form. In fact, these histories are little more than
teleological accounts and they provide no analysis at all of
the development of magistrates' courts. Not only do they
assume that magistrates' courts operate on the basis of due
process, but often implicit behind their apparently neutral
description is an assumption that these courts are part of a
legal system which represents a high point of "civilisation".
This idealised view of the English legal system is then taken
as a benchmark with which to assess all previous stages in the
history of the magistracy. Each development is thus portrayed
as an inevitable step towards the end product - as society
reaches a higher stage of 'civilisation' so magistrates'
courts and other parts of the legal system are 'reformed' to
reflect this 'progress' until we reach the present in which
the modern magistrates' court is assumed to be as close as
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possible to perfection. Again, Osborne's discussion of the
1848 Summary Jurisdiction Act will serve as an example. Having
outlined the details of the legislation, he says:
It is not possible to exaggerate the importance and
significance of the legislation of 1848. Its passage
into law was a stupendous achievement. No longer was
it necessary for Justices and those who appeared
before them to try to find their way through the
by-ways and by-lanes of centuries' old statutes and
judicial decisions, criss-crossing each other in a
most bewildering manner, often well-nigh impassable
in the mass of undergrowth that obscured them. They
were now declared unfit for further traffic, sealed
off under the closing order imposed by the new
legislation. To take their place there was now a
great highway, constructed with much labour and
considerable ingenuity, mainly from material
salvaged from the old pathways and passages, along
which traffic was able to move with a speed and
regularity never before attainable.
Monumental as was the great engineering structure
built in 1848, it was by no means complete; the
limitations imposed by the use of material from its
discarded predecessors meant that many desirable
changes were deferred. The public notification of
the dates of meetings and the prohibition of
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sittings of Justices other than in prescribed
buildings - these are two examples of amendments
effected by legislation of later years. But these
and other changes serve only to emphasise the
achievement of the builders of the remarkable
construction that took shape a little more than a
century ago.
B. Osborne	 Justices
	 Of	 The Peace	 1361-1848 
pp.226 -227
We can see in this passage the way that Osborne interprets the
legislation passed in 1848 from a standpoint which takes the
modern magistracy for granted. It does not occur to him to ask
why these changes were implemented. The answer to such a
question appears to him to be 'obvious' - to clear up the
confusion created by the mass of old statutes. Instead, he
focusses on the achievements of the individuals who drafted
the legislation. This is a fairly typical example of the
teleological nature of the conventional histories, not only of
the magistracy but of the legal system in general. They accept
unquestioningly that the British legal system and its const-
ituent parts serve the interests of society as a whole in the
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best way possible. This obviates the need to explain why it
has arisen in its particular form and they have been content,
instead, to document how it occurred by describing in detail
the sequence of legislative and policy changes leading to the
creation of the modern system.
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the processes that
produced the English magistracy in its modern form. Our
argument will be that the form taken by the modern magist-
rates' court is inextricably linked with the emergence of
industrial capitalism and the particular class structure of
nineteenth century England. However, before turning to this
historical analysis, it is necessary to discuss some of the
methodological issues involved in such a project.
Research method
The major concern of this thesis is with the transformation
that occurred in the nineteenth century but, in order to
understand this more fully, I have also included a sketch of
the earlier history of the English magistracy. These two parts
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are not of equal importance and I have, therefore approached
them in different ways.
The examination of the early history of the magistracy has
been included both to provide an understanding of the develop-
ment of the gentry as an agrarian capitalist class and to
trace the significance of the institution of the magistracy as
an element of their power base. This helps provide the context
in which the Cl9th conflicts over the functions of the magist-
racy occurred but it is not of central importance to this
thesis. Partly for this reason but also because of the immense
time-span involved - six or seven centuries elapsed between
the inception of the magistracy and its transformation in the
nineteenth century (1) - I have had to rely on secondary
sources. As a consequence, the arguments contained in Chapters
Four and Five are more tentative than those in the later
chapters but the existing historical research appears to have
adequately demonstrated the major features to which I wish to
draw attention.
The study of the changes that occurred during the nineteenth
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century posed more difficult methodological problems. There is
existing material on county government, policing and, to a
lesser extent, magistrates' legal function which I have been
able to draw upon. However, it has largely been addressed to
different questions without a central focus on the functions
of the magistracy and it was therefore necessary to turn to
primary sources.
Social historians concerned with law and order issues have
produced some useful work based upon historical sources such
as court records, Home Office correspondence, newspaper
reports, military despatches, etc.(2) To have conducted
research of this kind would have been beyond the competence of
what is essentially a sociological study. Moreover, it would
not have provided the kind of evidence required for this
thesis. The historians' work has been valuable in providing
information on the way in which magistrates carried out their
legal and policing functions but, by its very nature, it has
taken these functions for granted. This is not intended as a
criticism. The point is simply that we are concerned with
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different questions which require a different kind of
evidence. The transformation of the English magistracy took
place, not at the local level within the courtroom or on the
street controlling crowds (although it had implications for
both) but, in the Houses of Parliament through legislation.
For this reason, the choice to concentrate on the material
contained within the nineteenth century Parliamentary Debates
(together with related Bills, Acts, Commissions, etc. and the
published work of some influential "reformers" such as
Fielding, Colquhoun, Chadwick and Eardley Wilmot) (3) appeared
to be a fairly obvious one.
However, that is not to say that it has been without its
difficulties. Firstly, there is the problem of "selectivity".
Although we have looked at over 300 volumes of Parliamentary
Debates containing a mass of material, only a small part of it
is referred to in the following chapters. There are two
problems here: How does the reader know that I have selected
the appropriate debates?, and; How does he or she know that I
have identified the most significant extracts from speeches?
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The answer to both of these questions is, of course, that the
reader cannot know for certain without repeating the study.
However, this is true of most social science research and, in
this respect, the choice of the Parliamentary Debates has the
advantage of allowing for the possibility of future
researchers conducting similar research projects to test the
interpretation of the material offered in this thesis.
A second set of difficulties, which impose more serious limit-
ations, arise from the fact that the Parliamentary Debates
only provide information about what occurred within the
parliamentary arena. Again, there are two clearly identif-
iable problems here. Firstly, it has meant that I have only
been able to identify the discourse of the gentry and the
bourgeoisie. The working class, who for the vast majority of
the period with which we are concerned had no parliamentary
voice, appear largely as the objects of repression rather than
as the subjects of history. As a result this thesis runs the
risk of creating the impression - so trenchantly criticised by
E.P. Thompson - that the working class have no place in the
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process of history (4). However, this is not necessarily the
case. The process through which the modern magistracy emerged
took place within parliament and it was not, therefore,
directly influenced by the working class but this does not
mean that it was not indirectly influenced by working class
protest.(5) Nor does it deny an important role for the working
class in the reaction to legislative change.(6)
Secondly, it is clear from reading the Parliamentary Debates
that, at certain points, decisions were taken 'behind the
scenes'. A good example of this occurred when Sclater-Booth
withdrew his County Government Bill (1878) and replaced it
with the less radical County Boards Bill (1879). In intro-
ducing the latter, he said that he had been influenced by
communications from magistrates who were opposed to the prop-
osed fusion of county boards and quarter sessions.(7) In this
instance, and others, the Parliamentary Debates provide an
indication of what occurred in the extra-parliamentary arena
but it also raises the logical possibility (or, indeed,
probability) that other such decisions were taken which are
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not manifest in the Parliamentary Debates. The failure to take
account of them imposes a limitation on the arguments that are
presented in later chapters but the nature of such decisions
makes their systematic study very difficult. They are likely
only to be revealed piecemeal by other historical invest-
igations and we can only await the outcome of such research to
see if it seriously invalidates my analysis. All that can be
said at present is that, on most of the issues with which I am
concerned, there appears to have been a full discussion within
the Parliamentary Debates and there is no reason to suppose
that this will be the case.
A third set of problems concerns the limitations of the
material contained within the Parliamentary Debates them-
selves. There were occasions, notably the 1848 Summary
Jurisdiction Act, when proposed legislation elicited little or
no discussion.(8) If this had been the normal pattern, then
this research project would have been impossible. However, it
was not and the majority of measures, particularly those which
were passed into law, were debated a good deal more fully. The
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major arguments for and against the changes that we discuss
recur throughout the Parliamentary Debates and in this
context, the lack of discussion on any specific proposal
becomes, in itself, an object of research. Thus, although my
interpretation of these issues is a little more speculative, I
have nevertheless been able to offer an explanation of them in
terms of the wider discourse contained within the Parlia-
mentary Debates.
A second problem resulting from the inherent limitations of
the Parliamentary Debates concerns the attribution of meaning
to statements made in Parliament: How do we know that when
politicians say that they are supporting or opposing a measure
for a particular reason that this is, in fact, their true
reason? It may be that monetary interests are concealed, or
that debates are dominated by concerns about immediate events
and the deeper issues therefore fail to surface, or it may be
that an advocate of a particular position chooses to couch his
arguments in terms that he believes will be most likely to
influence his colleagues. For all of these reasons, and more,
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we cannot assume that parliamentary speeches necessarily
reflect the contributors' true motives.
It is important to point out here that, even without knowing
the "true" motives of the speakers, statements made in the
Parliamentary Debates may take on a significance of their own
in terms of their ideological content. We will see later in
this chapter that the conflict of ideals was an important
dimension to the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the
gentry in Cl9th England. By analysing what was actually said 
in support of, or in opposition to, the various proposals it
is possible to assess the growth or decline in the signif-
icance of particular ideological positions and to comment upon
the changing nature of the discourse of reform. Nevertheless,
the problem of attributing meaning remains. If I had set out
to produce a body of absolute knowledge then this would
present insurmountable difficulties to my project, but this
has not been my intention. That is not to say that my version
is therefore arbitrary. What I am offering is an interpret-
ation of a particular historical process, whereby the signif-
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icance that I attach to particular speeches is supported by
cross-referencing to other debates, Parliamentary Reports,
published
	
contributions	 from	 outside	 parliament	 and,
previously published historical research. Thus, although I
have attributed motives to the participants and imposed
meanings upon the debates, the rigour of the research upon
which my interpretation is based is testable.
There is also a second sense in which my version of events is
not arbitrary. As with any historical or sociological study,
the researcher brings with him or her a conceptual framework
which structures their interpretation of the evidence. It is
incumbent upon us to attempt to clarify our key concepts at
the outset so that they too can be subjected to scrutiny. The
central argument of this thesis is that the form taken by the
modern magistracy was a product of the particular social form-
ation of nineteenth century English capitalism. In the follow-
ing section, therefore, I will outline at some length the
class concepts that underpin the discussion in subsequent
chapters.
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The Concept Of Class 
If the term class had an unambiguous meaning I could simply
reproduce it here and the reader would then understand what is
meant when I say that I am offering a class analysis of the
emergence of the modern magistracy. Unfortunately, this is not
the case. The concept of class has been used in many varied
ways within sociological analysis and research and I must,
therefore, attempt to clarify both my use of "class" as an
analytical concept and my understanding of the particular
"class formation" of nineteenth century England.
As a starting point I can say that I am using class in the
Marxist sense of conflicting groups defined in terms of the
ownership of the means of production. However, in view of the
many different interpretations of Marx's work, this statement
is far from adequate. In any case, my use of class concepts is
not dogmatic and it can best be unravelled through a critical
discussion of the ways in which it has been used by others.
An increasingly popular use of class which can be quickly
dismissed is that embodied in the Registrar General's Classif-
- 91 -
ication which divides occupations into six or seven bands
according to their perceived social status. Although this has
been utilised by some sociological research to produce useful
empirical evidence of inequalities in life chances in employ-
ment, education, income, health, etc., this has been at the
expense of an impoverished conceptualisation of class. Insofar
as these studies employ a concept of class at all it is
reduced to the social status of occupations. Even this is
unclear because no criteria are offered to explain why there
should be six or seven categories rather than any other
number. In practice, class ceases to be an analytical tool and
becomes, instead, an empirical category - an operationalised
"variable" - to be measured.
A more sophisticated usage of class can be found in the
Weberian sociological tradition. Max Weber's views on the
concept of class, like much of the rest of his work, are
underpinned by a rejection of the crude economic determinism
of the Second International. The primary thrust of his argu-
ment is that economic position does not automatically trans-
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late into political power. Hence the linkage of his analysis
of class to the possibility of power being based upon status
groupings or political parties.(9) However, his anti-
determinism and rejection of a base/superstructure model also
profoundly influenced his formulation of the concept of class.
He wishes to retain the idea of class as an economic category
but he does this by positing a separation of the social and
economic orders and narrowly defining the latter in terms of
consumption as "the way in which economic goods and services
are distributed and used."(10) For Weber, a person's 'class
situation' is determined by their market position which he
defines as the ownership or non-ownership of 'property'. This
is subdivided into the legal ownership of property and,
services that can be offered in the market. On this basis,
Weber argues that capitalist societies are composed of three
broad classes: the dominant entrepreneurial and propertied
groups; the middle class, consisting of petty bourgeois,
propertyless white collar workers, technicians and intell-
igentsia, and; the manual working class.
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The major strengths of the Weberian position are that it gives
some purchase on the nature of power and conflict and that
class retains its purpose as a conceptual tool for the
analysis of capitalist society. However, although Weber is
surely correct to reject crude economic determinism, his
formulation of the concept of class represents an unnecessary
over-reaction which loses some of the advantages of Marx's
original analysis. Superficially, Weber's model may appear to
be essentially similar to that offered by Marx, with the
simple addition of a middle class to reflect changes in the
occupational structure since the time of Marx's writing.
However, this appearance masks a fundamental difference in the
way that the two men conceive of the class structure in capit-
alist society. Marx's model is inherently dynamic in that it
portrays classes as mutually dependent based upon exploit-
ative production relations and characterised by conflict. By
equating 'class situation' with 'market situation' (11), Weber
loses this dynamic quality and presents us, instead, with a
static model of the class structure in which classes exist but
not in direct relation to each other. Thus, although Weber
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attempts to retain the notion of class struggle, it can have
little meaning within his model since he offers no analysis of
the material basis of such conflict.
It is because Webers analysis portrays an intrinsically
static view of class that I wish to reject it in favour of a
Marxist usage. Nevertheless, Weber's work points to a number
of important issues involved in the use of the concept of
class which require further discussion. Within contemporary
sociological analysis attention has focussed on the question
of where to draw the boundary between the working class and
the middle class.(12) However, since these debates are
primarily concerned with the analysis of class structures in
the later C2Oth, I will not follow them here.(13) For present
purposes it is more important to explore further the issues
with which Weber began concerning the relationship between the
economic and social orders. I have already expressed my lack
of sympathy with crude versions of economic determinism. Now I
want to attempt to clarify my position on the relationship
between the economic and the political, objective and
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subjective dimensions of class, etc.. To do this, I will turn
to recent debates amongst historians which have been addressed
to precisely these issues.
The central figure in the historians' debates is E.P.
Thompson. His starting point is similar to Weber's in that he
rejects those conceptions of class which portray class
consciousness and class struggle as inevitably determined by
the economic base of society. However, whereas Weber rejected
a Marxist framework and attempted to formulate an alternative
conception of the class structure of capitalism, Thompson
offers a "Marxist" analysis of the subjective dimension of
class. He argues that class is essentially an historical
concept in the sense that it is concerned with social
processes that occur over time in a largely unpredictable
manner. It is for this reason that he attacks theoretical
models "that are supposed to give us objective determinants of
class".(14) This led him to make the following statement in
his Preface to 'The Making Of The English Working Class':
I do not see class as a 'structure', nor even as a
'category', but as something which in fact happens
(and can be shown to have happened) in human
relationships.
E.P. Thompson The Making Of The English Working
Class p.9
His objections to structural analyses of class are more
fully elaborated in his later critique of Althusserian
Marxism when he says:
It is the misfortune of Marxist historians (it is
certainly their misfortune today) that certain of
their concepts are common currency in a wider
intellectual universe, are adopted in other discip-
lines, which impose their own logic upon them and
reduce them to static, a-historical categories. No
historical category has been more misunderstood,
tormented, transfixed, and de-historicised than the
category of social class; a self-defining histor-
ical formation, which men and women make out of
their own experience of struggle, has been reduced
to a static category, or an effect of an ulterior
structure, of which men are not the makers but the
vectors.
E.P. Thompson The Poverty Of Theory p.238
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Allied
	 to	 this	 attack on
	 "unhistorical	 theory-
mongering" (15),
	
is	 his	 passionate	 abhorance	 of
historical determinism and his insistence upon the
peculiarities of the historical development of specific
social formations.
[For] historical explanation discloses not how
history must have eventuated but why it eventuated
in this way and not in other ways; that process is
not arbitrary but has its own regularity and
rationality; that certain kinds of event (political,
economic, cultural) have been related, not in any
way one likes, but in particular ways and within
determinate fields of possibility; that certain
social formations are - not governed by "law" nor
are they "effects" of a static structural theorem -
but are characterised by determinate relations and
by a particular logic of process.
E.P. Thompson	 The Poverty Of Theory	 p.242
(original emphasis)
I, too, would want to reject models which portray class
in purely static terms or which suggest an inevitable
unravelling of historical processes. I am also mindful
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of Thompson's reminder of the dangers of abstract
theorising which loses sight of the importance of
concrete class struggles. Nevertheless, I cannot fully
accept the alternative offered by Thompson because he is
not, in fact, rejecting particular models but all
attempts to provide a theoretical model of the class
structure of capitalist society. He professes to offer a
dialectical view in which classes are both made and make
themselves. However, if we look more closely at what he
is saying, we see that he only offers an analysis of the
latter whilst completely ignoring the former. To
misappropriate one of his own terms, what he offers is
'class struggle without class".(16) This can be seen most
clearly in his polemic against Althusser which const-
itutes the most thorough formulation of his position.
Class formations (I have argued) arise at the inter-
section of determination and self-activity: the
working class "made itself as much as it was made."
We cannot put "class" here and "class conscious-
ness" there, as two separate entities, the one
sequential upon the other, since both must be taken
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together - the experience of determination, and the
"handling" of this in conscious ways. Nor can we
deduce class from a static "section" (since it is a
becoming over time), nor as a function of the mode
of production, since class formations and class
consciousness (while subject to determinate
pressures) eventuate in an open-ended process of
relationship - of struggle with other classes - over
time.
E.P. Thompson	 The Poverty Of Theory	 p.298
(original emphasis)
Here Thompson starts by stressing the dialectical nature
of class formation but his elaboration reveals the way in
which he reduces class to its subjective dimension of
experience and consciousness.
What is missing of course are the determinant cond-
itions on which Marx was equally explicit, and which
set limits to what is possible for any group of men
or women to do, which constitute them indeed as
social beings.
R. Johnson Edward Thompson, Eugene Genovese and 
Socialist-Humanist History p.92
By equating class with "the experience of determination",
Thompson fails to grasp the nettle of the objective
determination of class and, thus, succeeds in replacing
the "fleshless skeletons" offered by Althusser with a
"boneless alternative".(17) In concluding the section on
class in 'Eighteenth Century English society', Thompson
writes:
I hope that nothing I have written above has given
rise to the notion that I suppose that the formation
of class is independent of objective determin-
ations, that class can be defined simply as a
cultural formation, etc. This has, I hope, been
disproved by my own historical practice, as well as
in the practice of other historians.
E.P. Thompson Eighteenth Century English Society: 
Class Struggle Without Class? p.149
However, although Thompson's historical practice does
demonstrate a sensitivity to the objective dimension of
class, his failure to incorporate it into his theor-
etical contributions has meant that he effectively
"abandons the possibility of understanding experience and
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culture as class experience and culture".(18)
My usage of the concept of class attempts to reassert its
complex dialectical nature. It has both an objective
dimension in terms of the material position of groups in
relation to the means of production and a subjective
dimension in experience and consciousness. It also has
both an abstract meaning as part of the analysis of the
capitalist mode of production and, a more concrete
meaning as a tool for descibing particular social form-
ations. I accept that the objective existence of class is
a determinant of the concrete historical processes of
class formation, class consciousness and class struggle
but I would follow Richard Johnson in insisting that
determination is not the same as determinism.(19) Thus to
accept the objective existence of class does not, as
Thompson implies, involve assumptions about the ways in
which individuals and groups will necessarily act in
particular situations or about the inevitability of the
nature of the political, administrative and legal forms
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that will emerge from any particular social formation.
The implication of this position is that the relation-
ship between the capitalist mode of production and the
nature of any specific class formation cannot be estab-
lished on an a priori basis. Therefore, I must also
attempt to clarify the particularities of the class
structure of Cl9th England.
The Class Structure of Nineteenth Century England 
Although industrial capitalism was not entirely new in the
Cl9th, the rapid expansion of this mode of production was the
overarching feature of Cl9th England. The new factories, etc.
embodied a different set of production relations which gave
rise to the emergence of new classes - the bourgeoisie and the
industrial working class. However, although industrial capit-
alism became the dominant mode of production by the second
half of the Cl9th, we cannot merely assume that the bour-
geoisie became the ruling class and that they were able to
fashion a set of political and legal forms which unambig-
uously reflected their material interests. Firstly, existing
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modes of production and the associated class structure did not
simply disappear. The Cl9th was a period of transition in
which industrial capitalism gradually became dominant and
existing classes continued to play a significant role.
Secondly, as we have seen in the previous section, the nature
of the social formation of Cl9th England can not be predeter-
mined by the relations of production. Rather, it was mediated
by cultural traditions and the subjective experience of
material conditions which, in turn, influenced the character
of the class formation and the nature of the class struggle
over political and legal forms. Thus, in order to understand
this struggle, we must examine the nature of Cl9th class
relations more closely.
Because the first half of the Cl9th was a transitional period,
it is important to begin with a consideration of the social
formation prior to the Industrial Revolution. Perkin has
suggested that this was a "classless society". (20) However, he
goes on to describe the way in which those who owned landed
property monopolised the organs of state power and he
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concludes by saying:
[But] the overriding pursuit of landed gentlemen was
government. From the squire who was the unofficial
arbiter of village affairs through the J.P. at
Quarter Sessions and the M.P. in the Commons to the
House of Lords and the Cabinet, government was the
right, privilege and responsibility of the landed
gentlemen who, besides being the only nationwide
class in that otherwise classless society, were in
the most literal sense the ruling class.
H. Perkin The Origins Of Modern English Society
1780-1880 p.56
The reference here to the existence of a 'ruling class' makes
it difficult to tell what Perkin means by the term "classless
society". The structure of his book, in which he later
identifies the "birth of class" in the Cl9th, would suggest
that he is pointing to the fact that the social formation of
the Cl8th was different. If this is the case, then I would
agree with him but this does not mean that Cl8th England was
"classless". As Thompson reminds us, "In the eighteenth
century agrarian capitalism came fully into its inherit-
ance" (21), and the class formation of Cl8th England was a
product of this mode of production.(22)
Even a cursory acquaintance with the sources must
dispel all doubts as to the fact that the 18th
century gentry made up a superbly successful and
self-confident capitalist class.
E.P. Thompson The Peculiarities Of The English 
p.43
Thompson warns against the dangers of reducing political
phenomena to their "real" class significance and points out
that governing institutions operate with a good deal of
autonomy. He goes on to say:
Analysis of the governing elite in England before
1832 must surely proceed at this level. The settle-
ment of 1688 inaugurated a hundred years of social
stasis, so far as overt class conflict or the matur-
ation of class consciousness was concerned. The main
beneficiaries were those vigorous agrarian capit-
alists, the gentry. But this does not mean that the
governing institutions represented in an unqual-
ified manner, the gentry as a "ruling class". At a
local level (the magistracy) they did so in an
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astonishingly naked manner. At a national level
(desuetude of the old restrictions on marketing, the
facilitation of enclosures, the expansion of empire)
they furthered their interests. But at the same time
a prolonged period of social stasis is commonly one
in which ruling institutions degenerate, corrup-
tions enter, channels of influence silt up, an elite
entrenches itself in positions of power. A distance
opened up between the majority of the middle and
lesser gentry (and associated groups) and certain
great magnates, privileged merchant capitalists, and
their hangers-on, who manipulated the organs of the
State in their own private interest. Nor was this a
simple "class" tension between an aristocracy of
great magnates and the lesser gentry. Certain
magnates only were on the "inside", and the
influence swung according to factional politics, the
diplomacy of great family connections, control of
boroughs, and the rest.
E.P. Thompson The Peculiarities Of The English
p.48
This analysis of 'Old Corruption', which has been praised by
Thompson's critics (23), serves as an important reminder of
the complexities of the social formation of Cl8th England.
However, notwithstanding Thompson's qualifications, the Cl8th
can be described as a period of rule by the landed gentry the
key characteristics of which are summarised in the following
passage.
Patronage, however, was more than a device for
filling jobs, fostering talent, and providing
pensions for the deserving and undeserving. In the
mesh of continuing loyalties of which appointments
were the outward sign, patronage brings us close to
the inner structure of the old society. Hierarchy
inhered not so much in the fortuitous juxtaposition
of degree above degree, rank upon rank, status over
status, as in the permanent vertical links which,
rather than the horizontal solidarities of class,
bound society together. 'Vertical friendship', a
durable two-way relationship between patrons and
clients permeating the whole of society, was a
social nexus peculiar to the old society, less
formal and inescapable than feudal homage, more
personal and comprehensive than the contractual,
employment relationships of capitalist 'Cash
Payment'. For those who lived within its embrace it
was so much an integral part of the texture of life
that they had no name for it save 'friendship'.
H. Perkin The Origins Of Modern English Society
1780-1880 p.49
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I have cited this passage because it identifies those central
features of gentry rule which are important for an under-
standing of the conflicts that occurred in the Cl9th. Firstly,
it points to the significance of patronage whereby positions
were filled on the basis of influence rather than ability.
More importantly, it locates patronage within the social nexus
of mutual dependence which bound together Cl8th English
society. Perkins formulation suffers from many of the weak-
nesses that Thompson has pointed to in the simplistic use of
the concept of paternalism to describe Cl8th England.(24)
Nevertheless the "vertical friendship" that Perkin identifies
was an important feature of Cl8th England, if nothing else as
a powerful ideology governing social relations.(25)
The fact that industrial capitalism emerged in England within
the context of a social formation that was itself capitalist
is of central importance in understanding the class structure
of Cl9th England. This much is conceded by social historians
taking conflicting positions in debates about the nature of
the social formation of Cl9th England. In his seminal contrib-
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ution, Perry Anderson states that:
Yet the condition of ... [the industrial
bourgeoisie's] ... appearance in England was the
prior existence of a class which was also capit-
alist in its mode of exploitation. There was from
the start no fundamental, antogonistic contradic-
tion between the old aristocracy and the new bourge-
oisie. English capitalism embraced and included
both. The most important single key to modern
English history lies in this fact.
A period of intense political conflict between the
nascent industrial bourgeoisie and the agrarian
elite was, of course, inevitable once the manufac-
turers began to aspire towards political represent-
ation and power. But this clash was profoundly
affected, and attenuated, by the context in which it
occurred.
P. Anderson Origins Of The Present Crisis  PP-
17-18
Thompson's critique does not challenge the basic propositions
about the nature of the conflict between the gentry and the
bourgeoisie. Thus, he says:
If the industrial bourgeoisie had been excluded from
the political game in 1688 it was not because their
property was industrial but because it was petty. As
their property became more substantial they felt a
corresponding accession of resentment; but this
resentment was shared by many of their cousins (and
sometimes literally cousins) in the country and the
City. 1832 changed not one game for another but the
rules of the game, restoring the flexibility of 1688
in a greatly altered class context. It provided a
framework within which new and old bourgeois could
adjust their conflicts of interest without resort to
force. These conflicts, not only of direct interest
but of outlook, style of life, religion were consid-
erable; but so too were the attractive forces. We
may set the conflict surrounding the Corn Laws on
one side; but on the other (and simultaneously) we
must set the existence of a common enemy, in
Chartism, and the railway boom to which a parlia-
ment still overstocked with gentry gave tardy
blessings and in the rewards of which the gentry
shared.
E.P. Thompson The Peculiarities Of The English
p.50
In a similar vein, Johnson concludes his contribution to the
debate by saying:
The legacy from a past that was at once agrarian and
capitalist was undoubtedly very important. Through-
out most of the nineteenth century there were not
merely two sections of a ruling class (landed and
bourgeois) but two co-existing modes of production,
and two rather different kinds of social formation:
agrarian and industrial capital, the former in
relative decline but in a flourishing state until
the last decades of the century.
R. Johnson The Peculiarities Of the English Route 
p.25
Although they perceive it in different ways, all three of
these contributors are pointing to the fact that the
co-existence of agrarian and industrial capitalism had a
profound effect on the character of the class structure of
Cl9th England and the nature of the conflicts that ensued
between the gentry and the bourgeoisie. Before going on to
elaborate upon the significance of this, it is necessary to
point out that the divisions between the gentry and the
bourgeoisie were not as clear cut as some parts of the above
passages might imply. Throughout the Cl8th and Cl9th there was
a continual process of "merger" between the gentry and the
bourgeoisie. On the one hand, there was a tendancy for
manufacturers to convert into squires:
Whether to crown their success as	 'eminent
tradesmen' or to launch themselves and their
families into the landed gentry, then, the entre-
preneurs of the Industrial Revolution hastened to
acquire land and build or buy a great house. In
factory textiles Arkwright built Willesley Castle
and became in 1787 the most flambouyant High
Sherriff of Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire, while
the Peels bought the Drayton Manor and Tamworth
estates on which they raised their political
careers. In the metal industries, the Foleys became
barons, the Wortley's earls of Wharncliffe, the
Hardy's of Low Moor Earls of Cranbrook, the Guests
Lords Whimbourne, Isaac Wilkinson leased a country
house at Plas Grono near Wrexham, his son John was
buried at his seat at Castle Head, Ulverston,
Matthew Boulton's son bought Great Tew from the
Dashwoods, themselves descendants of a Restoration
London brewer, Thomas Williams 'the cooper king'
bought Plas Llanidan, Anglesey, from Lord Boston,
and Michael Hughes, also of Parys Copper Mining
Company, rebuilt Sherdley Hall, near St. Helens.
Wedgewood the great potter built Etruria Hall near
his works and Barlaston Hall in the country. In
brewing, a trade which had produced many new men
before them, the 'power loom brewers' of the late
eighteenth century built up large country estates:
the Barclays in Norfolk, the Hanburys in Hertford-
shire and Essex, the Whitbreads over k 612,000s worth
of land in Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire. In the
paper industry the greatest paper-maker of the
eighteenth century, James Whatman junior became High
Sheriff of Kent at the age of twenty-six, and
retired at fifty-three to his estate at Vinters,
near Maidstone.
H. Perkin The Origins Of Modern English Society
1780-1880 p.88
On the other hand, the gentry were investing in industrial
enterprises. This was particularly noticeable in railways and
the extraction of minerals but Aydelotte's study of the
business interests of the gentry in the mid-C19th suggests
that the links between the gentry and business went much
further. On the basis of his findings, he concludes that:
Many of the gentry, and many also related to the
baronetage and peerage, who were clearly not
businessmen had, nevertheless, important connexions
with the business world.
W. Aydelotte The Business Interests of The Gentry
In The Parliament Of 1841-47 p.296
By the end of the Cl9th it is possible to talk about a
"fusion" between big business and the large landowners
resulting in a new hybrid capitalist class.(26) However, in
the earlier period with which I am concerned, the process had
not advanced this far and the important point for present
purposes is to note the dynamic, transitory and complex nature
of the class structure of Cl9th England.
With this in mind, we can now return to the nature of the
struggle between the bourgeoisie and the gentry. Perkin
suggests that this took place primarily at an ideological
level.
The class which was most successful in this educa-
tional and moral struggle, in uniting its own
members and imposing its ideals upon others, would
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win the day and have most influence in determining
the actual society in which all had to live and in
approximating it more or less closely to its own
ideal. The primary conflict in the newly born class
society of the early nineteenth century was a
struggle for the minds and hearts of men. It was a
struggle between the ideals.
H. Perkin The Origins Of Modern English Society
1780-1880 p.220
Although I do not accept the implications of some of Perkin's
statements suggesting that the struggle between the bourge-
oisie and the gentry was purely ideological (27), his account
does provide some valuable insights into the the development
of the class identity of the English bourgeoisie and the
nature of their conflict with the gentry. He begins from the
observation that the old system of paternalism began to
crumble during the Industrial Revolution.
As late as 1795 ... [the gentry] .. were still
willing, in the form of Speenhamland, to pay the
price of paternal protection in return for filial
obedience. But from then onwards they began to exact
the fruits of paternalism but refuse to pay the
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price. As Baldwin has said of the twentieth century
press lords, they claimed the privileges of the
whore, power without responsibility.
H. Perkin The Origins Of Modern English Society
1780-1880 p.188
He goes on to argue that this provoked disillusion over the
gentry's claim to be the 'virtual representatives' of the
whole community.(28) In particular, "the provocative use of
the landlords' political power to defend rent at the expense
of profits and wages" in passing the 1815 Corn Law "opened the
eyes of the middle ranks and turned them into a class."(29)
Whereas the bourgeoisie had been content to petition as an old
society interest group for the redress of grievances, it began
to demand more radical changes in the political system.
Irresponsible use of aristocratic power, then,
provoked the middle class into existence. Old
society methods failed. Protest meetings and mass
petitions - 54,000 signatures from Manchester,
24,000 from Leeds - failed to halt the Corn Law. The
old society compact by which the landed interest
ruled on behalf of the rest was therefore broken,
and the middle class must assert its own power
through its representatives. The landed [sic] and
commercial interests, demanded 'A Manchester
Manufacturer' must be 'put on an equal footing in
Parliament' through 'a better representation of
commercial and artisan towns and districts.
H. Perkin The Origins Of Modern English Society
1780-1880 p.214
The disillusion with gentry rule created the climate in which
the bourgeoisie became ready to listen to Benthamite intell-
ectuals whose ideas helped to shape the 'entrepreneurial
ideal'.(30) This ideal developed in direct opposition to what
Perkin describes as the 'aristocratic ideal'. "By the light of
capital, property meant idleness" and, similarly, "by the
light of competition patronage meant corruption."(31)
[Thus] the entrepreneurial ideal confronted the
aristocratic at every point. In politics it demanded
the abolition of patronage and corruption by means
of 'such a reform of the House of Commons as may
render its votes the express image of the opinion of
the middle orders of Britain'. In commerce it
demanded the abolition of protection and monopoly as
symbolized by the Corn Laws, and the completion of
the system of free trade. In industrial relations it
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demanded 'free trade in labour', the abolition of
all State interference between employer and (adult)
worker, including (be it noted) the Combination
Acts, and the substitution of the contractual rela-
tions of employer and employed for the paternal
relations of master and servant.
H. Perkin The Origins Of Modern English Society
1780-1880 p.228-229
Perkin's analysis of the birth of the 'middle class' could be
improved by stressing its material basis in the growth of
industrial capitalism which is important for an understanding
of the conflict of interests resulting from the ownership of
different kinds of property. Nevertheless the conflict of
ideals that he identifies was central to the struggles over
the form taken by the magistracy. Perkin's work is also
helpful in that it helps us to understand the complexity of
the political formations around these struggles.
Perhaps the most significant effect of the sublim-
ation of the competition for income into a struggle
between ideals was that it allowed men to embrace
ideals other than that which sprang from their own
source of income. ... Further, it helps to explain
— lo7L —
one of the most puzzling phenomena of class
conflict, the large proportion of leaders and
spokesmen who led or spoke for classes other than
their own. .
Not that the leaders and spokesmen invented the
ideals and imposed them on their followers. For one
thing, they were at least as much chosen by the
class as the class by them: they 'spoke to their
condition', and when they did not were rejected.
H. Perkin The Origins Of Modern English Society
1780-1880 p.220-221
The preamble to this passage reveals Perkin's underlying
assumption that class can be defined in terms of market
situation (sources of income). It also reduces class struggle
to an ideological conflict. Although I do not accept this
theoretical position, the remainder of the passage is helpful
in understanding the dynamics of Cl9th class politics. In the
light of the earlier discussion of the overlapping material
interests of the bourgeoisie and the gentry, I would want to
remind Perkin of the complexity of "sources of income" and
point out that the idea of men speaking for "classes other
than their own" is, therefore, not as simple as he implies.
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However, his basic point about the ability of individuals and
groups to ally themselves to different ideological positions
is important for an understanding of the complexity of the
political formation of Cl9th England.
The final issue to consider in this discussion of the class
structure of Cl9th England concerns the broad nature of the
outcome of the struggle between the gentry and the bourge-
oisie. I have already mentioned the fact that by the end of
the century elements of the two groups had fused to form a new
ruling class. Anderson has suggested that this resulted in a
"unique paradox" whereby "the aristocracy became - and
remained - the vanguard of the bourgeoisie."(32) This view has
been attacked by Anderson's critics who have suggested that,
although the 'aristocracy' continued to fill important
positions, they pursued "identifiably bourgeois economic and
social policies".(33) Perkin, from his rather different theor-
etical perspective, reaches a similar conclusion.
The landed class possessed a clear majority of the
House of Commons until 1885, of the Cabinet until
- 107N -
1893, if not 1905, and the House of Lords until long
after the Parliament Act of 1911 drastically reduced
its powers. It effectively controlled recruitment to
the Civil Service until at least 1870, to the army
until 1871, to the Church for as long as it cared to
exercise it. It dominated local government until at
least 1888, and in some counties for much longer.
Yet neither contemporaries nor historians have
doubted that the capitalist middle class were the
'real' rulers of mid-Victorian England, in the sense
that the laws which were passed and executed by
landed Parliaments and Governments were increas-
ingly those demanded by the business men and - which
is not necessarily the same people - their intell-
ectual mentors.
H. Perkin The Origins Of Modern English Society
1780-1880 p.271-272
Although I would concur in the rejection of Anderson's view
that Cl9th England can be characterised as a period of
'aristocratic' rule, I would nevertheless be cautious about
accepting any alternative interpretation which portrays the
gentry as little more than puppets of the bourgeoisie. In
fact, Perkin attempts to avoid this position in his contin-
uation when he suggests that "the landowners had a veto on
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matters affecting their own interest, which on occasions of
head-on collision required the threat of revolution to
remove."(34) However, this is still an over-simplification of
the outcome of the struggle. Certainly, on those issues which
directly concerned the functions of the magistracy, my reading
of the Parliamentary Debates suggests that the emergent polit-
ical and legal forms did not constitute either absolute
victories for the bourgeoisie or total defeats for the gentry.
Rather what emerged was a series of compromises reflecting, to
varying degrees, bourgeois principles (the 'entrepreneurial
ideal') whilst simultaneously incorporating elements of
patronage and "paternalism". In chapters six, seven and eight
we will trace the nature of these compromises in detail to
show how the form of justice administered in modern magist-
rates' courts is a product of the class formation of Cl9th
English capitalism.
Summary
This chapter has been concerned with the methodological issues
involved in the historical analysis of the emergence of the
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modern form of the English magistracy that follows in the main
body of this thesis. Having outlined the inadequacy of the
conventional histories of the magistracy for this purpose, I
have discussed the merits of using the Parliamentary Debates
as a primary source material for studying the changes that
occurred during the Cl9th. This choice to use the the Parlia-
mentary Debates was dictated by the nature of the issues to
which this thesis is addressed. The changes in the function of
the magistracy resulted from legislation and the Parlia-
mentary Debates provide a rich source of material on the
discourse of reform and the conflicts out of which the legis-
lative changes emerged. However, there are also difficulties
involved in the use of the Parliamentary Debates and I have
pointed to some of the major problems in order to draw
attention to the limitations of the analysis that is offered
in this thesis. I have also attempted to clarify my usage of
the concept of class and my perception of the class structure
of Cl9th England which have structured my interpretation of
the emergence of the modern magistracy.
Having thus identified the limitations imposed by the nature
of the source material and clarified the key element of the
underlying conceptual framework we can now embark upon our
historical analysis of the English magistracy.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE ENGLISH MAGISTRACY FROM
THE C12TH TO THE CIVIL WAR
Introduction 
In this chapter, we will briefly examine the history of the
magistracy from its origins in the Middle Ages to the Civil
War. Although this period predates the historical moment when
the modern magistracy was forged, we will be able to high-
light the long connection between the gentry and the county
magistracy which had a significant effect upon the nineteenth
century developments.
The First Justices Of The Peace 
There is considerable disagreement amongst conventional hist-
orians as to the precise origins of the Justices of the Peace.
Beard has traced it back to the reign of Richard I when in
1195 Archbishop Hubert issued a proclamation which assigned
knights to summon all men of 15 years or more to swear that
they would not be robbers, outlaws or thieves and that they
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would make pursuit when the hue and cry was raised.
The theory is advanced that this assignment of
knights marks the origin of the conservator of the
peace, and it is compatible with subsequent develop-
ments. Here is a distinct appointment of officers to
take oaths for the preservation of the peace and to
assist the sheriff in his police work - functions
like those of the conservators before they received
that fuller authority and dignity which made them
justices of the peace.
C Beard The Office of Justice of the Peace in
England p.18
Beard shows that the precedent set by Hubert was followed by
King John and that under Henry III knights were used in police
and administrative work. Thus, in 1227 Geoffrey de Lucy and
four others were appointed as justices for the examination of
weirs in the Thames in Oxfordshire, Berkshire, Buckingham-
shire, Middlesex and Surrey. They were given powers to punish
offenders against the provisions for the maintainance of
weirs. In 1230 knights, in conjunction with sheriffs, were
assigned to take the assize of arms in the several counties,
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and, in 1252 a Writ provided that the sheriff and two knights
should compel all persons aged 15 or more in their county to
take an oath saying that they would arm themselves according
to the amount of their land and chattels.(1)
Beard's thesis has stimulated a debate amongst historians of
the English magistracy. For example, Hazeltine was prepared to
recognise the possibility that the history of J.P.s could be
traced back to 1195 but he argued that there is no clear
historical evidence to support this view.(2) Page follows
Hazeltine in rejecting 1195 as the origin of the magistracy
but goes on to say that something recognisable as the
magistracy emerged in 1264 after the treaty between Henry III
and the barons, when Simon de Montfort provided for Custodes
Pacis - Keepers of the Peace - in each county.(3)
They were publicly and firmly to forbid homicide,
incendiarism, robbery, extortion, bearing of arms
without license, and to repress all other offences
against the peace under pain of disinheritance and
peril of life and members.
C Beard The Office of Justice of the Peace in
England p.21
Osborne offers yet another starting point when he places the
origin of the magistracy with an Act of 1327 which provided
that "In every county there shall be assigned good and lawful
men to keep the peace'. (4)
Moir, in her account of this early period, points out that,
even after the Act of 1327, the position of the Custodes was
weak because, although they could initiate proceedings, they
could not determine their own indictments and without this
power they could not become an effective peace keeping
force.(5) She shows that there was divided opinion about
whether they ought to be turned into an effective peace
keeping force and that the period immediately after 1327 was
one of fluctuation in which these powers were successively
granted and withdrawn. In 1327 Parliament had asked for
Custodes to be granted powers of punishment. This request was
refused but the powers that had been requested were granted in
1329, withdrawn again in 1330 and restored once more in
1332.(6) According to Moir, this situation of flux existed for
about 30 years: "Some years saw their partial eclipse, others
the restoration and extension of their authority."(7) This
situation continued until 1361 when the Justices of the Peace
Act gave J.P.s definite powers to determine the cases that
they initiated. (8)
The Growth Of Magistrates" Powers - 1361 To 1640 
However fascinating, this debate need not concern us unduly in
our attempt to understand the development of the English
magistracy. The very fact that the conventional historians can
not agree about the precise origin and the fact that several
measures have been advanced as candidates for the title of
'the origin of the English magistracy' suggest that we are
dealing with a gradual process which occurred during the Cl3th
and Cl4th. The Statute of 1361 consolidated the position of
the Justices of the Peace and, although in the period immed-
iately following this Act their position was uncertain for a
time, apart from a few brief periods they never lost their
- 112 -
power to determine the indictments that they initiated.(9)
More importantly, their authority was extended beyond criminal
matters to cover economic and administrative affairs.(10) For
example, in 1378, Richard II reviewed the institution and
prepared a complete set of documents relating to the functions
of J.P.s. According to the writ prepared by Parliament:
they were to summon and bind to keep the peace those
who threatened the lives and property of others;
they were to enquire by wise and lawful men of the
county into highway robberies, mayhem, murders, and
other felonies, trespassing, forestalling, regra-
ting, maintainance, confederacies, extortions,
disturbances of the peace, weights and measures,
labourers, artificers, servants, and others offen-
ding against the labour laws; and to determine and
punish according to the laws, customs, and statutes
of the realm.
C Beard The Office of Justice of the Peace in
England p.45
In this very early period, the J.P.s existed alongside the
older offices such as sheriff and coroner associated with the
Norman police system but, as their powers grew, they came to
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replace them as the primary peace keeping agents. The
supremacy of the Justices over the sheriffs was finally sealed
by an Act of 1461 which "...laid down that all indictments and
presentments which were normally taken at (the Sheriff's)
tourn, when twice a year he presided over sessions of each
hundred in his shire and exercised summary jurisdiction over
such petty offences as brawls and affrays, should in future be
taken before the Justices."(11) From this time on the Justices
were clearly established, not only as the primary peace
keeping force but also as the premier instrument of local
government. It became customary to pass on all such duties to
them and the period from the late Cl4th to 1640 was one in
which the responsibilities of J.P.s expanded rapidly in a
number of areas.
(a) Labour Regulation 
One of the earliest functions given to the new justices was
the regulation of labour. This began in 1348 when, following
the Black Death, there was a shortage of labour and a series
of statutes were passed to restrict the movement of labo rers
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and to regulate their wages. At this stage, responsibility for
the enforcement of these statutes was in the hands of special
officers - Justices of Labourers - but towards the end of
Edward III's reign an Act (42 Edw. III, c.6) was passed which
gave J.P.s power to hear and determine in all cases under
statutes made for labourers and artificers and to award
damages according to the extent of trespass.(12) Under Richard
II	 (2 Ric.	 II,	 s.1,	 c.8)	 J.P.s powers were further
strengthened. Labourers and servants were forbidden to leave
their respective communities without letters of patent under
the King's seal which was held by J.P.s and other local people
of importance. Also, artificers were ordered to work at
harvest time under pain of punishment by J.P.s and the wages
of artificers and labourers were to be rated by J.P.s at
Quaterly Sessions (13).
During Henry IV's reign, when labour was again in short
supply, new legislation was passed giving J.P.s further powers
to regulate the movement of labour. An Act (23 Hen. IV, c.12)
was passed stating that parents could not apprentice their
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children to any trade unless they had 20s. per year in land or
rent. J.P.s were responsible for testifying to the value of
parents. They were also given powers to punish violators of
the labour laws. "They could issue writs to any sheriff in the
kingdom ordering the arrest of labourers; they guarded the
labour statutes after they had been proclaimed by the
sheriffs; and in their quarter sessions, they examined
labourers and masters on oath and confession, and punished
them without indictment for transgression of the labour
laws."(14) Under Edward VI (2&3 Edw. VI, c.15) J.P.s were
given new powers to punish combinations of labourers. This
statute empowered them to issue severe punishment to
artificers who combined to force 	 'certain arbitrary
conditions' upon employers. "For the first offence there was a
penalty of £10 or imprisonment; for the second €20 or pillory;
and for the third f40 or pillory, the loss of an ear and
infamy. "(15)
The various labour statutes culminated in a comprehensive
measure in 1563 (5 Eliz. I, c.4) - The Statute of Artificers -
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which gave J.P.s considerable powers to control the wages and
movement of labourers. Wages were fixed by J.P.s at Quarter
Sessions and two J.P.s in Petty Sessions could punish anyone
who took wages in excess of the authorised scale of wages,
with a crippling fine or imprisonment (employers only by a
light fine!). Servants could not leave their position without
buying a ticket of release (at ld or 2d) from their employer.
J.P.s were also given summary powers to deal with cases of
assault by employees against masters.(16)
(b) The Poor and Vagrancy
Closely connected to the J.P.s functions in the regulation of
labour was their role in the regulation of the poor.
Systematic legislation began with an Act of 1531 (19 Hen. VII,
c.12) which stated that the aged poor and impotent persons
must have a licence to beg within their districts and they
were forbidden to go beyond the confines of their districts.
J.P.s were responsible for the administration of this statute.
It was they who were to grant these licences and they who were
empowered to punish the transgressors by whipping or the
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stocks. They were also given the power to whip able-bodied
beggars and return them to their birthplace.(17) A number of
further statutes relating to the poor law were passed by both
Edward VI and Mary,(18) but they were systematised in the late
Cl6th under Elizabeth I. The law relating to the poor was
codified by a statute of 1572 (14 Eliz. I, c.5). This statute
reenacted the penal measures against idlers and beggars,
rogues and vagabonds and made the additional provision that
J.P.s may "place and settle to work the rogues and vagabonds
either born within the county, or being three years resident
therein, there to be holden to work to get their livings and
to live and be sustained only upon their labour and
travail."(19) This Act was explained and made more effective
by another Act passed in 1576 (18 Eliz I, c.3) which also
directed the J.P.s to "appoint and order (that) a competent
stock of wool, hemp, flax, iron and other stuff' should be
obtained from the rates and given to the mayor or other
persons in each place, as the Justices decide."(20) The
provisions of the 1572 and 1576 Acts were reenacted in a
simpler and more systematic form by the statute of 1598 (39
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Eliz. I, c.3). This Act was important because it consolidated
the extensive powers that J.P.s had been collecting in
relation to the poor laws and because it served as the basis
of their power in this area for the next two centuries.
By this Act the parish was retained as the lowest
unit for poor-law administration and upon it was
thrown the financial burden. The local execution of
the law was placed in charge of two overseers of the
poor nominated yearly by two justices of the peace,
one of the Quorum, who were residents of the parish
or at least nearby. The overseers so chosen were to
act under the complete supervision of the justices
of the peace in the performance of their duties,
which may be summarised as follows: they were to put
to work the children of parents too poor to support
them and all other persons without the means of
support, and to supply a stock of materials for the
employment of the poor: they could tax the inhab-
itants of the parish and the occupiers of lands for
the support of the poor and the impotent, and do
"all other things 	
 concerning the premises as
to them shall seem convenient". The overseers with
the permission of a lord of the manor in which there
was waste land, could make provisions for the
erection of poorhouses. In the execution of this
act, the duties of the justices of the peace were
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mostly supervisory and corrective. They were to
require a strict account from the overseers, and in
case any parish was not able to pay the required
assessment, the justices in quarter sessions could
assess any other parish or number of parishes for
the benefit of the poor community. They could commit
any person who made default in payment of the
assessment, and they could punish the church wardens
who did not give full reports of the finances
according to the law. They were to hear all
complaints against the overseers and to send to the
house of correction all persons who refused to work
under the orders of the overseers. In the quarter
sessions, the justices could rate the parishes and
force the collection of money for the poor prisoners
at the King's Bench, and for the support of the
county hospitals and almshouses. The money so
collected was to be delivered to two justices chosen
as treasurers. These treasurers were to pay a
portion of the money to the Lord Chief Justice,
disburse the remainder according to the statute, and
render an account of the business to quarter
sessions. This general measure was altered in no
essential principle by an act a few years later, and
so it may be regarded as marking the culmination of
the powers of the justices of the peace as poor-law
administrators under the Tudors.
C. Beard The Office of the Justice of the Peace In
England pp.90-91.
At about the same time another Act (39 & 40 Eliz. I, c.40)
gave J.P.s the power to erect, maintain and govern houses of
correction. It also empowered them to apprehend any wandering
idler and to have him stripped to the waist, whipped until
bloody, and then sent to the place of his birth, or to the
parish through which he last passed without punishment. After
administering the punishment the Justice was to issue a
testimonial of the fact to the beggar and to have it recorded
by the minister of the parish. (21)
(c) Trade 
The extension of the Justices powers also involved them in the
regulation of trade and industry. Even in the pre-Tudor period
they were involved in regulating guilds: "They adjusted the
profits which victuallers were to recieve; they punished
regrators of wool and other merchandise of the Staple; they
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supervised the shipment and exportation of wool and the
details of the manufacture of woolen cloth. They enforced the
statutes regulating the preparation of
	 leather,	 the
manufacture of arrow heads, tuns, barrels, and hogsheads, wax
candles and images, and tiles."(22) Later, under the Tudors,
they were involved in the regulation of prices of wine (24
Hen. VIII, c.6 and 7 Edw. VI, c.5), and meat (24 Hen.
VIII,c.3). They were given powers to punish combinations of
victuallers (2&3 Edw. VI, c.15) and regrators, ingrossers and
forestallers (5&6 Edw. Vi, c.14). They were involved in Acts
regulating: leather trade; boots and shoe manufacture; weaving
and dying woollens; preparation of malt; and Acts providing
for improvement in the breed of horses, fixing the time for
killing calves and weanlings, ordering the preservation of
forests, protecting the spawn and fry of eels and salmon,
regulating sizes of wood and measures of coal.(23)
(d) Administration
Under the rule of the Tudors, J.P.s were also given respon-
sibility for a number of other aspects of county admin-
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istration. During the reign of Henry VIII, they were given
responsibility for the maintainance of roads and bridges.
Where responsibility could be allocated they were empowered to
compel the culprit to pay the cost, otherwise the local
population was to be taxed to meet the expenses.(24) Later,
their powers were extended to include the building of new
roads. (25)
J.P.s were also given responsibility for the county gaols.
Under Henry VIII, J.P.s in some counties were authorised to
decide which towns should have gaols and to determine the
amount of money required (23 Hen. VIII, c.2). "They could lay
the necessary tax, appoint the collectors for the levy and the
surveyors for the erection of the structure, and punish all
officers concerned for the defaults."(26) Another statute in
1572 enabled J.P.s to levy a sum of 6d - 8d per week on each
parish to provide food for prisoners.(27)
The other main area of administration in which J.P.s were
involved under the Tudors was the licencing of public houses
which began in 1552 (5&6 Edw. VI, c.25). This Act made two
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J.P.s responsible for issuing licences and it also gave two
J.P.s power to issue heavy penalties to anyone keeping an
alehouse without a licence.(28) "The result was that the
Justices had it in their power to create a valuable property,
and to give it to whom they chose".(29)
(e) General Policing
In addition to the various new powers that were being heaped
upon the Justices during this period, their original policing
role was also being developed and strengthened. In particular,
they were given increasingly extensive powers to deal with
riots. Under Richard II an Act (15 Ric. II, c.2) was passed
empowering J.P.s to take sufficient force of the county and go
to the scene of a riot, forcible entry, disturbance of the
peace, etc. The Act gave them the power to compel people to
assist them in this task on pain of fine and imprison-
ment.(30) These powers were later extended (8 Hen. VI, c.8) to
include peaceable entry and the forcible holding of lands.(31)
More legislation relating to riots was passed by Henry VII (11
Hen. VII, c.7) and Edward VI (3&4 Edw. VI, c.5). The latter
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was a fairly comprehensive measure which brought together and
reinforced existing legislation on riots. This Act - known as
the Riot Act - served as the basis of magistrates' powers in
this area until 1714.(32)
During the Tudor period, Justices were also given a number of
other general policing duties. They were responsible for
statutes regulating hunting and unlawful games; they could
hear and determine cases of unlawful perjury, unlawful usury,
and petty misdemeanours (breaking fences, robbing orchards,
despoiling woodlands and gardens); they were to enforce the
statutes encouraging archery practice and the keeping of
longbows, and; they were also involved in the suppression of
Catholics and Catholicism.(33) Later, under the Stuarts,
magistrates' powers were extended into other areas. "The
'loathesome and odious sin of drunkenness' was made an offence
by an Act of 1608, under a penalty of a fine of five shillings
or six hours in the stocks. Swearing was dealt with by an Act
of 1623, conviction involving a fine of one shilling. In the
case of both offences the fines were to be devoted to the poor
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of the parish where the offence was committed."(34) In 1625
and 1627 Acts were also passed imposing stringent regulations
on Sunday observance. A single Justice was given powers to
deal with offenders on the spot.(35)
Magistrates And The Crisis Of Feudalism
The conventional histories offer a thorough description of the
formation of the magistracy and the subsequent expansion of
the powers of J.P.s but for the most part, their accounts have
been confined to a narrative of events without attempting to
analyse the developments that they describe. Their failure to
address the question of why the institution of the Justice of
the Peace emerged or why it flourished under the Tudors and
Stuarts lies in their teleological view of the English magist-
racy. Behind their apparently neutral description lies a tacit
acceptance of the inevitability of the emergence of the
magistracy. Thus, when discussing the early history of the
magistracy, Beard says:
The only solution which the government could devise
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was the extension of the powers of the guardians of
the peace, and thus under the stress of social need,
the office was advanced by stages to the position of
a court of record with far-reaching powers for
summary and effective action. It was quite natural 
also that the knights of the shire, who had assumed
such a prominent part in the parliamentary govern-
ment of the period, should secure to themselves the
powers of local government.
C. Beard The Office Of Justice Of The Peace In 
England p.35 (my emphasis)
In this passage, Beard implies that the formation of the
magistracy was a "natural" development. Clearly, if this is
the case then no further explanation is required except
possibly to explain how they occurred or why they occurred at
one time rather than another. For example, Beard explains the
origins of the magistracy in terms of the need for a new peace
keeping force resulting from a growing problem of order in the
mid-C14th caused by the •Black Death and the long war with
France.(36) In criticising Beard's account we are not
suggesting that there was not a problem of order in the
mid-C14th, nor are we denying the significance of the factors
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that he identifies. We would even accept that the Statute of
1361 was a response to this situation. However, by focusing
exclusively on these immediate causal factors Beard is unable
to explain why the particular instrument chosen to respond to
the problem of order in the mid-C14th was the Justice of the
Peace. More importantly, he ignores the fact that the form-
ation and consolidation of the magistracy was a gradual
process. He has himself dated the origins of J.P.s back to
1195 and he, too, has documented the rapid expansion of
magistrates' powers in the two centuries following the
Justices of the Peace Act. It should be quite clear that a
process which spans four hundred years or more cannot be
explained simply in terms of factors specific to the
mid-C14th. Rather, the early development of the magistracy
must be located in the context of wider changes that were
occurring throughout the period from the Cl3th to the Cl6th -
i.e. the period of late feudalism.
Within the conventional literature Redlich provides one of the
very rare attempts to relate the development of the magist-
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racy to changes in feudal society by arguing that the growth
of the magistracy enabled the English constitution to rid
itself of feudalism.
It is true that a kind of social or practical
feudalism survived owing to the continued predom-
inance of the great landowner, and that this predom-
inance - secured and preserved by the peculiar
characteristics of the English law of real property
- remains a modified but still considerable force in
the politics and society of the present day. But of
far more importance for the development of constit-
utional government was the rapid absorbtion by the
Justices of feudal powers of jurisdiction and admin-
istration. And although this process did not involve
the disappearance of venerable antiquities like the
Manorial Courts and the Courts Leet till several
centuries after its completion, still these were
only meaningless survivals - shadowy forms deprived
of their life and strength by the vigorous develop-
ment of the new office. For not only were the
Justices of the Peace exercising severally and
jointly the whole of the preventive powers and
police jurisdiction formerly wielded by the feudal
courts, but the latter were deserted by the chief
men of the townships and tithings of the old Hundred
Moot, who were now bound to appear as the Grand Jury
to make presentments at the Quarter Sessions of the
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Justices of the Peace. In this way the hundreds and
their tithings, the oldest divisions of English
local government, were subordinated to the Justices
of the Peace; and the process which relieved English
administration of feudalism was completed by the
beginning of the fifteenth century.
J. Redlich and F. Hirst	 The History of Local 
Goverment in England p.17.(37)
Redlich attempts to locate the expansion of the English
magistracy within the wider structure of British society, but
he actually offers little more than description. Although he
escapes from the assumption of inevitability, he nevertheless
offers a post hoc account in terms of the importance of this
development for the emergence of constitutional government in
the Cl9th. In this way, he fails to explore the political
formation which gave rise to the magistracy and he offers no
explanation of the form that it took in its early stages.
The fundamental error in all of the conventional histories
lies in this failure to consider the political considerations
behind both the formation and subsequent growth of the magist-
racy. There has been a marked tendency to present these
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phenomena as if the institution of the Justice of the Peace
developed in a vacuum, isolated from the political forces
affecting the wider society. Although there has been consid-
erable debate amongst historians about the nature of feudalism
in this period, there is a broad agreement that it was one of
crisis(38) out of which emerged a new form of domination.
Athough the central feature of this new form of domination was
the strengthening of the power of central government, through
the absolutist state, the Crown ruled at the local level
through the Justices of the Peace. .
The Justices of the Peace were the agents of this
royal nationalism. From the Reformation the eccles-
iastical machinery of the parish was at their
disposal, supplying what they had hitherto lacked,
subordinate officers to carry out their commands.
J.P.s were appointed by the crown, and the
dependants of the great magnates were deliberately
excluded from the commission of the peace. It
instructed justices to act 'as well within liberties
as without', thus encouraging them to break down the
immunities of feudal lords. Society ceased to be, in
Aubrey's vivid phrase, 'like a nest of boxes', with
villeins holding of lords of manors who held of a
- 131 -
superior lord who held of the king.
C. Hill Reformation to Industrial Revolution p.33.
Hilton has shown that, even at an early stage the magistracy
were part of this new form of domination.(39) This can be seen
most clearly in the fact that they were the instruments used
by the government in its attempted wage-freeze under the 1351
Statute of Labourers(40) and more generally in the way in
which J.P.s powers were developed in relation to the
regulation of labourers and the poor. (41)
However, having said this, it would seem that the relation-
ship between central goverment and the J.P.s was complex and,
although the magistracy formed an important component of the
absolutist state, they were also a contradictory element
within it. Insofar as the conventional histories refer to this
relationship at all, they have seen it purely in terms of the
many attempts of central government to strengthen their
control over the magistrates.(42) They rarely comment on this
except, as in the following extract, to sympathise with the
overburdened magistrates.
- 132 -
,As the narrative has shown the outstanding feature
of that lengthy period was the wide and varied range
of extraneous duties that were thrust upon them. By
the 16th century they had become the maids-of-
all-work of every branch of government. It was a
development that accorded well with the Tudor ideas
of government from the centre - the innumerable
directions from the Council show how energetically
and consistently that aim was pursued. Equally the
many reproofs administered to the Justices reveal
the disappointment of authority that its directions
were not being executed with the precision that a
central bureaucracy might reasonably expect from its
subordinates. A little reflection might have shown
the reason why.
B. Osborne Justices of the Peace 1361-1848 p.59.
Apart from the obvious partiality of these comments, the major
problem with Osborne's account is that he assumes that the
reproofs' and 'expressions of disappointment' emanating from
the central bureaucracy reflect the total subordination of the
J.P.s. The same mistake has been made by Sydney and Beatrice
Webb. They describe the period immediately preceeding the
Civil War (i.e.,1590-1640) as one which witnessed an element
of central control (from the Privy Council) in local govern-
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ment hitherto unknown and which did not reappear until the
1830s. They go on to say that there was:
an almost continuous series of letters, instructions
and orders, emanating from a central government
department, in the names of the Privy Council or
some members of it, either to the Assize Judges, or
to the Lords Lieutenants or High Sheriffs of the
various counties, or directly to the Justices of the
Peace in Quarter Sessions, insisting that the
statutes for the relief of the poor and maimed
soldiers, for the maintainance of tillage and the
repression of vagabondage, for the regulation of
alehouses and of the sale of bread, and for the
suppression of recusancy and crime should be put in
operation. These instructions took different forms
eg. asking them to make special arrangements for
special sessions to consider what to do; directions
to intervene to prevent employers laying off
workers.
S.& B. Webb English Poor Law History Vol.I p.65.
Implicit within this passage, is the assumption that the flow
of letters and the generally hectic activity of central
government during this period is an unproblematic reflection
of its strength. However, although county magistrates were
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clearly restricted by central government, the fact that it was
necessary to continually restrain their activities suggests
that, there was a major conflict between the central and local
elements of the absolutist state. We would suggest that the
source of this tension lay in the role of the gentry during
this period. From its inception, the choice of Justices of the
Peace as the instrument to perform the regulatory functions
for the absolutist state appears to have been the product of
struggle. Thus, Moir demonstrates that the statute of 1361
marked the resolution of a long period of conflict between the
House of Commons (representing the interests of the gentry and
the burgesses) and members of the central government (notably
Sir Geoffrey Scrope, then Chief Justice of the King's Bench)
who, "wanted to rely on specially commissioned royal justices,
probably distinguished by lawyers and magnates, with extra-
ordinary powers to deal with all offences."(43) This conflict
was reflected in the changing powers of the J.P.s between 1327
and 1361 culminating in a victory for the gentry in the
Statute of 1361.
Because the magistracy was recruited exclusively from the
gentry, the growth of J.P.s powers in the period from 1361 to
1640, involved a steady strengthening of their political
power. This was significant because, at the same time, the
gentry were becoming increasingly converted to capitalist
agriculture(44) and were developing as an embryo capitalist
class with different interests to those of the Monarchy. By
the Cl6th and Cl7th, they were using their magisterial powers
to further their own interest, sometimes at the expense of
central government. For example, when discussing the Statute
of Artificers (1563), Hill observes that the power which this
gave magistrates to punish labourers who took more than the
minimum wage was a very useful weapon in their armoury as
employers. However, he also notes that this clause was not
always enforced: "On occasions, in areas where there was a
shortage of labour, J.P.s would wink at its infraction".(45)
The important point is that the law was enforced at the disc-
retion of the magistrates and if it was not in their interests
to enforce the law rigidly then they would ignore its infrac-
tion. In this particular example there was probably little
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conflict with the interests of the Crown but at other times
magistrates were prepared to exercise their discretionary
powers in direct oppositionfb the interests of the monarchy.
In particular, Charles I's final bid to create a fiscal base
through the imposition of a Ship Tax was sabotaged by the
refusal of J.P.s to operate it.(46)
The contradictory role of the gentry within the absolutist
state is summed up in the following passage from Christopher
Hill.
Thus England, in the words of Professor MacCaffrey,
became a hybrid political society, in which
centralized monarchy existed side by side with a
kind of confederation of local political interests.
Parliament represented these interests to the
central government. The latter depended on the
gentry as M.P.s for taxes, on the gentry as J.P.s
and deputy lieutenants for the maintainance of
order, and used gentlemen increasingly as civil
servants. Since it needed their support for the
break with Rome, it allowed them to purchase
monastic lands (or allowed members of other classes
to make themselves gentlemen through the purchase of
monastic lands) - in order that, as one gentleman
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purchaser put it, 'his heirs may be of the same mind
for their own profit'. Tudor governments thus
inevitably favoured the process which Professor
Tawney called 'the rise of the gentry'. By the time
that the gentry became collectively as strong as
the feudal baronage had been in the fifteenth
century, able to claim privileges and powers for the
House of Commons such as had previously been claimed
for the House of Lords, it was too late for Stuart
governments to reverse the process.
C. Hill Reformation to Industrial Revolution p.31.
It would seem then that the position of the magistracy was
more complex than has been suggested by the conventional
histories. In particular, the formation and the growth of the
institution of Justice of the Peace did not take place in a
social and political vacuum, but rather it appears to have
been closely related to the rise of the gentry and their
contradictory position within the absolutist state. Rather
than being a natural development, it can, perhaps, better be
understood as part of the new form of domination that emerged
in response to the crisis of feudalism. Moreover, although
magistrates were constrained by central government, the
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attempts to control their activities can be seen, not simply
as a show of strength, but as an attempt to resolve the
inherent contradictions within the absolutist state resulting
from its reliance upon an embryo class of capitalist land-
owners with different and sometimes conflicting interests to
those of the monarchy.
SUMMARY
Although, in covering such a vast historical period, we have
relied upon secondary sources, we have been able to outline
those features of the early development of the magistracy
which are important for our later analysis. Firstly, we have
seen that the range of powers entrusted to J.P.s grew enor-
mously between 1361 and 1640 to the extent that they were
responsible for virtually all aspects of local government.
Secondly, we have shown that this development did not occur in
isolation - as the conventional histories frequently imply -
but that it was the product of the social and political
formation of the period. In particular, the growth of the
magistracy was intimately connected with the growth of the
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gentry. This function of the county magistracy as the power
base of the gentry became increasingly important in the Cl8th
and their reluctance to lose it had a significant effect upon
the later developments in the Cl9th.
We have also suggested that the gentry magistrates const-
ituted a contradictory element within the absolutist state and
that, as they increasingly engaged in capitalist agriculture,
this created the strains which led to the series of attempts
by central government to control the activities of magist-
rates. In the following chapter, we will see that, with the
abolition of the absolutist state, these contradictions were
removed and the gentry magistracy emerged as a key element in
the transitional form of rule that characterised the Cl8th.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE RULE OF THE GENTRY
MAGISTRATES IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
Introduction 
A number of histories have shown that, in the period between
1689 and the early decades of the Cl9th, the English magist-
racy enjoyed greater power than at any time in its long
history. We will argue that magistrates did not simply grow in
strength during this period but that their functions changed
following the Civil War and the emergence of the rule of the
gentry.
The Powers Of Eighteenth Century Magistrates 
Conventional histories have shown that the Cl8th was a period
in which the powers of the English magistracy reached a peak.
These powers were organised on three levels. The highest level
was the Quarter Sessions which comprised of all the
magistrates in the county and which, after 1689, was the
supreme county authority. This body had a legal function
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similar to that of the Assizes in that it was formally
entitled to pass a sentence of death on certain offenders.(1)
It also had a rapidly growing administrative function. By 1689
it carried out the bulk of the civil administration of the
county:
The repairing of bridges, the maintainance of the
King's gaols, the building and management of the
newer Houses of Correction, the fixing of wages,
prices and rates of land carriage, the licensing of
various kinds of traders, the suppression of
disorderly houses, the sanctioning of special levies
for various parish needs, the confirmation or
disallowance of the orders of individual Justices or
pairs of Justices on every conceivable subject, were
among the multifarious civil functions of Quarter
Sessions.
S. & B. Webb The Parish and the County pp.296-297
This list was continually added to throughout the eighteenth
century. By this time the role of J.P.s as local admin-
istrators was beyond question and, whenever new legislatiion
was passed, responsibility for its administration in the
counties was invariably placed in their hands.
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At the next level were meetings of groups of magistrates in a
particular locality. These can be sub-divided into Special
Sessions and Petty Sessions. Special Sessions were monthly
meetings of magistrates in particular areas of the county.
At these local sessions, held at stated times and
places, only those Justices resident in the
Divisions were summoned, together with the local
Hundred and parish officers. If we may judge from
the Privy Council Order of 1605, there was nothing
that these Divisional Sessions were not competent to
deal with, except the actual trial of offences
requiring a Jury, and such orders for expenditure as
needed presentment by the Grand Inquest, or
appertained to the county as a whole.
S. & B. Webb The Parish and the County pp.297-298
Petty Sessions is the term used to describe those occasions
when two or more magistrates sat together to administer
summary justice. Although summary justice did not develop
fully until the Cl9th, magistrates in Petty Sessions already
had fairly wide powers to try and sentence certain types of
offenders. (2)
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Hence, there existed in 1689, alongside of the
Quarter Sessions and the Divisional Sessions, a
rough and ready organization of Petty Sessions or
Privy Sessions - informal meetings of two or three
justices at the village inn, or even in their own
parlours - to appoint Overseers of the Poor and
Surveyors of Highways, to allow their accounts, to
sanction the parish Poor Rate, to make orders for
the removal of paupers to their place of settle-
ment, to order the maintainance of a bastard child
by its reputed father, to commit to the House of
Correction parish officers who neglected to account
for their expenditure or parents who refused to
support their children, as well as to try, convict
and sentence persons guilty of various minor
offences, or to hear and commit for trial at Quarter
Sessions those accused of assault, petty larceny,
and graver offences against the law of the land.
S. & B. Webb The Parish and the County p299.
In addition to the powers that magistrates possessed when
sitting together they also possessed certain powers to act
alone. In their administrative role they were responsible for
the organisation of the Parish. Magistrates' control over
local officials dates back before the Civil War but during the
Cl7th and Cl8th this control was strengthened. For example, in
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1662 the power to appoint parish constables was transferred to
J.P.s(3) and in 1691 an Act was passed giving J.P.s power to
appoint the Surveyor of Highways.(4) Perhaps their most
important administrative duty was the control of Overseers of
the Poor. These officials were appointed by Petty Sessions but
the day-to-day control of their activities lay with individual
magistrates.(5) "And it was to the individual Justice, as much
as to High and Petty Constables, that Quarter Sessions looked
for the presentment, 'on his own view', of parishes and parish
officers for defaults in fulfilling their legal obligations -
a presentment which carried the same weight as if made by a
Jury of twelve sworn men."(6)
In their legal capacity, single magistrates had powers to
issue summonses requiring the defendant to appear at the next
Sessions and to issue warrants for the arrest of suspects.(7)
In certain cases, Single Justices were also empowered to
exercise a summary authority over offenders. Thus, "If he
heard a profane oath, discovered any person tippling in an
ale-house, or saw a man drunk, he could, 'on his own view',
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and without further evidence or formality, then and there
sentence the offender to pay a fine, commit him to prison in
default of payment, or order him to be put in the stocks for
four hours."(8) Any person not attending church could be fined
1 shilling, labourers attending a bull-baiting, or similar
sport, on a Sunday could be fined or set in the stocks, and
other forms of non-observance of the Sabboth (eg. carriers
conveying goods, or butchers killing beasts or selling meat)
could be dealt with even more severely.(9) But, according to
the Webbs, the greatest authority of a Single Justice lay in
his power to deal with vagrants.
If after hearing the evidence of a village
constable, or other witness, he chose to consider
any person, male or female, guilty of any act of
vagrancy, he might condemn such person to the
stocks, order him to be stripped from the middle up
and soundly whipped in public "until his back be
bloody', and then despatch him with an ignominious
pass to his last place of settlement."
S. & B. Webb The Parish and the County pp.300-301
rMagistates had one other important function which the Webbs do
A
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not discuss fully - i.e., they were responsible for policing
and keeping order in their districts. As we have seen,
magistrates had held this responsibility since their initial
formation. Thus, it was not a new power but it took on a new
dimension during the Cl8th with the passing of the notorious
'Riot Act' in 1714 which enabled them to use troops to force-
fully disperse a crowd - a power which they used against the
"food riots" that became an increasingly popular form of
social protest during this period.(10)
In fact, the strength of the magistracy was still greater than
the growth of their formal powers suggests because they were
simultaneously developing a range of informal powers which do
not appear in any Statute. Their extensive discretionary
powers and the absence of any effective control from above
enabled them to become a de facto legislature(11) At the
local level: "The same power of themselves deciding the cases,
coupled with the power to give commands to all officers of
townships or parishes, enabled the Justices, in practically
any detail of local administration, to convert their on
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opinions into mandatory enactments."(12) At the county level,
when the magistrates were gathered together in Quarter
Sessions, they could decide how to implement the various
Statutes for which they were responsible or, indeed, they
could choose not to implement them at all. Furthermore, the
fact that it became customary during this period for Parlia-
ment to distribute Bills to the magistrates in Quarter
Sessions and to ask their opinion before presenting them to
the House of Commons(13) suggests that central government gave
at least tacit encouragement to the growth of these informal
powers. The strength of the Cl8th magistrates is summed up
well by the Webbs when they discuss the transition from a
situation in which the county was administered by a quarterly
Court of Justice, answerable to higher courts (and generally
open') to the situation prevailing in the Cl8th in which
J.P.s, operating behind closed doors, had become both a legis-
lative and executive body with considerable autonomy from
central control.
We have now seen how, in the course of little more
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than a century, this judicial tribunal was, as
regards the civil administration of the county,
silently and almost imperceptibly replaced in every
county by an organised local legislature and
executive, composed exclusively of magistrates and
such persons as they chose to consult; meeting in
private at any dates and in any places; convened by
chairmen, served by salaried officials, and advised
by committees, all unknown to the legal constit-
ution; deliberating on any matters without formality
or notice; recording or not recording their 'orders'
as they chose; amending them, varying them, or
rescinding them as the haphazard majority of the
moment thought fit; and issuing them, with
undisputed authority, as friendly 'recommendations'
to all the Justices of the county, as 'requests' to
the local committees of Justices meeting in Special
and Petty Sessions, or as private 'instructions' to
their salaried executive staff, - even advertising
them to the ordinary citizen as the principles
according to which future judicial decisions would
be given.
S. & B. Webb The Parish and the County p550
Magistrates, Agrarian Capitalism And Gentry Rule 
However, although the Webbs offer an excellent description of
the powers of Cl8th magistrates, they make little or no
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attempt to locate the basis of this power in the underlying
social relations of the period. As will become apparent, they
introduce a class dimension into their account by illust-
rating some of the ways in which the gentry magistrates used
their position to protect their own property interests, but
the Webbs share a tendency with other historians of the
magistracy to portray the growth of magisterial powers as a
straightforward linear development of the powers acquired in
the Cl5th and Cl6th.
In the previous chapter we saw that both the class composition
of the magistracy and the growth of their powers can be traced
back at least 300 years before the Restoration, but their
position in the Cl8th was more than a simple continuation of
these trends. Rather than a gradual increase of magistrates'
powers, the position in the period after 1688 is divided fron
that discussed in the previous chapter by a fundamental break.
We have seen that the form taken by the magistracy prior to
1640 was closely related to the role of the gentry ,within the
absolutist state but, as the Civil har destroed the
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absolutist monarchy and the remnants of feudalism, the devel-
opment of the magistracy in the Cl8th can not be explained in
the same way. Rather, the period from 1688 to the early Cl9th
was a transitional period based upon early forms of agrarian
and mercantile capitalism. We have seen that the gentry were
becoming increasingly involved in capitalist agriculture and
that they were a powerful force in Britain during the Cl5th
and Cl6th but, as Christopher Hill has shown us, it was the
Revolution that brought them to ascendancy.
When the Civil War broke out in 1640 the loyalties of the
gentry were split with Parliament drawing its support largely
from the south and east, whereas Charles' strongholds were
largely in the north and west. This split reflects the uneven
nature of the development of capitalist agriculture which had
influenced many landowners in the south and east whilst the
northern and western parts of England had been relatively
unaffected.(14) However, the Revolution helped to destroy the
conservative gentry. The lands of Church and Crown and of many
leading Royalists were confiscated and sold and others were
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taxed to the verge of ruin.
For many owners of economically undeveloped estates
who were already desperately in debt, the period of
the Commonwealth and after represented a great fore-
closing on mortgages, capital at last getting its
own back against improvident landlords.
C. Hill The English Revolution 1640 p.54.
Land was restored to Church and Crown in 1660 and some of the
wealthier Royalists bought back their land before then but the
old order did not return.
...the mass of smaller Royalists who had sold their
estates privately after ruining themselves in the
cause, got no redress. And even where landowners
were restored, they were not restored on the old
conditions. Feudal tenures had been abolished in
1646, and confirmation of their abolition was the
first business Parliament turned its attention to
after recalling the King in 1660; the absolute
property rights of big landlords were secure.
Between 1646 and 1660 many of the confiscated lands
had passed into the possession of speculative purch-
asers, mostly bourgeois, who had inproved culti-
vation, enclosed, racked rents up to the rarket
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level. The returned Royalists had perforce to adapt
themselves to the new free market conditions, i.e.
to turn themselves into capitalist farmers or
lessors of their estates, or they went under in the
competitive struggle.
C. Hill The English Revolution 1640 p.58.
Thus, the Revolution hastened the process of conversion to
capitalist agriculture and by 1660, and certainly by 1688, the
gentry had become a fairly cohesive class of capitalist land-
owners who, having overthrown the absolutist monarchy, ruled
through their dual role of M.P. and J.P..
Thus, although in many ways the position described by the
Webbs represented an extension of powers that had been granted
to magistrates in an earlier period, the functions of the
magistracy changed in the Cl8th. Whereas, before the Civil
War, the magistracy had constituted an element within the
absolutist state, after 1688, it became a key part of the rule
of the gentry. Thus, the change that occurred as a result of
the Civil War and the Revolution was not a straightforward
growth of magistrates' powers, but a change in the form of the
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magistracy.
However, although Cl8th British society was dominated by
agrarian capitalism, this was a period of transition and this
is reflected in the nature of the magistracy. One of the most
obvious changes - and this has been noted by most conven-
tional historians, including the Webbs - was that Cl8th
magistrates were drawn almost exclusively from the gentry (or
beneficed clergy). They had always been drawn largely from
this class but, during the Cl8th, a number of factors helped
to strengthen the homogeneity of the magistracy. In
particular, the mode of appointment of magistrates changed so
that Lords Lieutenants rather than Assize Judges made
recommendations to the Lord Chancellor. This effectively put
an end to the appointment of "Justices of mean degree' because
the Lords Lieutenants did not recommend anyone likely to be
unwelcome to the existing magistrates. Another factor which is
sometimes pointed to in this connection is the Act of 1732(15)
which increased the property qualification to .E100. There is
some debate about whether this legislation in itself was
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sufficient to exclude "lesser men" from the Bench. Quinault
suggests that the qualification was deliberately fixed at a
low value to enable quite minor landowners to become
magistrates: "...it made eligible for admission to the Bench
men who, although attached to the propertied class, were in no
sense county magnates."(16) Osborne goes further and says
that, given the reduction in the value of money since 1439
(when the property qualification had been fixed at £20) the
1732 Act merely updated the property qualification in accord
with the inflation of the previous 300 years. For him the
figure of E100 was not, in itself, prohibitive. Rather, it
signalled the intention to restrict the composition of the
magistracy to the landed class.(17) Whatever the merits of the
positions of these authors, the fact remains that - with the
exception of manufacturing millionaires such as the Arkwrights
and the Strutts who were appointed to the county benches in
the late Cl8th and early Cl9th(18) - the social exclusivity of
the magistracy appears to have been maintained throughout the
Cl8th and:
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We accordingly leave the County Benches in 1835
composed (with either no clergymen or else a consid-
erable proportion of them) almost exclusively of the
principle landed proprietors within the county,
whose fathers and grandfathers had held their
estates before them; nearly all men of high standing
and personal honour according to their own social
code, but narrowly conventional in opinions and
prejudices; and - with the exception of the old Whig
families of the governing class who could not
decently be kept out - exclusively Tory in politics.
S. & B. Webb The Parish and the County p386
However, although the strengthening of the position of the
gentry on the magistrates' bench was a significant develop-
ment, the nature of gentry rule did not reside simply in the
personnel of the ruling class. Rather, the magistrates' court
formed an important part of the particular form of law that
emerged in the Cl8th.
The most striking feature of Cl8th law is the dramatic rise in
the number of property offences punishable by death -
according to Radzinowicz, there were 190 new capital offences
between 1688 and 1810 and the actual scope of the death
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penalty was still more extensive because of the way that some
of the statutes were drawn up.(19) This coincided with the
acceleration (following the removal of restrictions imposed by
central government) in the process through which the gentry
were enclosing the common land for their own private use.
Through this process, the gentry converted the common land
with its associated use rights into private property. In thus
restricting the use of the common land, they not only inter-
fered with long established customs and practices but also
threatened the destruction of the traditional economy which
depended upon these customary rights.(20) Rural labourers,
capitalist farmers and some of the lesser gentry, who were
excluded by this conversion of common land into private
property, responded by either destroying property or cont-
inuing to exercise their traditional rights to the use of the
land.(21) The series of capital statutes can be seen as an
attempt by the gentry to protect their newly acquired property
rights. However, as Douglas Hay, in his seminal work on Cl8th
criminal law, has shown, the number of offenders actually
executed during this period declined and it was the threat of
- 157 -
capital punishment, rather than the punishment itself, which
was important for the gentry's rule. The ever-present threat
of capital punishment enabled the gentry to exercise
discretion and thus enhance the dependancy of their social
inferiors.
Here was the peculiar genius of the law. It allowed
the rulers of England to make the courts a selective
instrument of class justice, yet simultaneously to
proclaim the law's incorruptible impartiality, and
absolute determinacy. Their political and social
power was reinforced daily by bonds of obligation on
one side and condescension on the other, as
prosecutors, gentlemen and peers decided to invoke
the law or agreed to show mercy. Discretion allowed
a prosecutor to terrorize the petty thief and then
command his gratitude, or at least the approval of
his neighbourhood as a man of compassion. It allowed
the class that passed one of the bloodiest penal
codes in Europe to congratulate itself on its
humanity. ... The law was important as gross
coercion; it was equally important as ideology. Its
majesty, justice and mercy helped to create the
spirit of consent and submission, the 'mind-forged
manacles', which Blake saw binding the English poor.
D. Hay Property Authority and the Criminal Law
pp.48 -49.
The dependency which was created in this way was an essential
part of Cl8th law in that it afforded an efective means of
protecting the property of the gentry. Hay has further shown
that the alternative penal code, envisaged by the reformers,
would have been of little benefit to the gentry. Their most
serious threat was from forgery because this was the only way
of taking their greatest possession - land - but forgery was
dealt with effectively by the existing penal code. The other
major threats to their possessions came from sabotage and from
their own servants. In both cases legal reform or the creation
of a police force would have made little difference and may in
fact have made the gentry more vulnerable because it would
have taken away their ability to grant pardons.(22) Those
whose property suffered most from the Cl8th penal code were
the 'middling men' (i.e., capitalist farmers, merchants and
the early industrialists) lower down the social scale who were
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not able to benefit from the informal elements embodied in the
Cl8th legal system. (23)
The nature of eighteenth century criminal law reflects the
transitional nature of this period. It was designed to protect
a traditional form of property right and was "less concerned
with the setting in motion of productive forces character-
istic of productive capital than with the appropriation of a
finished product".(24) It offered a legal protection to
property based upon privilege. The legal system, itself,
represented a form of direct domination based upon the terror
of capital punishment and the dependence resulting from the
gentry's ability to grant pardons.(25) Thus, although the
eighteenth century judicial system served to protect
(agrarian) capitalist property, it mirrored the transitional
nature of the period by retaining the characteristics of
absolutist rule, enforcing the privileges of property through
a form of direct domination.
In 'Property, Authority and the Criminal Law', Hay is largely
concerned with the higher levels of the Cl8th legal system but
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at the lower levels magistrates' courts also served to protect
gentry property. Magistrates had been granted summmary powers
to deal with certain offences before the Civil War, but,
during the Cl8th, the scope of these powers increased consid-
erably. The most frequent use of summary prosecutions was for
poaching but legislation was passed which:
... provided for summary conviction in cases of
theft, suspected theft, destruction or receiving of
trees, rails, wood, hollies, grain, fruit and
vegetables, turnips, goods on wrecks, metal, yarn
and wool, dogs, park pales, hedges, cattle and
horses or goods undefined. In addition most of the
vast mass of excise offences could be tried by
summary proceedings before two or more justices.
Vagrants in general and those possessing weapons in
particular could be punished, as could food rioters,
offenders against the turnpike acts, persons who
damaged floodgates and sea-walls, cheating
victuallers and bakers and alehousekeepers, those
who were caught damaging the property of any of
,
dozens of canals throughout the country, and
swearers of profane oaths.
D. Hay	 Crime, Authority and the Criminal Law
p.314.
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Hay's list is not complete(26) but it does give a fairly clear
idea of the extent of magistrates summary powers in this
period. At the same time, their powers to punish these
offences were also growing. In 1718 they were given the
statutory power to transport offenders and, according to
Christopher Hill, they used it widely.(27) In the same year
they were also empowered to issue whippings and this became
the major form of punishment throughout the Cl8th.(28)
This growth of summary jurisdiction, coupled with the virtual
absence of any checks from above,(29) enabled the gentry, in
their guise as magistrates, to further their own class
interests, particularly in their enforcement of the game laws.
Thus, in summing up the evidence from his study of Cannock
Chase, Hay says:
The Staffordshire evidence, though limited to the
correspondence of a few large landowners, shows a
highly discretionary use of the law, usually within
legal limits, but always sensitive to the require-
ments of authority and to the demands of the great
county magnates.
D. Hay	 Crime, Authority and the Criminal Law
p.308.
In support of this conclusion, Hay cites an example in which a
local J.P., by the name of Chetwynd, heard a case in which the
Earl of Uxbridge's witness gave contadictory evidence on the
vital point of whether she had seen the accused carrying a
deer into his house. Hay suggests that he ought to have
dismissed the case but, instead, he deferred it for two weeks
to enable him to confer with Uxbridge. In the later trial the
witness gave a new account of what happened which Chetwynd
accepted and which formed the basis for the conviction of the
defendant. The Webbs cite another oft-quoted instance
involving the Duke of Buckingham.
In 1822, a farmer coarsing hares on his own land,
with the permission of his own landlord, was
summoned by the keeper of the adjoining landowner
for doing so. The adjoining landowner in this
particular instance was the Duke of Buckingham, and
the farmer was literally convicted by the Duke
himself, in the Duke's private house, at the
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instance of one of the Duke's keepers, and on the
evidence of another of his keepers. The Duke refused
to permit the defendant to bring in an attorney to
help in the defence, and would not even allow a
friend to take notes. The latter was told that if he
uttered one impertinent word there was a constable
in the room to take him to the stocks.
Sir S.Walpole quoted in S. & B.Webb The Parish and
the County p.599.
Evidence of particular cases such as those cited above is
difficult to obtain because of the inaccessability of Petty
Sessions records, and the obvious reluctance of magistrates to
record irregularities. However, it is clear from the novels of
Swift, Fielding and others, together with the growing popular
discontent towards the way in which magistrates enforced the
game laws,	 that the above cases were not isolated
incidents.(30) This feeling was expressed vividly by Brougham
when he said:
There is not a worse constituted tribunal on the
face of the earth, not even that of the Turkish
Cadi, than that at which summary convictions on the
Game Laws constantly take place; I mean a bench or
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brace of sporting magistrates.
Quoted in J.L. & B. Hammond The Village Labourer
p.134
The class nature of the magistrates' enforcement of the game
laws was so naked that even an apologist such as Tobias cannot
avoid acknowledging it.
These severe laws were usually enforced by the local
gentry, in their capacity as justices of the peace.
Justices had more freedom of action against poachers
than against most offenders. Some writers regard the
game laws as class legislation in its most extreme
form. They point to the fact that the magistrates
were able to enforce the laws even when the crime
was said to have occurred in their own preserves or
in the preserve of their neighbours. It may
reasonably be thought that a landowner anxious to
protect the rights of property would be fairly easy
to convince that an adequate case had been made
against those brought before him on the charge of
poaching.
J. Tobias Crime and Police in England 1700-1900 
p.23.
Although the class nature of magistrates' justice in the Cl8th
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is revealed most clearly in their enforcement of the game
laws, this was not the only way in which it was manifest. In
the late Cl8th and early Cl9th, as urban areas began to expand
more rapidly, the increased flow of pedestrian traffic along
certain footpaths became a nuisance to the landowners
concerned and they frequently responded by blocking up
footpaths. Initially they took such actions without any legal
sanctions but an Act of 1815 formalised this power by enabling
any two magistrates to close any footpath which they deemed
unnecessary.
The Justices, in fact, did not scruple to give away
the public rights-of-way at the request of their
neighbours; they would even go so far as to make
such orders in the case of footpaths across their
own estates. It became common - so it was gravely
asserted in the House of Commons - for one magist-
rate to say to another, 'Come and dine with me: I
shall expect you an hour early as I want to stop up
a footpath'.
S. & B.Webb The Parish and the County p.601.
Similar observations have also been made about the ways in
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which magistrates used their authority in the building and
repair of roads and bridges. David Williams cites the example
of the suspension bridge at Llandovery, completed in 1832,
which was not near a main road and which, in the opinion of at
least one contemporary, had "no purpose other than the
convenience of magistrates living in the neighbourhood."(31)
The Webbs cite another example involving Robert Peel the elder
who attempted to divert the road from London to Liverpool to
run closer to his own home at the expense of the town of
Tamworth.(32) Although this particular attempt was frustrated
by a counter petition from the residents of Tamworth, the
above examples nevertheless illustrate the way in which
magistrates attempted to use their position to further their
own interests.
The above discussion, again, reveals the transitional nature
of the legal forms that eemerged in the Cl8th. The magist-
rates' courts, at the lower levels of the criminal justice
system, exhibited many of the same characteristics as the
higher courts discussed by Hay. Magistrates' justice was
largely beyond the control of central government and it
involved an authoritarian, direct and naked protection of the
property rights of the gentry. This system reflected the
continuities with the magistracy's absolutist past and it was
opposed by those groups, significantly representatives of the
embryo bourgeoisie (eg. Brougham), whose property was not
protected by this legal form and who objected in principle to
direct domination. We will see, in later chapters, that, as
this group grew in strength, they were able to mount a
successful challenge to the rule of the gentry, but, for the
remainder of the Cl8th and part of the Cl9th, magistrates'
courts survived in this transitional form.
The Eighteenth Century Magistracy As A
Transitional Form Of Class Rule 
The transitional nature of the eighteenth century magistracy
can further be seen in their policing role which also
displayed continuities with the pre-Civil War period, creating
its own set of contradictions. Magistrates continued to
enforce the poor law and the laws against vagrancy, which were
clearly designed to regulate the supply of labour and keep
down the level of rural labourers' wages(33) and, on
occasions, this led them to a suppression of the emergent
working class. Thus, for example, when discussing the Vagrancy
Laws, the Hammonds say that:
They were used to put into prison any man or woman
of the working class who seemed to the magistrates
an inconvenient or disturbing character. They
offered the easiest and most expeditious way of
proceeding against anyone who tried to collect money
for families of locked-out workmen, or to
disseminate literature that the magistrates thought
undesirable.
J.L. & Barbara Hammond The Town Labourer p.49.
However, magistrates' exercise of their public order function
was more complex than this might suggest. This can be seen
most clearly in the relations between magistrates and the
Cl8th "crowd". The Cl8th witnessed a number of food riots
throughout the country which, until recently, historians have
tended to portray as irrational actions. Recent work by Rude,
Hobsbawm and, particularly, Thompson has shown that, far from
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being mindless, food riots reflected the attempts of Cl8th
labourers to protect traditional customs regarding the sale of
food - especially grain and bread.(34) Seen in this way, the
Cl8th food riots reflect the conflict between traditional
customs and laissez-faire capitalist market principles, with
the crowd protecting the former and capitalist farmers trying
to operate according to the latter. Insofar as these riots
constituted a problem of public order, magistrates were
inevitably drawn in as mediators of this conflict and it was
common for them to side with the crowd against engrossers,
forestallers, etc..
In this tradition we find a London magistrate in
1795 who, coming on the scene of a riot in Seven
Dials where the crowd was already in the act of
demolishing the shop of a baker accused of selling
light-weight bread, intervened, seized the baker's
stock, weighed the loaves, and finding them indeed
deficient, distributed the loaves among the crowd.
E.P. Thompson The Moral Economy of the English 
Crowd p.107.
Other historians have shown that magistrates were prepared to
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support the 'crowd' even when this went against the directives
that they received from central government.
Scarcity sometimes revealed a conflict between the
local authorities and the central government. ... in
these shortages the central government was often
acting against the natural inclination of local
magistrates in emphasising the free circulation of
grain. The local authorities could be prevented by
legislation from interfering with the movement of
grain about the country, but little could be done to
prevent local magistrates from intervening in the
marketing of food in their own area. Thus in many
towns the local magistrates took the initiative in
arranging a reduction of prices with the food
dealers, as for example at Banbury in 1800. In the
same year at Nottingham it was reported that the
J.P.s were considering taking over the corn trade
from the dealers. At Brandon in 1816 the magist-
rates agreed to press the corn dealers for a
reduction in prices. In other places the authorities
revived the medieval instrument of the assize of
bread, which fixed bread prices in relation to the
cost of grain. In places where it had ceased to be
observed, a number of exemplary prosecutions were
undertaken. Similarly, the legislation against
monopolistic practices was revived and prosecutions
undertaken. In 1800 the most important trial was
that of John Rusby, a London corn dealer before Lord
Kenyon, for regrating.
J. Stevenson Food Riots in England 1792-1818 p.61.
And again:
In the 1790s the authorities of Cardiganshire and
Pembrokeshire sought to prevent violence by
attacking the root of popular unrest. They gave
severe warnings to forestallers and regrators, and
placed restrictions on the trade in corn. This
policy ran directly counter to that adopted by the
government, and the Pembrokeshire magistrates were
severely criticised by the Duke of Portland. Another
attempt to interfere on the side of the lower
classes came in 1831, when anxious Swansea magist-
rates enforced the payment of wages in money, not
goods.
D.J.V. Jones Before Rebecca p.168.
There are a number of reasons why magistrates acted in this
way. It can be explained in part by the fact that, in many
instances, they had little choice. As Thompson says, one of
the problems of the weak state - the source of J.P.s powers in
this period - was the licence of the crowd which left indiv-
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idual magistrates vulnerable to personal attack.(35) Sometimes
this took the form of written threats(36) and at other times
it involved attacks on magistrates' property. Thus, when
discussing an incident in Sheffield, Thompson says:
In 1792 the two magistrates lived out of town, one
at a distance of fourteen miles the other having
made some efforts during the riots last year
relative to some enclosures, the populace burned
part of his property, and since that time he has
been very little in the country.
E.P. Thompson The Making of the English working
Class p.165
And, Stevenson, when discussing the Gordon Riots, says:
The mob also turned its attention to the justices
involved in arresting men for the attacks on the
Sardinian chapel. The houses of Mr. Rainforth in
Clare Street and of Mr. Maberly, in Little Queen
Street were attacked and demolished; at midnight a
mob attacked George Saville's house in Leicester
Square, damaging the windows, railings and some of
the furniture before the Guards intervened. Burke's
house too was threatened...
About five o'clock Justice Hyde read the Riot Act
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and ordered the Horse Guards to disperse the crowds
outside parliament. One of the crowd hoisted a red
and black flag and shouted 'To Hyde's house a-hoy',
and the crowd surged off to St. Martin's Street
where Hyde's house was located and turned its
furniture into the street where it was devoured by
half a dozen bonfires.
J. Stevenson Popular Disturbances In England p.80
Occasionally, magistrates, themselves, suffered physical abuse
from the crowd.
In these circumstances justices of the peace inevit-
ably became the target of intimidation. Some
received threatening letters, while others had more
humiliating and frightening experiences. As we have
seen a Merioneth justice who was trying to execute
the act for raising men for the navy was forced to
wear wooden shoes. At Denbeigh, Abermule (Mont-
gomeryshire), and in the Rhymney Valley, magist-
rates were imprisoned for several hours and forced
to grant concessions. The authorities at Denbigh
even had to pay the lower orders for their loss of
time. Worse still rioters sometimes injured
justices. Richard Watkin Price was assaulted on his
way to quell a disturbance at Bala in May 1815, and
Edward Frere was clubbed during the strike of 1822.
It was fear of such attacks which made magistrates
reluctant to read the Riot Act without the presence
of a considerable body of constables or soldiers.
D.J.V. Jones Before Rebecca p.172
Even if magistrates were willing to act against the crowd they
faced the possibility that they would be confronted with legal
action	 resulting	 from their handling of riots.
	
As
Radzinowicz(37) has pointed out, magistrates were in a legal
double bind. On the one hand, the common law imposed a strict
duty upon them to suppress riots and they were criminally
liable if they did not do so. On the other hand, if their
actions resulted in the death of any one not guilty of
participating in the riot, they might find themselves - like
Samuel Gillam in 1768 - defending a murder charge. A common
response to this dilemma seems to have been for magistrates to
retreat from the trouble spot entirely or, failing this, to do
nothing. By following this course they were less likely to be
implicated and, even if they were, it may have been prefer-
able to be tried for neglect of duty than to face the
hostility of the crowd and/or a possible murder charge.
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The historical evidence suggests that both the hostility of
the crowd and the possibility of legal action were signif-
icant factors influencing magistrates' actions but this does
not explain the fact that magistrates often took positive
action in favour of the crowd. It is concievable that such
actions were conscious attempts to reinforce the complex web
of mutual obligations that existed between the rural labourers
and the gentry, thus strengthening the authority of the
latter. However, although magistrates' support for the crowd
may well have functioned in this way, there is no evidence to
suggest that it was based upon a calculated self-interest. It
would seem more likely that they were acting on the basis of
more genuine motives in support of causes that they consid-
ered to be just. They were a class that had been moulded in a
period before the advent of laissez-faire capitalism which was
a philosophy as alien to them as it was to their labourers.
Although the gentry enjoyed a privileged position within 18th
century society, they shared many of the same values and
traditions as their labourers. For much of the Cl8th the
gentry were united with their labourers in opposing both
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laissez-faire market principles and the new industrial
bourgeoisie. They refused to allow men of trade to sit on the
county benches(38) and, on occasions, magistrates were
prepared to ignore their responsibility to maintain order and
actually encourage 'the crowd' in acts of intimidation against
dissenters and radicals. This is illustrated in the following
account of the Priestley Riots.
At the very least the magistrates showed an unwanted
incompetence. There are numerous earlier testi-
monies to the efficiency, reliability and zeal of
"Justice" Caries as the most active local magist-
rate. Faced with the probability of a riotous
outbreak on 14th July he allowed himself to get
drunk, and intervened in a half-hearted manner only
when it was too late. He then washed his hands of
the whole affair. Still more serious charges may be
made. Caries and Spencer were present when the mob
first gathered at the Royal Hotel to hiss the
bastille diners, and made no effort to caution or
disperse them. Although they acted to protect the
Hotel in the evening, they did so merely by
directing the rioters to the Unitarian meetings.
This accusation was made by deponents against all
three magistrates, both severally and jointly.
Brooke, who is even said to have bribed the
mob-leaders to go to the New Meeting, had adequate
private and personal reasons for so doing, apart
from any public antipathy towards the Unitarians;
his house stood next to the Hotel and was thus in
imminent danger from the lawless crowd. This may
help to explain why his clerk, Matthew Jones,
boasted in 1793 that he, Jones, had personally led
the mob to the New Meeting on 14th July.
There is general agreement among witnesses that the
magistrates promised the rioters protection as long
as they restricted their attacks to the meeting-
houses and left persons and property alone, and that
the promise was kept. When T.W. Hill, one of
Priestley's congregation, siezed one of the rioters
outside Fair Hill on the night of 14th-15th July and
took him to gaol, the prisoner was promptly
released, the keeper informing Hill that he had
orders to take no prisoners that night. The
following morning, when George Humphreys applied to
Spencer for protection for his house, he was met
with abuse and advised to "go home and burn your
seditious papers or it will be the worse for you."
According to Whitbread, while the riot was still in
its early stages the magistrates turned down an
offer of assistance from a recruiting party then in
Birmingham and dismissed them. Two witnesses agree
that Spencer, or Spencer and Caries, released one of
the looters who had been seized while attacking
Ryland's house between 1 and 2 p.m. on 15th July.
Further affidavits support the general charge that
Carles and Spencer remained on affable terms with
the rioters right up to the arrival of the military,
and the specific accusation that even as late as 9
or 10 p.m. on 17th July Caries urged the rioters in
Thomas Street "not to leave those presbyterian dogs
a place standing." It seems probable, however,that
this sympathy was only apparent, and tactical, for
other witnesses agree that Spencer tried to get the
rioters at Priestley's house to desist at 5 or 6
a.m. on the 15th, and that Carles and Brooke both
made attempts to disperse the crowd around Ryland's
house the same afternoon. They had, Caries is
alleged to have said, "gone past what they were
ordered. (39)
R. Rose The Priestley Riots of 1791 pp.80-82
This hostility towards the principles of laissez-faire and its
proponents also lies behind the sympathetic actions of magist-
rates towards 'food rioters' and workmen. For example, when
discussing the seamen's strike on Tyneside in 1792, Stevenson
says:
Often a genuine desire to find a settlement within
the local community helps to explain the reluctance
of magistrates to call on outside help, hence it was
usually only when affairs clearly got out of hand
that the troops were called in. ... Workmen could
often call on a greater degree of sympathy from
magistrates and local gentry than has sometimes been
allowed by historians determined to see in these
conflicts a class dimension which serves to obscure
the complexities of the relationships involved.
J. Stevenson	 Popular Disturbances In England
1700-1870 p.132.
The values and customs which the crowd were attempting to
protect were part of a traditional culture, not based upon
capitalist private property, in which the gentry shared and it
is likely, therefore that, at least occasionally, "a concil-
iatory policy was not forced upon the justices but was the
result of their sympathy with the rioters."(40)
Towards the end of the Cl8th and in the early Cl9th, we can
detect the beginnings of a change in the way that magistrates
exercised their public order function. During this period the
beginnings of an organised working class coupled with the
revolutionary climate abroad and the intrusion, in some areas,
of manufacturers onto the Bench drove the gentry closer to the
industrial bourgeoisie.
But at the moment when the men's grievances were
loudly and effectively voiced, at that moment also
they threatened the values of order. The old-
fashioned squire might sympathise with a famished
stockinger who appeared as a passive plaintiff at
his door. He had no sympathy at all with secret
committees, demonstrations in the streets, strikes,
or the destruction of property.
E.P. Thompson The Making of the English Working
Class p.596.
The emergent working class constituted a more serious threat
to both the property and the social position of the gentry
magistrates than did the rural labourers. Not only did they
not receive the same sympathy but they were clamped down upon
by magistrates in a variety of ways. "Undesireables" were
punished under the Vagrancy Laws(41); working class activists
received heavy sentences in the magistrates" courts(42);
publicans were pressured not to allow radical groups to use
their rooms(43), and; political meetings were met with
force.(44) Perhaps, more significantly, legislation which was
supposed to apply equally to both masters and men (such as the
Combination Laws and the Truck Acts) became redundant because
of the magistrates' refusal to implement it. According to the
Hammonds, magistrates took it for granted that if the masters
would not obey these laws then there was nothing that could be
done to enforce them.
When the trouble became serious they met, not to put
the Truck Acts into operation against the masters,
but the Vagrancy Acts against the men. As they could
not persuade the masters to obey the law, they sent
them to prison for trying to make them do so.
J.L. & B. Hammond The Town Labourer p.46.
This is not to say that there was a sudden or total with-
drawal of sympathy in the late Cl8th and early Cl9th. There
were still instances during this period - such as the attack
on Arkwright's factory in 1779(45) - when workers received
some support from local magistrates. Rather, the attitudes of
the authorities were split between those who were clearly
opposed to the working class and those who still retained a
hostility towards laissez-faire capitalism and a sympathy with
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their social subordinates who opposed it.(46) However, these
developments are indicative of the more profound changes that
were to take place later in the Cl9th. The growth of
industrial capitalism was both undermining the rule of the
gentry and strengthening the position of the industrial
bourgeoisie. The growth of an organised working class was
beginning to undermine the network of informal relationships
between the gentry and their subordinates which formed the
basis of their authority and the bourgeoisie were beginning to
challenge the legal and political forms that constituted the
rule of the gentry. This process was by no means complete by
the late Cl8th but we can detect the start of a change that
was to result in the radical transformation of the magist-
racy.
Summary
In this chapter, we have seen that the magistracy emerged
after 1688 as a still more powerful force than they had been
before the Civil War. This was not a simple linear develop-
ment of the growth of their powers that had begun under the
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Tudors and Stuarts. Although the powers that magistrates had
in the Cl8th were similar to those that they had been granted
in their earlier history, the functions of the magistracy
underwent a subtle but, nonetheless, significant change.
Whereas they had previously constituted part of the absol-
utist state, they now formed an important element within the
rule of the gentry. Just as this was a transitional period in
the development of British capitalism, so, too, was it a
transitional period in the form taken by the magistracy.
Although the gentry were engaged in capitalist agriculture,
they were a class that had been formed under centuries of
feudalism. This was important in two major respects. Firstly,
the legal and political forms that they developed were closely
related to the forms that had existed under absolutism. Thus,
although their rule was geared to the protection of property
interests, it offered little protection to the property of
capitalist farmers and the nascent bourgeoisie and it took the
form of a direct rule based upon privilege, terror and oblig-
ation. Secondly, the gentry remained opposed to the prin-
ciples of laissez faire capitalism and acted, particularly in
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their policing role, to protect traditional customs, for
example, in the sale of bread and grain.
This was to lead the gentry into conflict with the emerging
industrial bourgeoisie, whose interests were generally not
well served by gentry rule and who, with their commitment to a
liberal philosophy based upon laissez faire economics and
indirect, representative government, were opposed in prin-
ciple to the legal and political forms developed by the
gentry. In the Cl8th, industrial capitalism was still in its
infancy and we can only detect the beginnings of the changes
that were to come, but this conflict between the bourgeoisie
and the gentry was to lead to a fundamental transformation of
the English magistracy.
CHAPTER SIX
MAGISTRATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Introduction 
In Chapter Four we have seen that, during the Cl8th, Justices
of the Peace acquired a range of powers and an autonomy from
central government which enabled them to combine judicial,
administrative and executive functions in a way which made
them the virtual rulers of the counties. During the course of
the Cl9th, the magistracy underwent a transformation in which
it was stripped of most of these powers and emerged in its
modern form as a lower court of criminal justice. In this and
the following two chapters we will examine this transform-
ation in some detail in an attempt to offer a better under-
standing of the modern magistrates' court and the nature of
magistrates' justice.
In this chapter we will analyse the process through which
local government was taken out of the control of the magist-
rates and handed over to elected councils and other bodies.
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Our argument will be that this transference of power from the
unrepresentative magistracy to the nascent organs of the
modern state can only be fully understood in the context of
the emergence of industrial capitalism. This is not to suggest
that it was simply the product of a 'logic of capitalism' but
rather, as we will see, that it was the outcome of a struggle
between the bourgeoisie and the gentry.
The End Of An Era
The process of stripping magistrates of their administrative
functions was contested and drawn out and it lasted for most
of the Cl9th but it began fairly suddenly in the second
quarter of the Cl9th. Between 1828 and 1835 a number of Acts
were passed which, when taken together, mark the end of
magisterial dominance of local government. During this short
period magistrates powers to control the sale of liquor were
curtailed(1); responsibility for inspecting cotton factories
was transferred to the Home Office(2); they lost all authority
over the administration of highways(3);their administration of
prisons was brought under the stricter control of the Home
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Office(4); the Poor Law Amendment Act (1834) established
elected authorities (Boards of Guardians) to replace the
magistracy in the supervision of vagrancy(5), and; the
Municipal Corporations Act (1835) transferred responsibility
for all aspects of local government to elected councils in the
boroughs. In addition to this legislation transferring admin-
istrative powers from magistrates to other bodies,a number of
Acts were passed creating new administrative functions in
which the magistracy was completely ignored.(6) This set the
pattern for the remainder of the Cl9th and as successive
reforms were passed creating new local government functions,
it was no longer usual to place responsibility for their
administration with magistrates. This was devolved to the
borough councils, Boards of Guardians, Government Inspectors,
or other special bodies beyond the influence of the magist-
racy.
In their discussion of this period, the Webbs argue that these
changes resulted from the growing unpopularity of the magist-
racy in the first part of the Cl9th. They argue that in
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addition to the widespread dissatisfaction with the Middlesex
'trading justices', who were becoming increasingly corrupt,
the magistracy was disliked even in its honest administ-
ration. This discontent derived from a number of quarters. The
Tories and their brewer friends objected to the regulation of
inns and alehouses as an interference in their capital
investment; ratepayers objected to attempts to obey the
injunctions of parliament in building new prisons, asylums and
bridges because these projects added to the expense of the
county rates; labourers objected to the efforts to limit the
generosity of the Overseers of the Poor, and; both bourgeois
Radicals and labourers objected to the arbitrariness and
severity with which the game laws were administered.(7) As a
result, the magistracy was "individually and collectively
denounced on every platform and criticised in every newspaper.
By one powerful party they were threatened with annihil-
ation."(8)
According to the Webbs the growing dissatisfaction with the
magistracy reached a crescendo in the 1830s and this was the
- 189 -
major factor underlying the stripping of their administrative
functions at this time. However, although we may accept that
criticism of the magistracy increased during this period, it
does not adequately account for the nature of the changes that
occurred. Firstly, as the Webbs themselves point out, the
magistracy emerged from this period with less actual change
than other local governing authorities of the time.(9)
Yet against the institution of unpaid justice of the
peace, the method of his appointment, or the
comprehensive powers recited in the ancient
Commission of the Peace, no adverse action was
taken, even under the Reform Ministry.
S. & B. Webb The Parish and the County p.605.
Thus, although many of their administrative powers were
transferred, the institution of the Justice of the Peace
remained unchallenged. Given that the Webbs argue that the
undemocratic nature of the appointment of the magistracy lay
at the root of popular discontent, the fact that this instit-
ution remained not only unchanged but unchallenged implies
that the discontent with the magistracy was not as strong a
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force for change as the Webbs suggest. Secondly, and more
importantly, the Webbs fail to place these changes within the
context of the changing nature of British society in the early
Cl9th. In the previous chapter we have seen that the powers
that the magistracy acquired in the Cl8th were an important
element in the form of rule that emerged in early (agrarian)
capitalism. By the late 1820s and 1830s, the class formation
was changing bringing new ideologies which resulted in a call
for new legal and political forms. In this period we can see
the champions of the new order (sometimes with the support of
the industrial working class) begin to stand up and challenge
the defenders of the old order. The loss of magistrates' local
government functions reflects the changing balance in the
struggle between these two groups. The replacement of the
undemocratic rule of the gentry with new forms based upon the
twin principles of (a) no taxation without representation, and
(b) the separation of judicial and executive powers repre-
sents a series of victories for the industrial bourgeoisie.
Osborne suggests that the New Poor Law (1834) was a turning
point in the history of the magistracy because it marked the
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Great Divide between their legal and administrative
functions(10) but the Municipal Corporations Act constituted
an even more fundamental attack on the rule of the gentry.
When discussing this Act, the Webbs suggest that, although the
1832 Reform Act "struck at them as citizens of state", the
Municipal	 Corporations	 Act	 "struck	 at	 their	 local
predominance,	 their social superiority,	 their personal
authority, and their power of dealing with local rates."(11)
In view of the importance of this Act both in terms of the
demise of the old order and the loss of magistrates' administ-
rative powers we will examine the passage of this measure
through Parliament in detail to illustrate the way in which
the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the gentry resulted
in new political forms.
The 1835 Municipal Corporations Act 
The Bill that was introduced, by Russell, on 5th June 1835
proposed to abolish the old corporations for 183 of the
boroughs in England and Wales.(12) In their place were to be
created town councils elected by all ratepayers who had paid
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their poor rates regularly for at least three years. These
councils were to be responsible for the administration of
local government within the boundaries of their borough and,
in those boroughs that were granted a Commission of the Peace,
they would be responsible for nominating magistrates to the
Home Secretary. The only concession made to the corporations
was that magistrates were to have a share in the control of
the police. The sill proposed to create Watch Committees which
would be constituted of one half magistrates and one half
councillors. (13)
Although this Bill was approved by the House of Commons the
House of Lords passed a series of debilitating amendments
contradicting the initial aims of the Bill. They passed: an
amendment designed to preserve the property rights of
freemen;(14) an amendment which imposed a property qualif-
ication for councillors;(15) an amendment to increase the
proportion of councillors exempt from election (i.e. aldermen)
to one quarter;(16) an amendment to allow existing magist-
rates to sit indefinitely;(17) an amendment allowing town
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clerks to hold their office for life,(18) and; a new clause
which stated that only members of the established English
Church would be able to vote on the distribution of Church
patronage.(19) The Bill was returned to the Commons in its
mutilated form and eventually a compromise was reached whereby
the property qualification for councillors remained, the
proportion of aldermen remained at one quarter but they were
to be elected for six year periods only, and existing magist-
rates and town clerks were not allowed to hold their office.
Thus, the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act was a compromise
measure which, whilst transferring the local government
functions of borough magistrates to elected councils, retained
a role for the old establishment. Many commentators on this
period have seen it purely in party political terms as an
attempt by Russell to challenge the Tory monopoly of control
in the boroughs. There can be no doubt that this was one
effect of the Act. Prior to the 1835 Act, the vast majority of
boroughs in England and Wales were controlled by the Tories
whereas the new councils were elected by the local ratepayers
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and (at least in the more industrial areas) were composed of
Whig/Liberals. Moreover, Russell appears to have used his
position as Home Secretary to increase the number of Whig
magistrates in the new municipalities. Thus, in a Commons
debate, Peel (the leader of the Tories in the Commons) cites
examples	 from	 Guildford,
	
Wigan,
	 Rochester,	 Coventry,
Leicester, Plymouth and Bristol to show how Russell exercised
party bias in the appointment of borough magistrates.(20)
Russell countered by referring to the difficulties of deter-
mining an individual's political allegiance and by saying that
he believed that the people he had appointed would not allow
their politics to prevent them doing their duty as magist-
rates. Other M.P.s who spoke in support of Russell also point
out that Peel had been partisan when he was Home Secretary and
they accused him of only "caring about justice, at the moment
when the right hon. baronet finds it impossible to preserve
that system of Tory domination over the people which he has so
long exercised."(21) Nevertheless, neither Russell, nor his
supporters, denied the fact that he had appointed a disprop-
ortionate number of Whig/Liberal magistrates and it is
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political opportunism of this kind that has led some comment-
ators to imply that party political motives were the major
force underlying the Municipal Corporations Act. However, if
the Bill was simply a piece of political manipulation by
Russell, we would have expected a concerted opposition from
the Tories but this was not the case. Although there was
strong opposition to the Bill in the House of Lords, in the
Commons disagreement was confined to details such as whether
freemen ought to be allowed to retain their traditional privi-
leges and whether responsibility for licencing ale-houses
should be in the hands of magistrates or town councils.(22)
The Tories in the House of Commons supported both the prin-
ciple of elected municipal councils and the need for local
government reform. (See below)
A second common explanation of the Municipal Corporations Act
has been that it was motivated by a desire to stamp out
corruption in the administration of the boroughs. Again, there
is certainly some evidence to support this interpretation,
most notably from the Select Committee on Municipal Corpor-
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ations that reported in 1833. The Committee's report provided
abundant evidence of partisanship, corruption, and loss of
public confidence in the corporations. Consider the following
evidence taken from Mr. Herbert (a magistrate in Ansty, near
Coventry).
888. Is the management of the corporation gener-
ally respected by the inhabitants of the city of
Coventry? - I believe not.
889. Upon what grounds? - The management of their
affairs is entirely within their own vortex, so that
nobody knows anything about it; nobody can tell
anything about their affairs but one of their own
body; it is so close and compact a concern, it can
be investigated only by those who know its concerns.
890. Is there any feeling with respect to the
manner in which justice is administered? - The
impression is that the magistrates are great
partisans; and we should say speaking broadly upon
the subject, that a man who is not in their party
would do better to hush up any quarrels that he had
than go before them. I myself do not choose to go
before them, and therefore I cannot charge them with
injustices to myself; in fact, I have no occasion; I
prefer, if I have a little difficulty with my
people, to settle it than to litigate it.
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891. Is that from a feeling that you entertain,
that the administration of justice is not likely to
be satisfactory? - It is certainly not; I have had
no occasion but in two instances to trouble them at
all; in both cases I was absent from Coventry, and I
have no reason to complain of their decision.
892. Can you speak of the general impression upon
that point? - The general impression is that from
their being so implicated in party proceedings, that
an opponent is better away.
893. What do you mean by party feelings? -
Political feelings.
Report From The Select Committee on Municipal 
Corporations, 1833, p.38
A little later Mr. Herbert adds:
The impression upon my mind is, that the general
feeling against the magistrates was founded upon
their partial conduct in the distribution of gifts;
and when the magistrates act partially in the
distribution of money in their hands as trustees, it
destroys in some measure the confidence of the
public in applying to them for justice.
Report From The Select Committee on Municipal 
Corporations, 1833, p.39
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This evidence of partisanship and public dissatisfaction is
typical of the evidence presented by the majority of the
boroughs. When introducing the Bill in the House of Commons,
Russell refers to this Report and he uses the evidence of
corruption to support the case for a more democratic form of
municipal government. As we will see shortly, this was also a
factor behind Peel's support for this measure but there is a
major problem with those accounts of the passing of the
Municipal Corporations Act which explain it purely in these
terms in that they can not explain why there was a desire to
eliminate corruption. These histories imply that the answer to
this question is obvious - it was part of a general process of
'civilization' leading to the best possible democratic
political system that it is assumed exists in modern Britain.
From this viewpoint, the creation of elected borough councils
in place of the self-recruiting, corrupt corporations is
simply one stage in this apparently inevitable process. As
such, the question of why leading politicians should wish to
abolish the old corporations does not arise. They are the
'great men
,
 of history, men of principle with the strength of
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purpose to enact reforms. However, if it was an inevitable
development, why was there so much resistance to it in the
House of Lords? Within this framework it is not possible to
explain the conflict that arose around this issue other than
perhaps in terms of an innate conservatism attempting to block
the march of progress. It is assumed that the transference of
local government to elected bodies was a general good which
served the interests of everybody. However, this rides rough-
shod over the nature of the class conflict between the indust-
rial bourgeoisie and the representatives of the old order.
Following the 1832 Reform Act, the composition of the House of
Commons altered with an influx of industrialists and other
representatives of the bourgeoisie. Their interests were not
served by the political forms that excluded them from local
government and they pressed for new forms based upon bourgeois
principles. This led them into conflict with the represent-
atives of the old order who clung to the traditional prin-
ciples of government. The basis of this conflict was spelt out
by the 1833 Select Committee. Their report criticises the
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undemocratic principles on which the old corporations were
based.
The principle that prevails of a small portion of
Corporators choosing those who are to be associated
with them in power, and generally for life, is felt
to be a great grievance. The tendency of this
principle is to maintain an exclusive system, to
uphold local, political and religious feelings, and
is destructive of that confidence which ought always
to be reposed in those who are entrusted with
control, judicial or otherwise, over their fellow
citizens.
Report From The Select Committee On Municipal 
Corporations, 1833, p.iv
It then goes on to recommend that they should be replaced by
more responsible bodies:
Your Committee are further led to infer that Corpor-
ations, as now constituted, are not adapted to the
present state of society; the Corporate Officers are
not identified with the Community, who have rarely
any influence in choosing them, and have no control
over their proceedings; Corporate Officers, even the
highest rank, are not always objects of desire, and
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are likely to be less so now that the political
influence of Corporations has been much diminished.
To make Corporations instruments of useful and
efficient Local Government, it seems to be essential
that the Corporate Officers should be more popularly
chosen; that the Officers should be accessible to
all that have entitled themselves by their good
conduct to good opinion and confidence of their
fellow-citizens; that their proceedings should be
open and subject to the control of Public Opinion;
and that it should be felt by the Community that the
maintainance of Order, and the equal administration
of Justice in all things, depend on the energy and
principle of the Corporate Officers.
Report From The Select Committee On Municipal 
Corporations, 1833, p.vi
The principles behind these recommendations were more closely
identified with the Whigs, but the Tories were also able to
accept them when applied to the boroughs partly because of the
feeling that borough justices were of mean degree and,
therefore, unfit but, also, because of their growing concern
about the ability of the old corporations to preserve order.
The Webbs suggest that this concern reached a crescendo
following the riots in Bristol and a series of other towns
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governed by Close Corporations in 1831(23) and it is clearly
evident in Peel's speech in favour of the Bill:
...if in any case corporate privileges are found to
be an obstacle either to pure administration of
justice, or to the establishment of a good system of
police and general government, we are willing to
admit, that the regard for the special privileges
ought not to bar the consideration of whatever may
conduce to the authority of the law, and to the
maintainance of public order. We therefore, shall
offer no opposition to the second reading of this
Bill. Sir, I cannot contemplate the condition of
some of the great towns of this country, and witness
the frequent necessity of calling in the military in
order to maintain tranquility, without feeling
desirous that the inhabitants of such towns should
be habituated to obedience and order through the
instrumentality of an efficient civil power, and a
regular and systematic enforcement of the law. I
believe that you could not establish a system of
good government in the populous towns and cities of
this country, retaining at the same time every
existing privilege and practice of the corporate
bodies as at present constituted; and I think it
much better to place those towns under the exclusive
control of a corporate authority, invigorated and
adapted to the present state of society, than to
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leave the ancient Corporation precisely where we
find it - devolving at the same time real power, and
almost all the functions of administrative authority
upon some new body constituted on a different and
more popular principle.
Parliamentary Debates, Vol.28, 15th June 1835,
cc.831 -832
Thus, although for slightly different reasons, both parties in
the Commons supported the bourgeois principle of responsible
government when it applied to the boroughs. The main
opposition came from the aristocratic representatives of the
gentry in the House of Lords who were not prepared to accept
any interference with traditional privileges. The main
spokesmen against the Bill were the Duke of Newcastle and Lord
Lyndhurst. Newcastle's speeches were filled mainly with
rhetoric against the way in which petitions against the Bill
had been got up and his proposed response was to simply throw
the Bill out. (24) It was Lyndhurst who adopted the more subtle
approach of passing a series of debilitating amendments. As we
have seen, this tactic enabled Lyndhurst to win a number of
concessions from Russell but the outcome was nevertheless a
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victory for the bourgeoisie. The Webbs describe it as a
victory which established "the middle class shopkeeper,
miller, or merchant" in power.(25) This is certainly true but
the bourgeois victory lay not simply in changing the personnel
in charge of local government but also in changing its form.
The Municipal Corporations Act not only embodied the principle
of responsible government, but also, by taking away magist-
rates' administrative powers, it facilitated the separation of
judicial from administrative and executive powers.
Thus, we can see that the Municipal Corporations Act was
closely linked to the growth of industrial capitalism. This is
not to say that this form of local government was in any way
an inevitable product of the logic of capitalist social
relations. Rather, it was the outcome of a struggle fought out
by specific groups within the political arena formed by the
particular social formation that existed in Britain in the
mid-1830s. The bourgeoisie, who fought to replace existing
institutions with a new form of local government more
consistent with their own class interests, owed its strength
to the expansion of industrial capitalism, but the gentry
remained a powerful force and the Municipal Corporations Act
can be seen as a compromise between the two groupings. The
nature of this compromise appears in the concessions that
Russell made to the Lords. These may seem to be relatively
insignificant in comparison to the acceptance of the bourgeois
principles embodied in the Municipal Corporations Act but the
balance had not yet swung as far in the direction of the
bourgeoisie as the outcome of this particular compromise might
suggest. This Act only applied to the municipal boroughs where
the justices were less likely to belong to the gentry and it
therefore constituted less of a challenge to their position.
In the next section, we will see that, for most of the Cl9th,
the gentry remained sufficiently powerful to prevent the
extension of the principle of representative government to the
administration of the counties.
County Councils 
Although the Municipal Corporations Act can be seen as a
victory for the bourgeoisie, it was only one stage in the
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longer struggle against the gentry's control of local govern-
ment. In addition to the Lord's amendments, the impact of the
Bill was further limited by the fact that, although a majority
of the boroughs covered by the Act had been granted a separate
commission of the peace, county magistrates retained the right
to exercise concurrent jurisdiction within the boroughs.(26)
In any case, the Act only applied to those boroughs that had
been granted a Royal Charter. New industrial towns as large as
Manchester and Birmingham were not covered by the Act(27) and
neither were large areas of the industrialised counties.(28)
Thus, even in those boroughs that were included in the Act,
the gentry (in their role as county magistrates) retained some
powers. Outside of these boroughs, the administrative powers
of county magistrates had been reduced by the Poor Law
Amendment Act (1834) and the other measures mentioned earlier
in this chapter, but they nevertheless retained control over
the administration of the counties.(29)
Following the passing of the Municipal Corporations Act, the
struggle over local government shifted to the counties but
this proved to be a far more difficult battle to win. The
first skirmish occurred in the summer of 1836 when Hume intro-
duced a County Rates Bill which proposed that J.P.s would lose
all control over the collection, assessing and spending of
county rates, and that these powers should be transferred to
county councils elected by all ratepayers. In addition, the
Bill also proposed to transfer all of the administrative
functions of county magistrates - including their power to
appoint police constables - to the new county councils.
Finally, the Bill proposed that the new councils should have
the power to nominate people of their choice as J.P.s, even if
they did not satisfy the property qualification.(30) In his
speech asking for leave to bring in the Bill, Hume said:
The object of the Bill is to separate the judicial
from the financial affairs of the counties of
England and Wales, and to authorise the rate-payers
of counties to elect a certain number of represent-
atives to form a County Board for the assessment,
levying and administration of the county rates, and
to perform those duties having reference to the
financial expenditure of the counties, now executed
by the magistrates in Quarter Sessions. At present
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there is not sufficient check on the management of
the county rates which there ought to be, and which
the rate-payers have a right to demand. This is
owing to the inherent defects of the present system
- the principle of which is, that those magistrates
who levy and direct the expenditure of rates are
independent of those who pay them. . ..
What I complain of is that there is not that whole-
some check and control over the taxes in counties
which has been lately extended to the Municipal
Institutions of the county. A majority of this House
and the country has approved of the Bill for
allowing the inhabitants of corporate towns and
cities to elect persons to control the municipal
taxation, and also to recommend magistrates for
their respective cities and towns, and I ask the
same privileges for the counties.
Parliamentary Debates, 21/6/1836, Vol.34, c680
As we have seen, the principles embodied in this Bill - the
separation of judicial and executive powers and ratepayer
control over the expenditure of the rates - had been accepted
in relation to the boroughs in the previous year. In his
County Rates Bill Hume was attempting to extend the prin-
ciples of the Municipal Corporations Act to county govern-
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ment. However, although the Commons had offered almost
unanimous support for the Municipal Corporations Act, Hume's
Bill was rejected by the Tories and only received muted
support from the Whig front bench.(31) Genuine support for the
Bill within the House of Commons was restricted to a handful
of radical utilitarian M.P.s - notably Ewart and Roebuck(32) -
and, consequently, it was thrown out of the Commons at its
second reading. During the next half century a series of
further attempts were made to introduce a measure of local
government reform in the administration of the counties all of
which met with a similar fate.
Hume tried, both in 1838 and 1839,to introduce a modified
version of the 1836 Bill. These County Rates Bills proposed
the creation of county councils for the sole purpose of regul-
ating county rates, leaving the other administrative powers of
magistrates intact, but they too were thrown out by the
Commons.(33) In 1849, Hume introduced a County Rates and
Expenditure Bill which also proposed to create county councils
for the sole purpose of administering the rates but, this
time, Hume suggested that they should be elected, not by the
ratepayers directly but, by the Boards of Guardians. "It was
proposed that each union should elect one of its guardians to
form a county board, to which one magistrate would be added
for every two guardians so elected".(34) This Bill was also
rejected at its second reading.(35) In 1850, Milner Gibson
introduced a County Rates and Expenditure Bill which was
almost exactly the same as Hume's 1849 Bill. This Bill was
read a second time and referred to a Select Committee but it
was not discussed again in the House of Commons.(36) In 1851
Milner Gibson introduced another County Rates and Expenditure
Bill proposing the formation of county councils composed of
one half magistrates and one half guardians. At the same time
it also proposed that they should have wide-ranging administ-
rative powers. This Bill met with exactly the same fate as his
previous measure.(37) In February 1852, Milner Gibson tried
again to introduce a County Rates and Expenditure Bill which
proposed the formation of county councils to be elected by
ratepayers (i.e. it was very similar to Hume's 1836 Bill), but
it was thrown out of the Commons at its second reading.(38) In
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December 1852, Milner Gibson introduced yet another County
Rates and Expenditure Bill which proposed the formation of
county financial boards to be composed of one half guardians
and one half magistrates. It also proposed that magistrates'
judicial powers and their control of gaols should not be
interfered with. This Bill appears to have been treated fairly
sympathetically but after three nights in Committee, when it
was clear that there would not be sufficient time to pass the
Bill, Milner Gibson withdrew his Bill asking the Government to
commit itself to the principle of the Bill. Palmerston replied
by saying that the Government would introduce a measure of its
own at the beginning of the next session, but it was not
forthcoming. (39)
The issue of county government reform was reopened in 1861, by
Sir John Trelawny who introduced a County Rates and Expen-
diture Bill which was very similar to the one introduced by
Hume in 1849.(40) In 1868, Wild introduced a County Financial
Boards Bill which, again, was basically the same as Hume's
1849 Bill. The major difference was that Wild proposed that it
should be a permissive measure. In other words it would only
be adopted in those counties where a majority of the Boards of
Guardians wanted a county financial board. This Bill was read
a second time and referred to a Select Committee.(41) In 1869,
following the Report of this Committee, Knatchbull-Hugesson
(President of the Local Government Board) introduced a County
Financial Boards Bill which proposed that magistrates should
retain their judicial powers but that the administration of
county business should be controlled by a board consisting of
both magistrates and representatives to be elected by Boards
of Guardians according to their gross estimated rental.(42)
Using this formula, Knatchbull-Hugesson estimated that there
would be a ratio on the Boards of 1 representative to 5
magistrates although he thought that not all of the magist-
rates would attend. This Bill was read a first time but later
withdrawn without explanation. (43)
The issue was not raised again until 1878, when Sclater-Booth
introduced a County Boards Bill which proposed that all of the
magistrates' non-judicial business should be transferred to
county boards which would have consisted of one half magist-
rates and one half guardians. The Commons went into Committee
on this Bill but it was withdrawn following opposition from
county magistrates who did not favour the proposed fusion of
county boards and Quarter Sessions.(44) In 1879 Sclater-Booth
introduced a second County Boards Bill which was similar to
the first except that it proposed that magistrates should
exercise their judicial duties and their duties under the
Police Acts separately. It was also proposed to alter the
composition of the county boards so that there would be twice
as many guardians as magistrates. This Bill was also with-
drawn because the county magistrates objected to the fact that
the reduced function of the county boards was to be at the
expense	 of	 a	 decreased
	
representation	 of	 magist-
rates.(45)
It was not until 1888, with the passing of the County Councils
Act, that responsibility for local government was finally
transferred from the county magistrates to elected councils.
When introducing the Bill in the Commons, Ritchie said that he
proposed to leave the judicial work of the magistrates
untouched, but:
We propose, however, to transfer to the new bodies
all existing administrative powers of the Justices
in respect of County Rates and financial business,
County Buildings, County Bridges, the provision and
management of the County Lunatic Asylums, the
establishment and maintainance of Reformatory and
Industrial Schools, the granting of licences for
Music and Dancing, the granting of licences for the
sale of Intoxicating Liquors - which I shall deal
with separately presently - the division of the
county into Polling Districts for Parliamentary
Elections, the cost of the Registration of Voters,
the execution of the Acts relating to the Contagious
Diseases of Animals, the Adulteration of Foods and
Drugs, Weights and Measures, and other minor matters
with which I will not trouble the House.
Parliamentary	 Debates,	 Vol.323,	 19/03/1888,
cc.1643 -44
The only concession that Ritchie made to the county magist-
racy was with regard to policing. He argued that policing was
partly judicial and partly administrative and he, therefore,
proposed to create Joint Committees consisting of equal
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numbers of councillors and magistrates to be responsible for
policing the counties. After twenty two nights in Committee,
the Bill was passed by the House of Commons and taken to the
House of Lords where it was passed in virtually the same form
that it had left the Commons.
Given that the content of the County Councils Act was very
similar to that of the County Rates Bill that had been
introduced by Hume in 1836, we must ask the question why did
it take half a century to get such a measure passed by Parlia-
ment? In one of the more sophisticated conventional histories,
Redlich and Hirst have suggested two possible explanations in
answer to this question. Firstly, they suggest that there was
little to complain of in the way that magistrates administ-
ered the counties and, secondly, they point to the fact that
there was no material base for a concerted opposition to the
gentry.(46) Each of these explanations are plausible but,
because neither of them provides an adequate account of the
struggle between the bourgeoisie and the gentry, they do not
offer a sufficient answer. Although Redlich and Hirst appear
to recognise that the attempts to reform county government
were part of this struggle, they are wrong to imply that this
was based primarily upon the way that magistrates performed
their function. The strongest arguments in favour of reform
were those that advocated the bourgeois principles of repres-
entative government and the separation of administrative and
judicial functions. Furthermore, by pointing only to the
weakness of the opposition to the gentry in the counties, they
fail to acknowledge the continuing strength of the gentry
representation in the Commons for most of the Cl9th.
Taking their argument that there was a lack of complaint about
the way in which magistrates administered the counties, it is
clear that, although there were some accusations of jobbery
and some complaints about the partiality of magistrates in the
building of roads and bridges, they were generally not consid-
ered to be corrupt in the same way as the old corporations
were. This explanation receives further support from a close
reading of the Parliamentary Debates. Before 1888, criticism
of the magistracy was only heard occasionally from Benthamite
radicals such as Roebuck(47) but in the debates on the 1888
measure, this was no longer true to the same extent. For
example, when moving an amendment proposing that county
councillors should be endowed with the functions of J.P.s, Mr.
Seale-Hayne launched into an attack on the magistracy that
went far beyond any criticism that had been heard in the
previous debates. He argued that the existing system of
appointing magistrates was unsatisfactory and he went on to
say:
That dissatisfaction had frequently found expression
at the meetings of the Trades Unions Congress, and
it had also found expression from time to time, in
the House of Commons. ... The present system of
nomination and property qualification was a system
by which class was set against class, because it
inferred the idea that there was a class of rich men
who were entitled to rule, and that there was a
class of poor men whose fate it was to be ruled
over. That, he maintained, was entirely incon-
sistent with our present democratic institutions.
Parliamentary Debates, Vol.327, 14/06/1888, c.174
He returns to this theme a little later in the same speech.
A portion of the county magistracy might be regarded
as hereditary. Some of the county magistrates had no
claim to a seat on the Bench other than that their
fathers had sat there before; others had acquired
the dignity by purchase, as it frequently happened
that if a gentleman came into the county, and bought
a large estate, he was straightway put on the Bench,
irrespective of any personal qualification. Other
gentlemen got on the Bench simply because they
happened to be of the same political complexion as
the Lord Lieutenant; they merely took the position
because it gave them a certain amount of social
position, and got them into the charmed circle of
county society.
Parliamentary Debates, Vol.327, 14/06/1888, c.176
Similar radical criticism of the magistracy was heard during a
later debate on an amendment proposing that county councils
should have power to nominate people to the Lords Lieutenants
for inclusion on the county benches. In moving this amend-
ment, Mr. Arthur Williams argued that the system of appointing
magistrates was "mischievous and unsatisfactory". He said:
The first tradition was that the Lord Lieutenant
should put on the Commission of the Peace persons of
a certain rank and means, and it was a notorious
fact that when the young squire was made a County
Justice it was a matter of no consequence whether he
was intelligent or not, or whether he was a proper
person to discharge the duties of the office.
Parliamentary Debates, Vol.328, 19/07/1888, c.1800
In supporting this amendment, Mr. Picton added a criticism of
the manner in which magistrates carried out their administ-
rative functions:
They had had, for instance, a great deal of demo-
cratic legislation in the interests of education;
they had had School Boards appointed; and compul-
sory powers passed. He asked whether that legis-
lation had been carried out in the spirit in which
it had been passed, and he replied to this question,
that this had certainly not been the case. They
found magistrates tending to minimize the law as far
as possible, and usually their sympathies were so
opposed to the working of the school board system
that they were found making all sorts of excuses,
and even granting payments to parents who would not
send their children to school.
Parliamentary Debates, Vol.328, 19/07/1888, c.1809
The fact that this kind of radical criticism of the magist-
rates emerged in the House of Commons at the time when reform
was finally passed could be interpreted as evidence in support
of Redlich and Hirst's explanation - i.e. that a measure was
passed because of the strength of feeling against the county
magistracy. However, this would ignore the fact that, even in
1888, the radical opposition to the magistracy was still a
minority in the Commons and none of the amendments that they
moved were accepted into the final draft of the Act. The 1884
Reform Act allowed into the House of Commons a handful of
working class M.P.s who were able to express their criticism
of county magistrates but it would be wrong to assume that,
because this first appeared in the debates in 1888, it was the
prime force behind the reform. Support for a new form of local
government had grown steadily throughout the Cl9th but the
majority of M.P.s speaking in favour of reform were careful to
stress that their support for the principle of more democratic
local government did not imply a criticism of the county
magistracy. (48)
What the parliamentary debates reveal is that the opposition
to the existing system of county government was not based on
its content but on its form. It was support for the prin-
ciples of representative government and the separation of
powers, rather than dissatisfaction with the magistracy, which
led to the creation of county councils.
Redlich and Hirst's first explanation misses this and thus
fails to explain why it took fifty years to reform county
government. Their second argument suggests that, whereas the
new industrial bourgeoisie were strong in the towns, there was
no effective opposition to the gentry in the counties because
of the weakness of the position of the agricultural labourers
and the desire amongst industrialists to become squires them-
selves. The major strength of this explanation lies in its
recognition that the attempts to reform county government
resulted from the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the
gentry. However, although there is evidence to support their
point about the "gentrification" of the bourgeoisie(49) which
may, indeed, have weakened the opposition in the counties,
Redlich and Hirst overstress this side of the equation whilst
understating the continuing strength of the gentry during this
period. Moreover, although they acknowledge the conflict
between the bourgeoisie and the gentry, they do not fully
grasp the basis of this conflict. Their explanation implies
that local government reform was simply a question of trans-
ferring power from the gentry magistrates to the industrial
bourgeoisie but this is only a partial analysis. The import-
ance of the County Councils Act was not that it changed the
personnel of local government - in fact, in the short term, it
did not do this(50) - but rather, to repeat, it introduced a
new form of local government based upon bourgeois principles.
It was the attempt to establish such a form that was at the
heart of the struggle over county government and, it was
because the gentry retained much of their strength in Parlia-
ment that they were able to resist its implementation for so
long.
When Hume introduced his Bill in 1836 he appears to have been
optimistic about the possibility of extending the principles
of the Municipal Corporations Act to county government.(51) If
this was the case, then he seriously misjudged the strength of
the gentry and the tenacity with which they would fight to
retain their magisterial privileges. Following their defeat in
1836, the advocates of reform abandoned the attempt to
introduce the principles of the Municipal Corporations Act
wholesale and opted, instead, to introduce compromise measures
"that they might get something carried, desiring, on the
instalment principle, to take as much as they could get".(52)
The modified proposals contained in the Bills of 1838, 1839,
1849, 1850, 1851, December 1852, and 1861 were treated more
sympathetically by a number of speakers in the Commons debates
but there remained an influential section led by Sir John
Pakington (chairman of Worcestershire Quarter Sessions) which
remained totally opposed to any change in the system of county
government that involved tampering with magistrates' powers.
The parliamentary strength of this group is clear from the
fact that the reformers were unable to pass even a compromise
measure. However, whilst the gentry remained entrenched in
their control over the House of Commons, they were losing
ideological ground. Even as staunch an opponent as Pakington
was reluctant to be seen to oppose the principle of rate-
payers' control of local government. When speaking against
Hume's Bill in 1849, he said that he could not understand the
distinction between magistrates and ratepayers. He argued that
because magistrates were the major landowners in the counties
they paid an enormous proportion of the rates and that, there-
fore, the principle being advocated by Hume - that there
should be no taxation without representation - was already in
effect.(53) However, he also argued that the administration of
local affairs was a right (he called it a duty) belonging to
property.
one of the first duties of those who were blessed
with property was to attend the administration of
the local affairs of the district. In the perform-
ance of that duty they might depend on it, that
whatever was for the interest of the rich man was
also for the interest of the poor man in these local
affairs.
Parliamentary Debates, Vol.106, 13/06/1849, c.133
In this speech he is arguing for the retention of the patern-
alistic rule of the gentry whom he believes have a right to
rule but he does so by attempting to take over Hume's ideol-
ogical ground. This reluctance to openly oppose the prin-
ciples underlying reform is still more obvious in his oppos-
ition to Milner-Gibson's February 1852 Bill when he says:
Without calling in question the connection that
ought to exist between taxation and representation,
he was prepared to assert that the rule, although
generally applicable to all countries with free
institutions, did not apply at all to county
affairs, or only in a degree which was very limited,
and it would not be wise in Parliament, for the sake
of a theoretical advantage, to tamper with arrange-
ments which had long worked beneficially to the
country, and which had never worked more benefi-
cially than at the present time.
Parliamentary Debates, Vol.119, 08/02/1852, c.729
Here Pakington is careful not to publicly oppose the prin-
ciple of 'no taxation without representation' but, equally
clearly, he does not want to accept its implications. Although
there was a moment in 1852 when the House of Commons appears
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to have come close to passing a compromise measure(S),
generally speaking, the gentry ensured that Pakington's line
was followed. This was clearly reflected in the Report of the
Select Committee on the County Rates and Expenditure
Bill (1850) which dismissed the petitions in favour of
Milner-Gibson's Bill saying that they were not such as to
prove a general desire in the country for such a measure. The
Report goes on to say that the magistrates had conducted the
financial business of the counties to the satisfaction of the
public and it points out that this Bill would:
substitute for them a small and fluctuating body of
men, who would in many cases be less fitted for the
discharge of such duties, and who would indivi-
dually have a much less degree of pecuniary interest
in the counties in which they live.
Report of the Select Committee on the County Rates 
and Expenditure Bill, 1850 (468) xiii, 1
During the 1860s and 1870s support for the principle of
linking taxation with representation strengthened further. The
fact that both Knatchbull-Hugesson (1869) and Sclater-Booth
(1878 and 1879) introduced Bills in their capacity as Govern-
ment ministers is an indication of this. Although they were
compromise measures the fact that they were introduced by
Conservative governments following promises made in election
manifestoes clearly reflects the political importance of being
seen to support the principles behind reform. A close reading
of the Parliamentary Debates during this period further
reveals that not only was the principle of linking taxation to
representation accepted by the vast majority of M.P.s, but
that many of them favoured the introduction of some measure of
reform. However, this growing support was not sufficient to
enable a measure to be passed in the Commons because county
magistrates both inside and outside of the Commons were able
to exercise a virtual veto over any proposals that threatened
their traditional privileges in county government.(55)
On the one hand, then, support for the bourgeois principle of
linking representation to taxation was growing but, on the
other hand, the position of the gentry in the House of Commons
was so strong that they were able to block any proposed
change. The deadlock was only broken when the 1884 Reform Act
changed the composition of the House of Commons and finally
ended the dominance of the county gentry. Thus, when Ritchie
introduced his Bill in 1888 on behalf of the Government it
faced very little opposition. The only voice raised against
the Bill in the Commons was that of Knatchbull-Hugesson who
said:
He was afraid that the expression of what he used to
think Tory opinions were now very much out of place
in the House of Commons. ... He maintained ... that
the Bill . .. was neither more nor less than the
uprooting, the upheaval, the disturbance of that
system of domestic government which had prevailed in
this country for generations. ... Personally he was
utterly astounded that anyone calling himself
Conservative could possibly support this measure,
unless he were constrained to do so by political
exigencies.
Parliamentary Debates, Vol.324, 19/04/1888,
cc.1802 -03
This speech is a lament for the lost power of the gentry. Both
for the power that they had already lost in the House of
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Commons and for the power that they were about to lose to the
county councils. In view of their vigorous opposition to the
Municipal Corporations Act back in 1835, one might have
expected stronger opposition to have emerged from the House of
Lords. However, the general attitude in that House seems to
have been one of resigned acceptance as summed up in the
speech from the Earl of Carnarvon when he said:
In conclusion he would only say this - he accepted
this Bill; he accepted facts which he had no share
in shaping, and he would make the best of these
facts in future; he would induce others to do the
same; but he deeply regretted that this Bill should
ever have been introduced.
Parliamentary Debates, Vol.329, 31/07/1888,
cc.923 -24
Like Knatchbull-Hugesson in the Commons, Carnarvon is clearly
accepting what apppears as the inevitable defeat of the gentry
and the end of magisterial control of county administration.
In fact, the County Councils Act did not end this control
immediately because about one half of the councillors returned
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by the first elections for the county councils were magist-
rates and many others were related to magistrates.(56) This
has led Keith-Lucas to conclude that:
The revolution which the country gentlemen had
resisted for half a century had in fact resulted in
making them into constitutional rulers, but not in
their abdication.
B. Keith-Lucas	 The	 English	 Local	 Government
Franchise, p.115
However, this misses the true significance of the Act which
was that it created a new form of county administration. The
County Councils Act replaced the unrepresentative, direct rule
of the gentry with a new form of local government based upon
the principles of separating judicial and executive functions
and linking representation to taxation. It was in this respect
that the County Councils Act was a victory for the industrial
bourgeoisie.
Summary
With the passing of the County Councils Act in 1888 the
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transfer of local government from magistrates to elected
bodies and other organs of the modern state was virtually
complete. We have seen that this process was closely related
to the rise of industrial capitalism but it was not an inevit-
able product of the logic of capitalist social relations.
Rather, the new forms of local government that emerged during
the Cl9th were the product of a struggle between the
bourgeoisie and the gentry and they reflect the balance of
power in this struggle. The fact that the gentry remained a
powerful force in Parliament and acted to defend their social
position helps to explain the timing of some of the changes
that took place. Because the borough magistrates tended not to
be recruited from the gentry and because of the particular
problem of order in the boroughs, there was relatively little
opposition to the Municipal Corporations Act but, when it came
to the counties, the gentry fought a long rearguard action to
protect their traditional power base in the county magistracy
which frustrated the attempts of the reformers to introduce
county councils. The parliamentary strength of the gentry also
explains the compromises that were made in both the Municipal
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Corporations Act and the County Councils Act. In particular,
the continuing role of the magistracy on Police Committees - a
role which they have retained to the present day - reflects
the fact that the gentry remained a powerful force even in
1888.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE BIRTH OF THE NEW POLICE AND A CHANGE IN THE
NATURE OF MAGISTRATES' POLICING FUNCTION
Introduction 
Thirty years before the creation of elected county councils,
the English magistracy had also experienced a major change in
the nature of its policing function. In this chapter, we will
examine the emergence of the new police and its implications
for the role of magistrates in the period up to, and
including, the County Police Act of 1856. We will argue that,
although this development was linked to the growth of indust-
rial capitalism, the form taken by the new police was a
product of the particular social formation of nineteenth
century British capitalism. We will show that, although the
representatives of the industrial bourgeoisie were instru-
mental in the creation of this new form of crime control and
order maintenance, the continued political strength of the
gentry resulted in a compromise which enabled the magistracy
to retain a significant degree of control over its administ-
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ration.
Stages In The Formation Of The New Police 
The process through which the nature of policing changed in
Britain culminated in 1856 but its origins can be traced back
to 1750 when Henry Fielding published his book 'An Enquiry
Into The Causes of the Late Increase of Robbers, Etc.'.
Fielding's work is significant not only because it was the
first systematic attempt to analyse the causes of crime in
London but, more importantly, because many of his proposals
were embodied in legislation passed during the late Cl8th. He
proposed a strengthening of the law relating to receiving
stolen goods by: making it a criminal offence to advertise
stolen goods; by regulating pawnbrokers; by making receiving
an original offence - i.e., that the trial of the receiver
should not depend upon the prior conviction of the thief, and;
by making the mere buying or taking to pawn of stolen goods
above a certain value an offence. He also proposed a change in
the system of prosecution such that both prosecutor and
witnesses could be paid thus making it easier to prosecute
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offenders. Finally, he advocated a change in the manner of
conducting executions in order to make them more awesome. He
suggested that this could best be achieved by conducting them
in private as soon as possible after the conviction.(1)
Although by no means all of Fielding's proposals were acted
upon, they were influential in the formulation of policing
policy for the remainder of the Cl9th. In 1751 a Parlia-
mentary Committee was set up to inquire into the laws relating
to felonies which recommended: a reform in the system of
prosecution to enable more speedy and efficient prosecution of
offenders; stronger legislation to deal with receivers of
stolen goods; an extension of magistrates' powers to deal with
robberies (e.g. by giving them powers to advertise in daily
papers), and; strengthening the Watch in the City of West-
minster by increasing their salary and the number of watchmen
and by extending their powers to arrest people lurking the
streets who could not give a satisfactory account of them-
selves.(2) Similar recommendations came from subsequent
Parliamentary Committees set up in 1770 to inquire into burg-
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lanes, etc. in the City of London(3) and in 1772 to inquire
into the state of the nightly watch in Westminster(4). Both of
these Committees recommended improvements to the existing
system of watchmen and the former also included recommen-
dations about the law relating to receiving together with some
suggestions for improving the system of punishment.
Many of these proposals were embodied in legislation. In 1757
an Act was passed which required pawnbrokers to keep records
of goods that they purchased on pain of a E5 fine. The Act
also empowered J.P.s to issue a search warrant when they were
satisfied that such goods had been unlawfully taken from the
owner.(5) The principles of this Act were extended by an Act
of 1785 which introduced annual licencing of pawnbrokers and
an Act of 1800 which imposed strict regulations on their rate
of profit. (6) Legislation was also passed to tighten up the
law relating to receivers of stolen goods. Between 1755 and
1785, a number of statutes - each relating to specific kinds
of stolen goods - were passed reaffirming the principle of the
independent liability of receivers. These Acts further
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extended the powers of J.P.s to search for stolen goods and to
arrest suspected buyers. For example:
The Act of 1756 authorised a single Justice to issue
a warrant for the search of any premises where, on
the oath of one witness, stolen metals were alleged
to be deposited or concealed. Should the goods be
found, the Act authorised two Justices to try for a
misdemeanour the person who had been concealing from
them and could not either indicate the party from
whom he had purchased them or give a satisfactory
account of how they had come into his possession.
L. Radzinowicz A History of the English Criminal 
Law and Its Administration From 1750 Vol.III p.72
In 1762, an Act was passed relating to receivers of stolen
goods from the River Thames which contained the same powers of
search and arrest as the 1756 Act mentioned above. These
powers were later extended by an Act of 1782 to cover all
receivers.
Under it Justices were empowered to issue warrants
to search for stolen goods wherever grounds for
suspicion existed, and to adjudge guilty of a
misdemeanour anyone who had concealed such goods or
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had had them in custody. They were also empowered to
take into custody and try for a misdemeanour not
only persons either suspected of carrying stolen
metals at night-time or offering such metals for
sale or pawn, but anyone who might carry or offer
for sale any stolen goods whatsoever.
L. Radzinowicz A History of the English Criminal 
Law and Its Administration From 1750 Vol.III p.73
Although in his magisterial capacity he had established the
Bow Street Runners and his brother John had set up the Night
Patrol(7), the result of Fielding's work was little more than
a tightening of the existing law relating to petty crime.
Later, Benthamite reformers such as Colquhoun also criticised
the existing legal system but they advocated the more radical
solution of a professional police force. Their campaigning
achieved some success through the Middlesex Justices Act(1792)
and the Thames Police Act (1800). The former brought the
existing police forces under the control of seven offices each
with three stipendiary magistrates and a police force of six
constables.(8) The latter created a new office which also had
a complement of three stipendiary magistrates but with a force
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of eighty constables.(9)
During the next three decades the number of policemen in
London was slowly increased through such developments as the
re-formation of the Horse Patrol in 1805 and the Unmounted
Horse Patrol in 1821.(10) Critchley estimates that by 1828
"the constables employed by the seven police offices, the Bow
Street Patrols, and the Thames River Police totalled some 450
men directly under the control of the Home Secretary."(11)
However, these were minor developments in comparison to the
Metropolitan Police Act(1829) which created a Police Office to
be responsible for the newly created Metropolitan Police
District extending over a seven mile radius from Central
London (but excluding the City of London). This Act allowed
for the appointment of two Justices under the direction of the
Home Secretary to take charge of the office and to be
responsible for recruiting and administering a police force
composed of a "sufficient number of fit and able men".(12)
The Metropolitan Police Act marks an important stage in the
formation of the new police but it only applied to London -
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the rest of the country was still dependant upon traditional
policing methods under the direct control of the magistracy.
However, during the next thirty years this situation changed
as uniformed police were gradually introduced throughout
England and Wales. Three distinct changes can be identified in
this transition. The first came in 1835 with the passing of
the Municipal Corporations Act. Although this was not a Police
Act, one of its provisions placed a responsibility on the
newly created local councils to appoint a 'sufficient number
of fit men' to be sworn in as constables.(13) In doing this
the Municipal Corporations Act assisted the formation of
police forces in some of the urban areas of England and Wales
but it should not be assumed that it applied uniformly. Many
of the new industrial towns were excluded from the provisions
of this Act because they had not been granted a charter.(14)
More importantly, the provisions of the Act were sufficiently
vague to allow for a number of interpretations. Thus, whereas
some towns (eg. Bristol) took the clause seriously and
attempted to create forces along the lines of the Metropolitan
police, others were less rigorous.(15)
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If they could fulfil their obligations under the Act
by simply taking over the old night-watchmen and day
police, who for years had been employed under
Improvement Act powers (or in some cases under the
more recent Lighting and Watching Act), many watch
committees must have argued, why embark on more
elaborate and costly arrangements?
...Thus the new Leeds force of twenty men, which was
created in 1836, had as its head constable the
former superintendant of the night-watch (a body set
up under a local improvement Act), and the four
inspectors in the new force had, similarly, served
as constables in the old.
T.Critchley A History of the Police in England and
Wales pp.64-65.
In cases such as this, the Municipal Corporations Act clearly
made little difference to the nature of policing. According to
Critchley, in 1838 only half of the boroughs had established a
police force and even as late as 1856 the police inspectors
discovered thirteen boroughs that had chosen not to create a
police force.(16)
The second stage in the growth of a provincial police force
came in 1839/1840. Five separate Police Acts were passed in
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these two years. The Birmingham Police Act, the Manchester
Police Act and the Bolton Police Act were passed to meet the
particular needs of these three unincorporated towns that
wanted to set up their own police forces but were unable to
because they were not yet encompassed by the provisions of the
Municipal Corporations Act. A more significant measure was the
County Police Act (1839) which enabled the magistrates of all
counties in England and Wales, with the permission of the Home
Secretary, to establish a police force in which the number of
constables was not to exceed one to every thousand of the
population.(17) This Act was modified slightly by the County
Police Act (1840) which enabled local magistrates to form
separate police districts within their counties, the expenses
to be borne by the rate-payers in the area concerned. (18)
Just as the Municipal Corporations Act did not result in the
formation of police forces in all boroughs, neither did the
County Police Acts have a uniform effect throughout England
and Wales. The decision as to whether to set up a force was
left to the magistrates of each county and some were more
- 243 -
enthusiastic than others. Of the 56 counties, 8 adopted the
Act in 1839, 12 in 1840, 4 in 1841, and a further 4 between
1841 and 1856. In other words, half of the counties responded
to the County Police Acts but, of these, 4 adopted it only
partially and others such as Lancashire, which had been quick
to set up a rural police force, later substantially reduced
the size of their force.(19)
The final stage in the formation of a national police force
came in 1856. Following two abortive attempts by Palmerston to
introduce a measure on county policing in 1854,(20) Sir George
Gray successfully steered the County Police Act through
Parliament in 1856. This Act compelled all counties to create
a police force but, as an inducement, the government offered a
grant of one quarter of the cost of the police force provided
that the force, had been certified as efficient by one of
three inspectors of police created under the Act. (21) The Act
did not propose the compulsory consolidation of the 64
boroughs with populations of less than 5000 people. However,
they were not included in the grant arrangements and Gray
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believed that this offered them "the strongest inducement to
become consolidated with the county."(22) Once such a consol-
idation agreement had been entered into, it could not be
reversed without the prior agreement of	 the Home
Secretary.(23) The Act also gave the Home Secretary, power to
make regulations for both borough and county police forces and
it imposed a requirement upon police authorities to supply the
Home Office with crime statistics.(24) Following this Act,
police forces were soon established throughout England and
Wales under the loose control of central government, but still
managed by county magistrates.
Conventional Explanations Of Police Reform
A change to the system for the maintenance of order as funda-
mental as that constituted by the formation of the new police
could not have been contemplated in the Cl8th, when the
traditional authority of the magistracy remained firm.
During this long period of more than three-quarters
of a century, from 1750 to 1828, there was no
section of public opinion, or group in Parliament or
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outside, no leading newspaper or periodical which
would advocate a reform in the traditional machinery
for keeping the peace. The doctrine that the civil
power should be exclusively vested in the justices,
who, in all matters relating to the preservation of
public order, and the prevention of crime should be
upheld by the parochial forces, had been challenged
on more than one occasion. But it had acquired an
almost constitutional validity and while this belief
prevailed there could be no police establishment in
the proper sense of the word.
L. Radzinowicz A History of the English Criminal 
Law and Its Administration From 1750 Vol.III p.72
In this passage, Radzinowicz overstates the position in that
he ignores the fact that small numbers of uniformed police had
already come into existence following the Middlesex Justices
Act (1792) and the Thames Police Act (1800). Nevertheless, the
basic theme of this passage - that the authority of the
magistracy remained intact and that there was widespread
opposition to the idea of a uniformed police force - is
supported by almost all commentators on this period.(25) In
view of the strength of the magistrates' position in the early
Cl9th, the fact that the Police Acts in 1829, 1839, and 1856
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passed through the Houses of Parliament with little oppos-
ition(26) would appear to be quite remarkable, but the conven-
tional histories of the police have failed to address them-
selves seriously to an analysis of why this should have been
the case.(27) On the contrary, the apparent lack of opposition
to the Police Acts has reinforced the teleological bias of
these histories.(28) They start from the implicit or explicit
assumption that the modern British police force is an ideal
administrative form(29) and they have tended to see its form-
ation as the product of some sort of inevitable process of
'civilisation'. These background assumptions have rendered it
unnecessary for them to attempt to explain why the new police
force was created and, instead, they have defined their task
as one of describing the stages in this development, resulting
in administrative histories focusing on the minutiae of
"reform".
However, although they appear to be offering no more than a
descriptive account, analysis and comment invariably creep
into the conventional histories. This normally involves the
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commentator stressing the role played by key individuals (eq.
Colquhoun, Peel, Russell, Palmerston) or the impact of
specific events (such as the Chartist outbursts in 1839 or the
Crimean War and the ticket-of-leave system in the early
1850s). In the absence of any other explanation, they imply
that the formation of the police force was a product of the
actions of great men combined with spontaneous responses to
immediate crises. Critchley's discussion of the Metropolitan
Police Act provides an example of this. He begins by praising
Peel's boldness in setting the terms of reference for the
inquiry into the police of the Metropolis in 1828 and he
continues by saying:
Having thus adjusted priorities to a realistic
assessment of the state of public opinion, he
proceeded in all that followed to display consumate
parliamentary skill.
T. Critchley A History of the Police In England and
Wales p.48 (my emphasis)
Critchley documents some of the ways in which Peel uses this
political skill and suggests that his brilliance combines with
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other circumstances to create a favourable atmosphere for the
passing of the Act.
In the Duke of Wellington he now had a Prime
Minister who, ever since the shock of Peterloo, had
preferred to entrust the maintainance of law and
order to professional police rather than soldiers;
influential public opinion had been educated by the
work of Bentham and Colquhoun; confidence in parish
constables and watchmen had largely disappeared; and
political opposition had been bought off or
conciliated.
T. Critchley A History of the Police In England and
Wales p.49
The problem with Critchley's explanation is not that favour-
able circumstances did not exist, but rather that, by focusing
only on the immediate causes, he does not explain why a
Metropolitan Police Act was passed. He is able to tell us why
the Act was passed in 1829 rather than 1785, 1822 or 1826,(30)
but, because he assumes that the creation of a police force
was a 'natural' and inevitable development, he offers no
explanation of why a new form of control emerged during this
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period.
In this respect, Critchley is typical of the conventional
historians. The major exception is J.J. Tobias. He steps back
from the immediate causes and attempts to explain the
emergence of the new police as a product of the twin processes
of urbanisation and industrialisation. In his book approp-
riately entitled 'Crime and Industrial Society', he says:
In the last half of the eighteenth century and the
first half of the nineteenth century, then, society
was in violent transition. The towns were growing
rapidly, and the facilities available to their
rulers were very limited and their knowledge of how
to use them even more limited. Their population,
ever increasing, was predominantly a young one, and
the young town-dwellers were faced with a host of
unfamiliar problems, problems for which their
background and training provided them with no
answer. The towns, and especially London, had always
had a criminal problem different from and larger
than that of other areas, and there were groups of
people, living in distinctive areas, who had evolved
a way of life of their own based on crime. Many
young town-dwellers, faced with these problems and
receiving no assistance from their families or their
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employers (if they had families or employers) or
from the municipal authorities, found solutions by
adopting the techniques, the habits and the
attitudes of criminals. There was thus, in London
and the other large towns in the latter part of the
eighteenth century and the earlier part of the
nineteenth century, an upsurge of crime which was
the fruit of a society in rapid transition.
J. Tobias Crime and Industrial Society p.37
In a later book, he suggests that the development of the new
police was a direct response to this situation.
The reform of the police in the nineteenth century
must be seen as part of the development of efficient
forms of town government, one consequence of the
rapid urban growth that characterised the period.
The towns of the eighteenth century had tried to
deal with the problems of policing, drainage and
sewerage by a haphazard machinery of local govern-
ment made up of medieval survivals and the results
of later tinkering. In the nineteenth century this
machinery was seen to be utterly unequal to the new
challenges and it was completely remade. The need
for action was greatest, and the task of reform most
complex, in the London area, where the system of
local government had failed to adapt as the capital
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had grown over the centuries. The urgency of the
situation there led to the development of a new
method of policing, a new method that was quickly
adopted in the rest of the country.
J. Tobias Crime and Police in England 1700-1900 
p.74 (31)
What distinguishes Tobias' account from other conventional
histories is the fact that he attempts to relate the form-
ation of the new police to changes in the nature of society.
He suggests that it was part of the process through which the
"nation's institutions had been remodelled on lines suited to
the urban, industrial society that England had...become."(32)
This explanation has a supeTficial	 plausibility in that
changing patterns of work and the concentration of people in
factory towns were significant changes which radically altered
the lifestyles of large numbers of people. However, even if we
accept that the growth of factories and large towns caused an
increase in crime and a breakdown of social morality, Tobias
offers no explanation of how this resulted in the formation of
the new police other than the assertion that 'something had to
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be done . He is only able to treat this as unproblematic
because he adopts the consensual view implicit within the
concept of 'industrial society'. He has a view of Cl9th
British society as a functional whole and, from this position,
the creation of the police force appears as a necessary
measure to adapt to changing circumstances. However, this
overlooks the fact that Britain was not simply an industrial
society but a capitalist industrial society(33) marked, not by
consensus but, by conflict, involving the bourgeoisie, the
gentry and the working class. The creation of the new police
can only be fully understood in the context of the struggles
between these groupings. This explains, not only the need to
replace the traditional machinery, under the control of the
magistracy, but also, why it emerged in this particular form.
The New Police and the Protection of Property
During the Cl8th, the gentry maintained a strong opposition to
the idea of a professional police force.(34) This was usually
expressed in terms of fears about the introduction of an alien
force and an increase in the powers of central government.
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However, underlying this was a desire to protect the basis of
gentry rule.
No doubt the fear of Leviathan was genuine, but it
is certainly also the case ... that they objected to
the exercise of power over their subordinates being
placed in other hands. In their analysis, preventive
policing was adequately performed by the beadles,
the nightwatch, the bow Street Runners, etc., who
were directly under the control of the bench.
J. Palmer Evils Merely Prohibited p.12
Not only did the existing decentralised system enable the
gentry to retain policing as a local responsibility under the
control of the magistracy, but also Cl8th criminal law offered
an effective protection for the property of the gentry.(35)
However, the property interests of the emerging industrial
bourgeoisie did not receive the same protection. They were
largely excluded from the magistrates' bench and, because they
were unable to obtain pardons, they did not derive the same
benefits as the gentry from the system of capital punishment.
Consequently, the bourgeoisie, together with merchants who
were similarly vulnerable, looked for alternative methods of
protecting their property. We will see, in the following
chapter, that this led them to support criminal law reform but
it also led to initiatives in the field of policing. In the
late 018th and early Cl9th the situation was such that the
bourgeoisie was not sufficiently developed to mount a serious
challenge to the traditional power of the magistracy and the
gentry, as yet, had no cause to support new forms of crime
control or order maintenance. Thus, property owners, in many
parts of England and Wales, joined together to form their own
felons associations. (36)
the Association would pay the expenses incurred by
the local constable or his assistants, by the patrol
riders going beyond their assigned routes in pursuit
of the missing property and the offender, or by
private individuals who helped to arrest the
offender. The result was that the expenses of search
and apprehension before committal - those that were
least certain to be repaid by the county, and whose
absence deterred so many prosecutors from proceeding
- were guaranteed, and men were supplied for the
function of search and apprehension.
D. Philips Crime and Authority In Victorian England 
p.121
Thus, although these associations were concerned primarily
with refusals to prosecute resulting from the complexities of
the legal system(37), they also provided a rudimentary private
police force to apprehend offenders. This was taken furthest
in London where the dramatic rise in the volume of trade
increased the merchants" need to protect their property
proportionately. The London merchants responded by forming
their own private police forces. 	 In 1749 merchants,
wharfingers and lightermen combined to finance a force of
'merchant constables" and in 1778 the West India merchants set
up the "Marine Police Establishment".(38)
With the advantage of hindsight, it is possible to trace the
continuities from the early attempts to protect property
through these private associations to the professional police
force that emerged in the Cl9th. However, at the time, there
was no direct challenge to the existing system and changes
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were restricted to attempts to bolster the existing machin-
ery. This can be seen most clearly in the work of Henry
Fielding. He prefaces his remarks by suggesting that the
increase in crime was a product of the increase in trade.(39)
He was concerned to ensure a better protection of private
property in the Capital but the measures that he proposed and
the legislation that was based on them, involved a tightening
of the existing law and a strengthening of the powers of the
existing forces of law and order. (See Above) It was not until
the turn of the century that the Benthamite "vanguard" of the
bourgeoisie - in particular Patrick Colquhoun - began to
advocate a professional police force as the most effective
means of protecting property. When discussing the growth of
the port of London, Colquhoun describes in some detail the
rapid increase in commerce during the Cl8th and he argues that
the data he produces:
cannot fail to produce a conviction of the
indispensable necessity of a well-planned and
energetic system of River Police, to regulate and
control the economy of so vast a machine, and to
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protect such an astonishing mass and variety of
property in its repeated transits to and from the
ships and vessels, until it can be ultimately
deposited in places of security. This detail also
may serve to show, how inefficient and abortive must
all the efforts of individuals prove in preventing
plunder, and depredation, without the superior power
of legislative aid.
P. Coquhoun A Treatise On The Commerce And Police 
Of The River Thames pp.21-22
His argument that bourgeois property can only be protected by
a professional police force is made still more forcefully in
Chapter Two of his Treatise when he discusses the increase in
pilfering from the docks. Here, he asserts that the majority
of people engaged in this activity would not entertain the
idea of committing other crimes such as burglary and he goes
on to say:
The leading cause of the evil is to be traced, to
the total deficiency of any measures of preventive
police, calculated to check the progressive increase
of crimes: the constant and never-failing attendant
on the accumulation of wealth. In the course of the
advance of the latter, which has already been shown
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to have been rapid beyond all example, nothing
material has been attempted towards the suppression
of the former; and hence it has followed, that
commercial riches and criminal offences have grown
up together.
P. Coquhoun A Treatise On The Commerce And Police 
Of The River Thames pp.155-156 (original emphasis)
Both Colquhoun and Bentham played an important role in the
passing of the Thames Police Act (1800),(40) and, thus, this
very early stage of the birth of the new police can be seen as
an attempt to offer better protection to the property of the
industrial bourgeoisie. Later stages in the history of police
reform cannot be explained as unambiguously in this way but it
is still possible to trace this theme through the Cl9th Police
Acts. Because of the lack of parliamentary opposition to the
Metropolitan Police Act, Peel was not forced to offer a
detailed argument in favour of the measure but he does discuss
the increased rate of crime in London referring to incidents
in Kensington, Tottenham and Spitalfields to support his
argument that the existing parochial police were unsatis-
factory and he says:
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For my own part, I consider that it is to be
attributed, in some measure to the exposed and
insecure state in which property is placed in many
parts of the metropolis, and to the facilities which
are afforded of removing it from one part of the
country to another - in a word to the increased
means of committing and concealing the commission of
an offence, and to the increased ingenuity of those
who live by preying on their neighbours.
Parliamentary Debates 28/2/1828, Vol.18, c.791
And, on another occasion, he says:
All causes, therefore, of the increased comforts of
the people of the country become the sources of
crime; not less from the increased temptation which
they necessarily created, than from the increased
facilities which they afforded of perpetration and
evasion.
Parliamentary Debates 15/4/1828, Vol.19, c.871
The Acts passed in 1839 also passed through both Houses of
Parliament with virtually no debate and so, like Peel, Russell
was not compelled to defend his measure. The Parliamentary
Debates on this legislation are dominated by a sense of panic
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about the Chartist disturbances(41) which has led some
commentators to explain the 1839 Acts purely as a response to
Chartism. We will argue later that this usually involves a
misunderstanding of the significance of the Chartist outbreaks
but it also overlooks the fact that Russell had been working
on police reform for a few years prior to these events. In
1836 he had set up a Royal Commission to consider police
reform in the counties. The content of this Report is
revealing because, having been written before the Chartist
outbreaks, it does not reflect the same concerns as the
Parliamentary Debates. The Report was strongly in favour of
extending the new police to the counties, not to improve
public order but, to protect property.
The Royal Commission, 'for the purpose of Inquiring
as to the best means of establishing an efficient
constabulary force in the counties of England and
Wales', spent nearly three years on its task. It
amassed much colourful evidence about the state of
crime, the careers of habitual delinquents, the
nature of their depradations, the degree of
insecurity of travellers on the roads, and the
increasing risks opened up in rural areas by the
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conveyance of valuable cargoes by canal and railway.
A commercial traveller with interests throughout the
south of England said that it was only on very rare
occasions that he dared to travel after dark.
'Occasionally in a moonlight night I may; but it
would be contrary to prudence for any person who
travels about the country with such money in his
pocket to be out after dusk'. This was the almost
universal habit amongst travellers. A straw-hat
manufacturer agreed, and said that he had himself
been shot at near Harpendon, while on his way to
Luton Market to buy straw, and a third traveller
testified that farmers in northern towns commonly
waited for hours to make up parties for their return
home after dark from the markets, rather than risk
the journey alone. Asked (no doubt by Rowan) what
kind of force would give confidence to travellers,
the witness predictably replied, 'A police like the
Metropolitan, on which one might rely in case of
need". The local and municipal police, he said,
could not be relied on.
T. Critchley A History Of The Police In England And 
Wales p.69
Although the Report was not published until after the County
Police Act had been passed, Russell was clearly aware of its
findings and he referred to them in introducing the measure.
The commissioners appointed by the Government three
years ago in order to investigate the subject had
shown in their report how very often it happened
that thieves and depredators of every description
enjoyed perfect impunity, owing to the inefficient
state of the police.
Parliamentary Debates 24/7/1839, Vol.49, c.728
He returns to this theme a little later in the same speech.
He thought the Bill he proposed to bring in would
lay the foundation of an improved system in the
county. At periods remote from the present time, it
might have been quite sufficient to have a constable
unpaid and appointed without qualification, but the
circumstances of the present day, when the
population had greatly increased, and where there
were great amounts of property exposed to
depredation, made it necessary that the constabulary
force should be more efficient.
Parliamentary Debates 24/7/1839, Vol.49, c.731
Concern about the protection of property emerges again in the
debates on the 1856 Act. Here, too, there was a concern about
public order problems - this time it was those anticipated as
a result of the ticket-of-leave system. (42) Nevertheless, when
introducing the Bill at its second reading, Grey stresses the
importance of protecting property rather than the consequences
of the ticket-of-leave system. He says that the County Police
Act had shown up the deficiencies of the old system of parish
constables and that it had offered a more effectual prevention
and detection of crime and a greater protection of property.
He goes on to say because of:
the obstacles which were placed in the way of the
apprehension of offenders and the repression and
punishment of crime by the partial application of
the present county constabulary Acts under which, a
police force being maintained in one county and none
in another, great facilities for escape are given to
criminals, and obvious difficulties thrown in the
way of detection; . • •
Parliamentary
	
Debates	 10/3/1856,	 Vol.140,
cc2114-2115
We can see then that the desire to protect property was an
important factor at each stage in the formation of the new
police. However, it would be mistaken to conclude that this
was the only, or even the major factor. The situation was far
more complex than this. Firstly, it is clear from our disc-
usion of the reform of local government, that the bourgeoisie
did not acquire the strength to impose new legal and political
forms until later in the Cl9th and, therefore, we must explain
why the gentry did not oppose the formation of the new police.
We will return to this question later but, first, we will
examine a second advantage for the bourgeoisie - i.e., the
creation of a disciplined labour force.
The Police As Agents Of Discipline 
From the earliest moment in the reform of the police we can
see that the desire to protect property was accompanied by a
concern to control the poor. Thus, Fielding argues that the
free movement of the poor is an encouragement to crime and, in
answer to his question what is to be done about it, he says:
Is it not to hinder the poor from wandering and this
by compelling the parish and peace officers to
apprehend such wanderers or vagabonds, and by
empowering the magistrate effectually to punish and
send them to their habitations? Thus if we cannot
discover, or will not encourage any cure for
idleness, we shall at least compel the poor to
starve or begat home: for there it will be
impossible for them to steal or rob, without being
presently hanged or transported out of the way.
H. Fielding An Inquiry Into The Late Causes Of
Robbers, Etc. p.144 (original emphasis)
In this passage, the concern with controlling the poor is
clearly related to the need to protect property but in other
passages we get a glimpse of another dimension to the concern
with control over the poor. Earlier in the book, when he
discusses drunkenness, Fielding asks the question what is to
become of the future generation born in gin?
Are these wretched infants (if such can be supposed
capable of arriving at the age of maturity) to
become the future sailors, and our future
grenadiers? Is it by the labour of such as these,
that the emoluments of the peace are to be procured
us, and all the dangers of war averted from us? What
could an Edward or a Henry, a Marlborough or a
Cumberland effect with an army of such wretches?
Doth not this polluted source, instead of providing
recruits for the sea or the field, promise only to
fill the alms-houses and hospitals, and to infect
the streets with stench and diseases.
H. Fielding An Inquiry Into The Late Causes Of
Robbers, Etc. pp.30-31
In this passage, Fielding is not concerned with the protection
of property but with the lack of control over the masses. Thus
he is not concerned simply with exercising greater control
over the movements of the poor (although he did advocate this)
but, rather, he is interested in turning them into "useful"
members of society. This is a theme which becomes much more
fully developed in Colquhoun's writing. He starts from the
assumption that the moral order is collapsing and that new
measures are required to restore the morality of the lower
orders of society.(43) He suggests a variety of ways of doing
this ranging from tighter legal control of prostitution,
gambling, vagrancy, etc. to punishing 'crimes against virtue
and religion' such as adultery.(44) He even suggests that the
police force might be used to give 'a right bias' to public
amusement.(45) However, his thoughts went much further than
this. He meant to imbibe the poor with a bourgeois morality o
that they might provide a well-disciplined labour force.
Labour is absolutely requisite to the existence of
all Governments; and as it is from the poor only
that labour can be expected, so far from being an
evil they become under proper regulations, an
advantage to every country, and highly deserve the
fostering care of the Government.
P. Colquhoun	 A Treatise On The Police Of The 
Metropolis pp.365-366
Colquhoun elaborates on this at some length when he reflects
on his part in the passing of the Thames Police Act.
Although in his arduous pursuit, the author of this
work has experienced infinite difficulties and
discouragements, yet is he rewarded by the
consciousness that he was engaged in an undertaking
in which the best interests of society were
involved:- that independent of the pecuniary
benefits derived by the State, and the proprietors
of commercial property (which already have unquest-
ioningly been very extensive) he has been instru-
mental in bringing forward a great preventive
system, and by administering the laws in conjunction
with a very zealous, able, and humane magistrate,
[i.e John Harriott, M.W.] in a manner rather
calculated to restrain than to punish, a multitude
of individuals, together with a numerous offspring,
are likely to be rendered useful members of the body
politic, instead of nuisances to society. - The
advantages thus gained (although his labours have
been in other respects gratuitous,) will abundantly
compensate the dangers, the toils, and the anxieties
which have been experienced. In the accomplishment
of this object, both the interests of humanity and
morality, have been in no small degree promoted:
unquestionably, there cannot be a greater act of
benevolence to mankind, in a course of criminal 
delinquency, than that which tends to civilize their 
manners; - to teach them obedience to the laws;- to
screen themselves and their families from the evils 
and distress attendant on punishment, by preventing 
the commission of crimes;- and to lead them into the 
paths of honest industry, as the only means of 
securing real comfort and happiness which a life of 
criminality, however productive of occasional 
supplies of money, can never bestow. - If it shall
be considered (as it certainly is) a glorious
achievement to subdue a powerful army or navy, and
thereby secure the tranquility of a state - is not
the triumph in some degree analogous, where a
numerous army of delinquents, carrying on a species
of warfare no less noxious, if not equally hostile,
shall not only be subdued by a mild and systematic
direction of powers of the law; but that the
conquered enemy shall be converted into an useful
friend, adding strength instead of weakness to the
government of the country.
P. Colquhoun A Treatise On The Police Of The 
Metropolis pp.245-247 (original emphasis)
The above extracts show how the concern with the morality of
the poor expressed by Fielding had, in the writing of
Colquhoun, become a clear vision of the necessity to "conquer"
the poor and mould them into productive labourers. However, we
must be careful not to accept uncritically what reformers such
as Colquhoun say about reform as the truth. (46) Thus, the fact
that he wanted the police to conquer the working class and
convert them into useful labourers does not necessarily mean
that the police succeeded in this task or, indeed, that they
even attempted to carry out the task. These are empirical
questions and to answer them we need to look more closely at
the activities of the new police.
Attempts by the industrial bourgeoisie to 'discipline' the
working class predate the Thames River Police. They can be
seen, for example, in the activities of the Society for the
Reformation of Manners formed by Zouch and Wilberforce in the
1780s. Thus, when discussing this Society, the Webbs say:
This movement came, as we pointed out, from several
distinct but converging currents of public opinion -
the new-found Evangelical zeal for saving men's
souls, the growing dislike of the propertied class
of the insecurity of life and property, the alarm
both of the financier and the ratepayer at the
increasing burden of the poor rate, and last but
not, we think, least, the half-conscious desire of
the rising class of industrial capitalists to drive
the manual workers out of the alehouse and gin-shop
into the factory and workshop. Such being the
influences at work, it is not surprising that the
most signal and durable manifestation of the
movement should have' been the strenuous attempt to
restrict the temptations to, and the opportunities
for, licentious conduct, disorderly gatherings,
wasteful expenditure and idle hours, which an
unlimited supply of unregulated public-houses
offered to the lower orders.
S. & B. Webb The History of Liquor Licensing p.57
With the growth of industrial capitalism in the Cl9th, the
bourgeoisie became increasingly concerned about the way that
their workers spent their time out of the factory. With the
widespread growth of factory production a physical separation
occurred between mill-owners and factory workers both inside
and outside of the factory. This physical separation was
accompanied by an increasing lack of social contact between
the two classes. In the Cl8th, popular culture provided an
important point of contact between the gentry and their
labourers. Although this culture generally sanctioned the
authority of the gentry it was, nevertheless, a shared
culture. "The race meetings of the rich became the poor's
popular holidays" and "The permissive tolerance of the gentry
was solicited by the many taverns which - as inn signs still
proclaim - sought to put themselves under the patronage of the
great."(47) Not only did the gentry sanction popular culture
but they openly and, sometimes officially, patronized tradit-
ional customs and celebrations.(48) In the new industrial
areas at the beginning of the Cl9th this informal contact was
disintegrating. The gentry were evacuating these areas in
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favour of the more pleasant environment away from the
factories(49) and the industrial bourgeoisie did not cultivate
informal social connections with the industrial working class.
Inside the factory, relations between the classes tended to be
formal and impersonal and outside of the factory there was
little evidence of a shared culture.
The Victorian bourgeoisie which set the moral tone
of cities like Manchester and Leeds were not likely
to patronize the cockpit as the Preston gentry of
the late eighteenth century had done, or to shower
coins on a Guy Fawkes crowd as the Wakefield Tories
still felt at liberty to do at mid-century. Such
gentlemen were much more inclined to either mind
their own business and businesses or else to
patronize temperance or rational recreation
societies or mechanics' institutes.
R. Storch	 The Policeman As Domestic Missionary
p.492
This physical and cultural separation meant that the
industrial bourgeoisie lacked first hand knowledge of the
working class and their leisure activities. As a result, they
became deeply suspicious - if not fearful - of the industrial
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proletariat.
We can, in fact construct a composite image of the
working classes as they appeared to some of the
better known middle-class publicists of the time.
They were portrayed as sunk in bestiality,
improvidence, intemperance and lack of sexual
restraint; their family lives appeared atomised and
their "homes" non-existent; they were viewed as
exempt from the restraints of religion and
apparently beyond the direct and indirect influences
which could conceivably civilise them. In terms of
their character-structure, they were perceived as
the very negation of the bourgeois and his virtues.
R. Storch The Problems Of Working Class Leisure
p.141
This view reflects the bourgeoisie's fear of the industrial
proletariat. Although they were able to exercise strict
control inside their factories,(50) they had no control over
their activities outside of the factory. Given that the
proletariat were perceived by the bourgeoisie as a potentially
revolutionary threat: "popular disorder of any type, even
manifestations usually devoid of overt political content -
public house affrays, dogfights, races, popular fetes of any
type - seemed to constitute a clear and present danger to the
social order."(51)
This fear reflects the crisis of control in the industrial
areas where the bourgeoisie could no longer rely upon the
informal mechanisms of control that had served the gentry in
the Cl8th.
One consequence of what political economists called
"free labour" was the appearance of its concom-
itant, "free leisure", and of a working class by and
large left to itself once it passed out through the
factory gate or workshop door in the evening. By the
middle of the nineteenth century - if not earlier -
a profound interruption of communications had
occurred between the classes: both the "language"
and the objectives of urban masses were, if intell-
igible at all, deeply frightening. ... The older
understanding that movements of the lower orders had
rational, legitimate, or at least comprehensible
ends was replaced in the first half of the nine-
teenth century by the feeling that they aimed at the
utter unravelling of society. To some extent these
fears were reflected in a concern that the lower
classes had escaped from all social control except
the discipline of work. The activities of workers
after their release from the salubrious discipline
of the workshop or factory therefore became a matter
of both profound interest and apprehension.
R. Storch	 The Policeman As Domestic Missionary
p.495
A number of commentators have suggested that the bourgeoisie
responded to this situation by engaging in a form of cultural
warfare against the emerging working class.(52) This assault
took the form of a pincer movement. On the one hand, there was
an attempt to 'educate' the working class into a bourgeois
morality. This took place through a wide range of philan-
thropic organisations(53), through the conscious efforts of
civil servants such as Chadwick, Kay and Nassau Senior(54)
but, most importantly, through schools.(55) These attempts
were accompanied, on the other hand, by a more direct
repression of the working class through the New Poor Law(56),
the suppression of fairs and other popular festivals(57) but,
most importantly for our discussion, through the new police.
The latter were employed to report on trade union activities,
public opinions and movements within the working class(58) but
they were also used to monitor a range of working class
leisure activities. (59)
In northern industrial towns of England these police
functions must be viewed as a direct complement to
the attempts of urban middle class elites - by means
of the sabbath, educational, temperance, and recrea-
tional reform - to mould a labouring class amenable
to new disciplines of both work and leisure. The
other side of the coin of middle class volunt-
aristic moral and social reform (even when sheathed)
was the policeman's truncheon. In this respect the
policeman was perhaps every bit as important as a
"domestic missionary" as the earnest and often
sympathetic men high-minded Unitarians dispatched
into darkest Leeds or Manchester in the 1830s and
1840s.
R. Storch
	
The Policeman As Domestic Missionary
p.481
The work of Storch, on the activities of the early police
forces in northern Britain, has shown us that they were used
by the industrial bourgeoisie in an attempt to incorporate the
working class, through an assault on proletarian culture. To
this extent, Colquhoun's vision of the police as a 'conquer-
ing army' converting the working class into 'useful members of
society' became a reality. However, although this constitutes
a dimension to police reform, it should not be overestimated.
The fact that the bourgeoisie used the police in this way does
not, necessarily, mean that they consciously set out to
establish it for this purpose. There is little evidence to
support such an interpretation, other than the writings of
Colquhoun that we have already considered. Certainly, this
form of 'social control' did not form part of the discourse in
the Parliamentary Debates on any of the major Police Acts.
Moreover, we must, once again, remind ourselves that the
bourgoisie were not the dominant political grouping during
this period. Thus, even if their usefulness in controlling
working class leisure was a factor in the bourgeoisie's
support of a uniformed police force, this can not explain why
a new form of county police emerged so much earlier than a new
form of county government.
The Police And The Threat Of An Organised Working Class 
So far, our discussion has focused primarily on the reasons
why the industrial bourgeoisie favoured replacing the trad-
itional machinery, under the direct control of the magistracy
with a new form of policing. However, although we do not wish
to deny the importance of this support, it is not sufficient
to explain the fact that change occurred at a relatively early
stage in the Cl9th. To address this issue, we must show why
the gentry supported the extension of the new police to the
counties. One possible explanation of this may lie in the fact
that the position of the gentry was also changing. Not only
were they becoming involved in similar kinds of enterprises to
the bourgeoisie but, the abolition of capital punishment meant
that gentry property no longer received the same protection
that it had in the Cl8th. In the following chapter, we will
see that this led some sections of the gentry , in the middle
of the Cl9th, to look for more effective methods of prot-
ecting property but this is not sufficient to explain the
formation of the new police. This affected sections of the
gentry in different ways and, when it emerged in the debates
on the extension of summary justice, it led to a split in the
gentry which was articulated in the Parliamentary Debates.
This was not the case in the debates on the Police Acts. In
particular, the County Police Act passed in 1839, which
appears to have struck at the heart of the gentry's authority
by tampering with the police function of the county magist-
racy for the first time, met with virtually no opposition from
the gentry. We will argue that this can be explained in terms
of the threat posed by a potentially revolutionary working
class which could not be contained by the traditional form of
order maintenance, thus forcing the gentry to accept change.
We will further argue that, in fact, the changes that occurred
were not as damaging to the position of gentry magistrates as
is often assumed and that this was both a cause and effect of
their tacit acceptance of county police forces.
A number of authors have pointed to the importance of the
Chartist outbreaks in the passing of the Police Acts in 1839.
These accounts usually contain the implicit assumption that
this legislation was simply one step in the inevitable
development of the modern system of policing and the Chartist
outbreaks are presented as the trigger which provoked the
necessary action. This interpretation receives superficial
support from the Parliamentary Debates on these measures which
are punctuated by anxiety about the disturbances. Also the
speed with which they were passed, and the lack of opposition
to them, feeds the teleological interpretation of the conven-
tional histories. However, in stressing the effects of the
Chartist disturbances, they ignore the fact that the
weaknesses of the traditional machinery of order maintenance
had been exposed many times before without eliciting the same
panic that occurred in 1839. To understand this, we must first
take a closer look at the nature of these earlier outbreaks of
civil unrest in the late Cl8th and early Cl9th and the way in
which the traditional machinery coped with them.
We have seen that responsibility for the maintenance of public
order had traditionally been in the hands of local magistrates
but the following passage from Mather's book on the Chartist
period provides a useful summary of the traditional system.
When riots broke out in a particular locality it was
the clear duty of the local magistrates to muster a
sufficient local force, to lead it in person to the
scene of disorder, to read the Riot Act to the mob
and, if necessary, to give the order to fire. If the
regular force was inadequate, any two justices had
power to swear in special constables. Should these
prove insufficient, they might call out on their own
authority the local troop of Yeomanry, or requis-
ition a regular military force from the nearest
barracks. Towards the end of the period they
acquired the additional power to summon corps of
Enrolled Military Pensioners, afterwards applying to
the Home Office for a warrant legalizing their
action. They might forbid meetings likely to
prejudice the public peace. They might also issue
warrants for the arrest of rioters and, in default
of sureties for their good behaviour, commit them to
prison to take their trial at the Assizes or Quarter
Sessions. Their warrants would also enable Chartist
arms, private papers and unstamped periodicals to be
seized. Finally, if all these measures failed to
restore the peace, it was up to the local magist-
rates to move the Lord Lieutenant or the government
to send further aid in the shape of regular troops,
Yeomanry, Metropolitan Policemen, or hard cash.
Their regular control over the machinery of public
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order extended to the swearing in of parish const-
ables and, universally after 1842, to the appoint-
ment of the same.
F. Mather Public Order In The Age Of The Chartists 
p.54
For most of the Cl8th this system had been sufficient to deal
with popular disturbances of all kinds but, in the late Cl8th,
weaknesses began to emerge. These first became apparent during
the anti-Catholic Gordon Riots in London in June 1780. These
riots were the most serious of the Cl8th and, and in terms of
the destruction of life and property, were more serious than
any of the later Luddite or Chartist outbreaks.(60) However,
for our purposes, their significance lies in the failure of
the local magistracy to act decisively in dealing with them. A
Catholic chapel was set on fire and a priest's house ransacked
while troops were present with a justice of the peace but the
latter did nothing to intervene(61) and at the height of the
riot, magistrates' refusal to attend and instruct the troops
forced the King to summon the Privy Council to issue a
proclamation authorising the army to take action without
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instructions from the civil power.(62) The reasons for the
magistrates' failure to act appear to have been threefold.
Some magistrates supported the rioters cause and did not wish
to act(63), there was an element of intimidation insofar as
those magistrates who opposed the crowd were liable to have
their own property destroyed(64) but, more importantly for the
present discussion, there was confusion amongst those
magistrates who did wish to act.
It was widely believed by both magistrates and
officers that troops could not be used until the
Riot Act had been read, and even then a chain of
prosecutions for murder against justices and
soldiers had taught both to act warily. Soldiers, in
particular, were extremely reluctant to interfere
without the authority of a magistrate and before the
reading of the Riot Act. Another confusion arose
from the belief that an hour had to be allowed after
the reading of the Act before action could be taken.
As a result a kind of paralysis affected the
soldiers and magistrates in the early days of the
riots as their uncertainty permitted the situation
to escalate. It was not until the Attorney-General
and later, Lord Mansfield made a clear declaration
of the law that the rioters were dealt with firmly.
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Even so, confusion about the law of riot remained
through the period and was to recur as a source of
dispute in the nineteenth century.
J. Stevenson Popular Disturbances In England p.89
The weaknesses in the traditional machinery became still more
obvious in the early Cl9th when disturbances occurred in the
new industrial areas of the North and Midlands. One reason for
this was that there were simply not enough magistrates in
these areas. By tradition, the Lords Lieutenants of the
counties preferred to appoint members of the gentry to the
magistrates' bench and they resisted pressures to appoint 'men
of trade'. However, this policy was creating increasing
difficulties because the gentry were evacuating the industrial
areas leaving a shortage of 'suitable' candidates.(65) Thus, a
situation was developing in which trouble-ridden areas were
emerging where the system of maintaining order was at its most
vulnerable. (66)
In fact, this was not an insurmountable problem for the
traditional system and, as a result of pressure from central
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government, many Lords Lieutenants were persuaded to modify
their appointment policies to include industrialists.(67)
However, the problems were more deep-seated than this and,
even where magistrates were available to deal with the distur-
bances, they often proved to be inadequate. Mather suggests
that many magistrates protected their own interests at the
expense of the public good.(68) At other times the failure of
the magistrates was due to their inability or unwillingness to
accept their responsibilities. For example, in his discussion
of the Luddites, Thomis says:
The key figure in this situation was the local
magistrate, and the success with which the problem
of Luddism was tackled in any one area was
determined by his energy, resolution and
intelligence. Unfortunately the high qualities and
initiative which the successful pursuit of Luddites
demanded were not markedly present inside the
magisterial group; it was distinguished by its
incompetence and misjudgements rather than by
qualities making for success.
M. Thomis The Luddites p.147
Thomis returns to this theme in a later book when he discusses
law and order.
When General Maitland went North to Lancashire in
1812 his endless trials and tribulations were a
principle theme of his correspondence to the Home
Secretary as he reported on the apathy, inactivity,
confusion, and jealousy that prevailed amongst the
local magistracy. And an almost identical picture
was painted by General Napier 30 years later, when
he complained of magistrates who disappeared from
the scene of action, leaving everything to the army,
and on one occasion of magistrates who went off to
shoot grouse at the height of the troubles of 1839.
Poor Napier even found the Home Secretary Russell
'very ignorant of what was going on' in 1839.
M. Thomis The Town Labourer And The Industrial 
Revolution p.33
In addition to the failings of individual magistrates there
were other major problems with the traditional machinery. In
the final resort the army was used to quell disturbances but
when, in the Cl9th, the army was resorted to more frequently,
its limitations became increasingly apparent. One dimension to
this was the fact that soldiers often sympathised with the
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crowd and in many cases soldiers acted to assist the
"rioters".(69) It was hoped that the creation of the
Volunteers as a separate force might overcome this problem
but, according to the Hammonds, in the industrial towns of the
north of England they, too, were likely to either refuse to
act or to act with the crowd in the case of food riots or
strikes.(70) Even if the soldiers could be relied upon, the
army was a cumbersome instrument to use for the maintenance of
order. Since the army was relatively ineffective if troops
were parcelled into small groups to hunt rioters or Luddites,
large numbers of soldiers had to be deployed in order to be
effective.(71) In addition to the practicality and the expense
involved, the use of the army in this way was often seen as
the use of a sledgehammer to crack a nut(72) and this further
fuelled popular hostility towards the army. The many diffic-
ulties in using the army to preserve public order are summed
up by Stevenson when he says:
Increasingly after 1815, the radical press was free
to conduct a running war with the authorities,
condemning occasions of "praetorian licentiousness'.
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The events at Peterloo, its very name a product of
the radical press, greatly strengthened the case
against the use of soldiers as a police force.
Although they had to be used extensively during the
Luddite outbreaks, the army frequently opened up the
government to attack. In that sense, the army could
not be used as lightly as many have supposed. This
at least partially accounts for the reluctance of
Home Secretaries to despatch troops whenever called
upon to do so. In fact the government was frequently
in the position of refusing to give military support
to worried magistrates. They did this because they
often doubted the judgement of the magistrates with
which they dealt in the manufacturing districts.
They feared too, that troops would be parcelled out
in small detachments and worn out in constant duties
- a situation that could easily provoke discontent
amongst the troops themselves, besides exposing the
army more effectively to the influence of the
populace amongst whom they were billeted.
J. Stevenson Social Control And The Prevention Of 
Riots In England, 1789-1829 p.35
It is clear, then, that in the late Cl8th and early Cl9th, the
increasing strain that was being placed upon the traditional
system for the maintenance of order was beginning to cause
cracks to appear in its structure. However, although a number
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of contemporaries commented on the ineffectiveness of the
system in general and the leadership of the'local magistrates
in particular, few were prepared to suggest that it should be
replaced by a professional police force. Even as late as 1831,
when law and order appeared to have collapsed in many of
Britain's largest cities,(73) there was no call for its
replacement. When speaking about the election disturbances of
that year, Earl Grey (the Home Secretary) said:
The law as it at present stands, has been found by
active magistrates, who exerted themselves properly,
to be sufficiently powerful to put down distur-
bances.
Quoted in D. Williams Keeping The Peace p.13
When the deficiencies of the traditional system were exposed
again by the Chartist outbreaks in 1839 , the response was
quite different. Whereas, in the past, the shortcomings of
local magistrates had been tolerated, in 1839 they were the
source of widespread concern - if not panic. The initial
Parliamentary Debates on the events in Birmingham were
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peppered with party political rhetoric. The Earl of Warwick
accused the Birmingham magistrates of failing to act because
they were in sympathy with the Chartists. (74) These
accusations were later repudiated, in the Lords, by Brougham
who said that no one who knew the magistrates concerned "would
think of imputing to them anything more than an error of
judgement, and a mistaken feeling of humanity."(75) ;and, in
the Commons by Russell who said:
If there have been faults or negligence in this
instance, I believe it to have been from an error in
judgement on the part of the magistrates in
imagining that the town was restored to tran-
quility, and perhaps from an apprehension that they
might be blamed if they proceeded to measures of
great activity in repressing the appearance of
tumult, and not from any sympathy with the rioters.
Parliamentary Debates 17th.July 1839, Vol.49, c.413
Warwick's initial attack on the Birmingham magistrates was an
extension of an ongoing conflict between the Conservative
county magistrates in Warwickshire and the radical Birmingham
Corporation.(76) Similarly, the interventions of Russell,
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,Brougham and others were attempts to defend their side of the
House. The party political dimension raised the tempo of the
debate but we should not allow this to obscure the fact that
there was a consensus about the fact that the local magist-
rates had failed to cope with the Chartist outbreaks in
Birmingham. Thus, although Russell and Brougham refute the
allegations of political bias, they accept the fact that
errors of judgement' were made. This failure of the magist-
rates was expressed most clearly by the Duke of Wellington
who, on this occasion, appears to have remained aloof from the
party wranglings. When replying to a comment to the effect
that there had been no deficiency of law and order, he agreed
that there had been no deficiency of police or military "but
it appears to me that there was a great deficiency on the part
of the magistrates to keep the peace."(77) A little later in
the same speech, he says:
I have been in many towns taken by storm, but never
have such outrages occurred in them as were
committed in this town only last night, and under
the eyes of magistrates appointed, not under the
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Great Seal, but by the Secretary of State for the
Home Department. In their presence, property was
taken out of many houses and burnt in the streets,
before the faces of the owners of it, not with-
standing the presence of the police and troops, with
ample means of putting an end to these disgraceful
disorders. This state of things ought not to have
been allowed to go under the eyes of magistrates,
and also under the eyes of troops, without anything
being done about these outrages.
Parliamentary Debates 16th.July 1839, Vol.49, c.374
The general feeling of both Houses of Parliament was summed up
by Melbourne speaking towards the end of the last debate on
the County Police Bill in the Lords. He asked whether it would
be prudent or safe to allow the country to remain without some
measure for the maintenance of public order, and he says:
It had been stated in former Sessions, and it was
now pretty clear to their Lordships - nay it was
manifest, from the state of the whole country, that
the present force of constables was insufficient
even to carry into effect the ordinary law in
ordinary times of trouble and excitement, and
therefore some measure, like the present, was
required to invigorate that force, and to make it
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efficient for the purpose for which it was intended.
Parliamentary Debates 20th.Aug. 1839, Vol.49, c.436
Given that the traditional machinery had failed before without
evoking calls for a new system of policing, the above extracts
from the Parliamentary Debates, together with the rapidity
with which the policing measures were passed in 1839, raises
the question: What was special about the Chartist distur-
bances? Insofar as the conventional histories have commented
on this, they have tended to suggest that the answer lies in
their scale. However, large-scale disturbances had occurred
before in 1831 and during the Luddite period and, in terms of
the destruction of life and property, the events of 1839 were
less serious than the Gordon Riots fifty years earlier. It was
not, therefore, merely the scale of these disturbances which
elicited a different response. We would suggest that a more
important factor was the growth of an organised working class.
With the growth of industrial capitalism, the working class
had slowly grown in strength and begun to develop its own
industrial and political organisations. The Chartist out-
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breaks in 1839 were a clear demonstration of the potential
threat that this posed, not just for the maintenance of social
order, but to the structure of society more generally. In a
period of rapid change and revolution on the continent, it is
not difficult to imagine how both the bourgeoisie and the
gentry might have been panicked into extending the new police
to the counties.
This change in the nature of class struggle would certainly
explain why the traditional system was not replaced earlier.
For the majority of people living in Britain in the Cl8th, the
market was an important focal point(78) which formed an arena
for the channelling of local grievances(79) such as riots over
the price of bread and a variety of other issues mainly in the
sphere of consumption.(80) Although such riots were frequent,
they lacked a conscious political direction. There is
virtually no evidence to suggest that any riot in the years
before the French Revolution aimed to bring about changes in
the social structure. On the contrary, evidence fro7
historical studies by Thompson, Hobsbawm, Rude and others
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suggests that the Cl8th 'crowd' were trying to preserve
traditional lifestyles, customs, culture and, indeed, a
traditional economy. This is summarised well by Thompson when
he says:
Hence one characteristic of the century: we have a
rebellious traditional culture. The conservative
culture of the plebs as often as not resists, in the
name of 'custom", those economic innovations and
rationalizations (as enclosure, work discipline,
free market relations in grain) which the rulers or
employers seek to impose. Innovation is more evident
at the top of society than below, but, since this
innovation is not some normless or neuter techno-
logical / sociological	 process	 ("modernization',
'rationalization') but is the innovation of capit-
alist process, it is most often experienced by the
plebs in the form of exploitation, or the exprop-
riation of customary use-rights, or the violent
disruption of valued patterns of work and leisure.
Hence the plebian culture is rebellious in defence
of custom. The customs defended are the people's
own, and some of them are in fact based upon rather
recent assertions in practice. But when the people
search for legitimations for protest, they often
turn back to the paternalist regulations of a more
authoritarian society, and select from among these
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those parts most calculated to defend their present
interests; food rioters appeal back to the Book of
Orders and to the legislation against forestallers,
etc., artisans appeal back to certain parts (e.g.
apprenticeship regulation) of the Tudor regulatory
labour code.
E. Thompson	 Eighteenth Century English Society
p.154 (original emphasis)
What Thompson is doing here is to summarise the nature of
class struggle in the early period of capitalist development,
characterised by enclosures and new market practices. Riots
can be seen as a response to the changes emanating from this
period but, as long as they were localised in defence of
traditional practices, the traditional peace keeping machinery
was able to cope reasonably well. In the 1790s, this situation
began to change in that there was an element of political
organisation in the food riots of this period.(81) Although
Thompson is careful not to overstate this point(82), he argues
that the food riots of 1795-1801 mark the end of traditional
forms of protest and the beginning of a period of transition
to new, more consciously political, struggles centred more and
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more upon wages and production issues rather than consumer
issues.(83) It was in this period that the old paternalism,
which had been crumbling since before the French Revolution,
finally snapped.
The forms of action which we have been examining
depended upon a particular set of social relations,
a particular equilibrium between paternalist
authority and the crowd. This equilibrium was
dislodged in the wars for two reasons. First, the
acute anti-Jacobinism of the gentry led to a new
fear of any form of popular self-activity; magist-
rates were willing to see signs of sedition in
price-setting actions even where no such sedition
existed; the fear of invasion raised the volun-
teers, and thus gave to the civil powers much more
immediate means for meeting the crowd, not with
parley and concession but with repression. Second,
such repression was legitimized, in the minds of
central and of many local authorities, by the
triumph of the new ideology of political economy.
E. Thompson The Moral Economy of The English Crowd
In The Eighteenth Century pp.128-129.
As a result, the last decade of the Cl8th and the first decade
of the Cl9th witnessed the rapid abrogation of paternalist
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legislation and its replacement with repressive legislation
such as the Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800.(84) The
repressive atmosphere of this period imposed an enforced
secrecy upon the embryo working class movement which helped it
to develop new forms of organisation which were manifested for
the first time in the activities of the Luddites.(85) Thus
Luddism marks an important step in the transition towards new
forms of class struggle. Although, on the one hand, machine
breaking was a reactionary attempt to hold on to a traditional
way of life and as such can be seen as an extension of the
Cl8th food riots, on the other hand, it was characterised by a
relatively high degree of discipline(86) and: "One can see
Luddism as a manifestation of a working class culture of
greater independence and complexity than any known to the
eighteenth century". (87)
Luddism and the agitation for Parliamentary reform which
followed(88) helped to galvanise the working class on a
national as well as a local scale and this imposed a far
greater strain upon the peace keeping machinery than had the
Cl8th food riots.
	 Initially, governments responded by
resorting to the most draconian measures that were available
within the traditional framework. During the Luddite period
the industrial north and Midlands was flooded with troops.(89)
Physical violence - most notably at St. Peter's Fields where
11 people were killed and a further 400 were injured - was
also used against the parliamentary reform movement. The
latter further provoked legislation, in the form of the Six
Acts, which was designed to prevent any further mass meetings
of workers. In this way, the traditional system survived both
Luddism and the parliamentary reform movement but its
resources had been stretched to the limit and weakened in the
process (viz, the political embarrassment of 'Peterloo' and
the subsequent reluctance to employ the army to quell civil
disturbances).
When these resources were next tested in 1839, they were
confronted with a better organised and more mature working
class, in the form of Chartism, and they were stretched beyond
the limit. Chartism was an autonomous, well-organised,
articulate working class movement adapted to the emerging
industrial capitalist society, but the system of control was
still rooted in Cl8th social relations. The Chartist outbreaks
in 1839 exposed the need for new forms of policing capable of
containing the protest of an organised industrial working
class.	 This was clearly recognised by Russell. When
introducing the County Police Bill, he makes the point that
policing was not a problem in the boroughs because they had
been able to create their own police forces under the powers
of the Municipal Corporations Act:
But many districts in the counties had in the
present time come to be thickly populated with a
manufacturing or mining population, which partook of
the character or nature of a town population, while,
at the same time, it was impossible to confer upon
them municipal institutions.
Parliamentary Debates 24th July 1839, c.730
In this passage Russell is equating the need for a county
police force with the development of an organised industrial
working class. Although this connection is not often made
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explicit during the parliamentary debates, it is clear from
the above discussion that it was this dimension to Chartism
(rather than the extent of the outbreaks per se) which
explains the sense of panic in 1839. The realisation of the
strength of the organised working class also explains the lack
of opposition to the policing measures passed in 1839 and
1840. The existence of a potentially revolutionary working
class posed as great a threat, if not greater, to the position
and property of the gentry as it did to the bourgeoisie. Thus,
whereas the gentry had been prepared to resist handing over
the reins of local government, they could no longer afford to
cling to the traditional system for the maintenance of order.
In the early Cl9th, when the weaknesses of the system had been
exposed by "politicised" food riots and Luddism, they had
responded by strengthening the traditional machinery and
introducing harsher legislation. The events of 1839 revealed
that it was not possible to strengthen the existing system
sufficiently to deal with the organised working class and the
extension of the new police to the counties was accepted by
the gentry without opposition.
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Thus, we can see that the birth of the new police was not a
simple reflection of bourgeois interests in the protection of
property and the control of working class culture. Rather, it
was the product of the particular social formation that
existed in Britain in the mid-C19th and the complexities of
the class struggle to which it gave rise. The central point is
that the industrial bourgeoisie did not become the dominant
political force in Britain until some time after the form-
ation of the new police. In the period with which we are
concerned, the gentry retained political control and this had
a significant influence on the nature of reform. In the above
discussion, we have focussed largely on the effect that this
had on the timing of reform. The initial stages in the birth
of the police (i.e. in 1792, 1800 and 1829) applied exclu-
sively to London - where policing had not been in the hands of
the gentry - and it is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that
there was little opposition to these measures. The same
applies to the policing clause in the Municipal Corporations
Act, but the County Police Act in 1839 appears to have struck
deep into the flesh of gentry authority by divesting trad-
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itional powers from the county magistracy. We have suggested
that the gentry were forced to accept this change because of
the threat from an organised working class which exposed the
inadequacy of the traditional machinery of order maintenance
rooted in eighteenth century social relations.
A measure such as that passed in 1839 could not have been
passed without, at least, the tacit acceptance of the gentry.
However, the gentry did not simply influence the timing of
reform. Their continued political dominance also had an
important impact on the form taken by the new police. The
county policing measures passed in the Cl9th represent a
compromise between the bourgeoisie and the gentry. This is
suggested by the fact that the County Police Act (1839) was
not compulsory and, therefore, enabled magistrates in the
industrial counties to create a police force whilst leaving
those in the more rural, agricultural areas to continue with
the existing machinery. Similarly, the fact that the Amend-
ment Act in 1840 was designed to enable magistrates to create
police forces only in those parts of their counties that were
industrialised, is further testimony to the impact that the
gentry had on the nature of police reform. Again, in 1856, the
need to appease the gentry can be seen in the way that Grey
"bought off" the county magistracy by offering substantial
grants to those benches who submitted to Home Office control
in setting up a county police force.
However, the impact of the gentry went further than this. They
did not simply use their power to delay the creation of a
nationwide police force or to secure financial benefits from
central government. More importantly, they were able to
influence the particular form taken by the new police. Thus,
although the 1856 Act led to the creation of police forces in
all counties in England and Wales under the nominal control of
the Home Secretary, county magistrates retained considerable
control over the administration of the forces in their
counties. Not only were they to be responsible for the
recruitment and dismissal of Chief Constables but, they
retained control over operational decisions concerning the
deployment of both the army and the police in dealing with
local disturbances. (90)
Summary
The first half of the Cl9th witnessed a change in the hiture
of magistrates' policing function, resulting in the re p lace-
ment of the traditional system, based upon deference and
paternalism, with the modern, uniformed, professional police
force. This was not a natural development forming part of a
process of 'civilisation' or 'industrialisation". Rather, it
was a product of the class struggle arising from the partic-
ular social formation of nineteenth century British societ .
This is not to suggest that it was a simple reflection of
bourgeois interests in the protection of property and th
control of the working class. These were important dimensions
to police reform, but the process was more complex than this.
In particular, the gentry retained their political dominance
throughout the period of the birth of the new police and
legislation could mot have been passed without their consent.
We have suggested that the threat of an organised w rking
class compelled the gentry to accept the need for reform o
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the system of order maintenance which explains why the Police
Acts were passed at such an early stage in the Cl9th with
little opposition from the gentry representatives in Parlia-
ment. However, the role of the gentry was, not merely to
influence the timing, but also, the particular form taken by
the police in Britain which allowed them to retain an element
of control over the administration of the police, the remnants
of which can still be seen today.
In the next chapter, we will continue our analysis of the
transformation of the magistracy in the Cl9th by looking at
the extension of summary justice and the way in which this,
too, was significantly influenced by the continued political
dominance of the gentry.
CHAPTER EIGHT 
CHANGES IN THE MAGISTRATES' COURTS 
AND THE SYSTEM OF PROSECUTION
Introduction 
In the two previous chapters, we have seen that, during the
Cl9th, magistrates had been replaced in their traditional
functions of local government and policing by new forms in
which they had a reduced role. Most commentators have inter-
preted this as a straightforward decline of the magistracy.
For example, Hazeltine says:
At the present day the office of Justice of the
Peace, not only in the British Isles but elsewhere,
is in the process of decay; its functions usurped by
other institutional machineries; and it is not
impossible, indeed, it is probable, that in the
course of time this heritage from the Middle Ages,
at least in the form in which it has filled so much
of history, is destined to disappear from the life
of society, taking its place among those instit-
utions of the past which men study in order to
understand the course of historical development that
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has produced the local government of their day.
H. Hazeltine General Preface to E.G. Dowdell
A Hundred Years Of Quarter Sessions p.xliii
Although not many of the conventional histories have gone as
far as Hazeltine in predicting the total disappearance of the
magistracy, there is a widespread tendency to portray the
history of the magistracy in linear terms as reaching a peak
in the Cl8th and then declining steadily in the Cl9th and
C2Oth. The major problem with this view is that it is
one-dimensional i.e., its focus is exclusively on the policing
and administrative powers which magistrates are assumed to
have lost, whilst ignoring the transformation that was
occurring in the nature of their judicial function. However,
at the same time as they were losing their traditional
functions, magistrates' courts were reformed and granted
extensive powers of summary jurisdiction. This is not to
suggest that these judicial powers balanced the loss of their
policing and administrative powers. The magistracy was less
powerful as a result of the changes that occurred during the
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Cl9th but magistrates did not simply suffer an absolute loss
of power. Rather they underwent a metamorphosis resulting in
the emergence of a new legal form for the magistracy. In this
chapter we will examine in detail the changes that occurred in
magistrates' judicial function. As in our earlier discuss-
ions, we will argue that this development was closely related
to the rise of industrial capitalism and the growth of the
bourgeoisie, but, again, we will show that, in order to under-
stand the precise nature of the form that emerged, this
development must be located within the context of the struggle
between the bourgeoisie and the gentry.
The Social Composition Of The Magistracy
One way in which the English magistracy changed with the
expansion of industrial capitalism was through the inclusion
of industrialists on the magistrates' bench. During the Cl8th
the magistracy had been the exclusive preserve of the gentry
and the aristocracy. The criteria for appointment as a magist-
rate were summed up by the Duke of Wellington when he said
that magistrates must be "gentlemen of wealth, worth, consid-
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eration and education ... they should have been educated at
the bar if possible, and . . . above all, they should be
associated with, and, respected by the gentry of the
county."(1) In this speech Wellington was speaking on behalf
of the vast majority of the county magistrates throughout the
country who still felt an intense hostility towards the idea
of appointing men of trade to the county bench.(2) Even when
the Lord Lieutenant of a county was disposed to appoint such a
person, he was likely to meet with considerable opposition
from the existing magistrates. "In 1838, for example, the
magistrates of the Bala district of Merionethshire 'went on
strike' to protest the appointment of a wealthy local land-
owner who had, within their recollection, operated a retail
shop and who was a Methodist."(3) Zangerl goes on to say that
Thomas Hogg, the government inspector who reported this
episode, thoroughly approved of their action.
They objected to this individual, not so much on
account of religious differences, which might
possibly be overlooked, but because his origin, his
education, his connections, his early habits, occup-
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ations, and station were not such as could entitle
him to be the familiar associate of gentlemen. The
refusal of the County Magistrates to act with a man
who had been a grocer and is a Methodist is the
dictate of genuine patriotism; the spirit of arist-
ocracy in the county magistracy is the salt which
alone preserved the whole mass from inevitable
corruption.
Quoted in C. Zangerl The Social Composition of The 
County Magistracy In England And Wales, 1831-1887 
p.120
During the Cl8th, the gentry had been very successful in
maintaining the social exclusivity of the county benches but,
although they continued to resist the appointment of men of
trade, this became increasingly difficult during the Cl9th. In
agricultural counties it was comparatively easy for the gentry
to maintain their dominance(4) but, in the early Cl9th, this
was no longer the case in the more industrialised counties. (5)
The landscapes of large parts of the latter counties came to
be dominated by industry (coal mines, iron works, factories,
mills, etc.) and its by-products turning them into undesirable
residential areas for the gentry who migrated to more rural
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surroundings. This created severe problems for the Lords
Lieutenants of these counties because, on the one hand the new
industrial regions were the areas with the highest crime rates
but, on the other hand, there was a sharply decreasing supply
of 'suitable' candidates for the magistrates' bench in these
areas.
With the advantage of hindsight the appointment of
industrialists to the bench appears to be an obvious solution
to this dilemma but the Lords Lieutenants of these counties
strongly resisted this logic and searched desperately for more
acceptable alternatives. One strategy was to attempt to
increase the volume of work carried out by the existing
magistrates. In Lancashire, for example, an intermediate
sessions was introduced for the Salford Hundred (the most
industrialised division of the county) in an attempt to cope
with the increased workload but it did little more than
scratch the surface of the problem. (6) Some Lords Lieutenants
looked to the appointment of stipendiary magistrates as a more
effective method of dealing with the increase in magistrates'
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judicial business without resorting to the appointment of
industrialists. As a result stipendiaries were appointed for
Manchester and Salford (jointly) in 1813, the Staffordshire
potteries in 1839, Merthyr Tydfil in 1843(7) and South
Staffordshire in 1854. Stipendiaries though were a far from
ideal solution. Not only were they unable to cope with the
volume of magisterial business on their own but, they posed a
threat to the tradition of the unpaid, lay, landowning
gentleman magistrate and, in any case, the government was
likely to refuse the necessary legislation to enable the
appointment of a stipendiary.(8)
Probably the most convenient solution to the Lords Lieutenants
problem and certainly the most preferred was to appoint
members of the Anglican clergy.
Appointing clergy to the Bench would carry a number
of advantages for the Lord Lieutenant: they were not
connected with any trade or business; they were
resident in their parishes; they had the time to
spare to attend to a magistrates' duties, and were
said to be conscientious in their performance of
those duties; and they were socially acceptable to
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the gentry as companions on the Bench.
D. Philips The Black Country Magistracy p.171
Large numbers of Anglican clergy were appointed to the magist-
rates' bench in the early Cl9th with the result that by 1831
they comprised one quarter of all the J.P.s in England.(9)
However, after 1835 this was no longer possible because of the
Whig Government's firm policy not to appoint clergy as part of
its attempt to redress the political balance of the county
benches - clerical magistrates were felt to strengthen the
already predominant Tory and Anglican presence on the
Bench. (10)
Having exhausted all of the possible alternatives and faced
with the continued pressure from Lord Russell (Home Secretary
1835-1839) who "acceded to the Reformers' demands and used his
1
influence to challenge the landed monopoly of the county
Benches",(11) the Lords Lieutenants of the industrialised
counties were forced to appoint industrialists to the Bench in
ever increasing numbers after 1835. In fact, the effects were
not uniform throughout the country. In the most industrialised
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counties the new industrial capitalists soon constituted a
majority on the county benches(12) but, in the less indust-
rialised counties the appointment of industrialists was a far
slower and slightly different process. Rather than the gentry
simply being displaced by the bourgeoisie, these counties
witnessed a merger between them. On the one hand landowners
began to invest in coal, railways, breweries and other
industries thus, at least to some extent, embracing indust-
rial capitalism. On the other hand, many of the wealthier
manufacturers and industrialists began to sell their business
interests and/or buy land in an attempt to establish them-
selves as country squires.
In fact, the altered composition of the county
magistracy, if viewed simply as a statistic, fails
to convey the extraordinary adaptability and flexib-
ility of the landed classes. Class barriers did not
disappear - instead, they were lowered. By
gratifying the social and political aspirations of
the upper middle-class individuals, the landed
classes were responding realistically to changing
social	 conditions.	 Assimilation,	 rather	 than
disturbing the established order of social relation-
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ships, reinforced the value system of the landed
classes. The circle of landed allies on the county
bench merely expanded to include bourgeois indiv-
iduals as well as Anglican clergymen, doctors,
barristers and military officers.
C. Zangerl The Social Composition of The County
Magistracy In England And Wales, 1831-1887 p.125
Although the changes in the composition of the magistracy were
not uniform throughout the country, the bourgeoisie were,
nevertheless, being assimilated onto the county benches. We
can further see that the bourgeois magistrates used their
new-found power to protect their own interests. This was
evident from the very beginning of the Cl9th in the way that
they enforced the Combination Laws. Although these laws were
supposed to apply equally to both employers and employees, in
practice, they were only used against combinations of
employees.
4
Parliament did not concede much to the working
classes, but the concessions, such as they were,
lost all their value from the refusal of the magist-
rates to carry out legislation that was obnoxious to
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the masters.
J.L. & Barbara Hammond The Town Labourer p.46
The Hammonds go on to suggest that many magistrates also used
the Vagrancy Laws to suppress the embrionic working class
organisations of the very early Cl9th.
They were used to put into prison any man or woman
of the working class who seemed to the magistrates
an inconvenient or disturbing character. They
offered the easiest and most expeditious way of
proceeding against anyone who tried to collect money
for families of locked-out workmen, or to dissem-
inate literature that the magistrates thought undes-
irable.
J.L. & Barbara Hammond The Town Labourer p.46
Later in the Cl9th industrialists used their position on the
magistrates' bench to enforce other industrial legislation in
a similarly partial manner. When discussing the Master and
Servant Act (1823) - which, in theory, provided remedies for
breach of contract of employment by both employer and employee
- Philips says that, in practice, it was used by the manufac-
,
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turing magistrates in the Black Country as a weapon against
trades unions and strikes.
If workers left their master's service before the
end of their contract, by going on strike, they were
open to prosecution. Black Country coal and iron
masters brought such prosecutions against striking
miners and ironworkers. The threat of the Act forced
the miners, in their large strikes, to give two
weeks' notice of their intention to strike, to avoid
prosecution. The coal and iron masters made more use
of their powers granted in the Act, not merely
keeping it in reserve as a threat, than any other
industry.
D. Philips The Black Country Magistracy p.180
Similarly, in his discussion of the 1831 Truck Act, Philips
shows that a number of wealthy coal and iron master magist-
rates were able to ignore this legislation and even continue
to operate their own 'tommy' shops. This Act was particularly
difficult to enforce because it specifically prevented magist-
rates who were either coal and iron masters themselves or who
were connected with them from hearing cases under this Act. In
industrial areas such as the Black Country this often excluded
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virtually the entire magistracy. R.H. Horne (the Children's
Empoyment Sub-Commissioner) noted in 1843 that:
Since the passing of the (Truck) Act nearly every
one of the magistrates in the vicinity (of Bilston,
a particularly bad area for truck) have always been
mine-owners or ironmasters, or connected with those
who were in such trades. There is at present only
one magistrate in Wolverhampton (there are no
magistrates in Bilston) really empowered in a strict
legal sense, to act in a truck case. Several magist-
rates, however, have acted from time to time; and as
those were directly or indirectly in the coal or
iron-trade, they naturally would not offend the
influential master by a conviction if they could
avoid it. Hence they discouraged informations, and
pacify the poor man by moralising - 'My man, you
know you have had your master's goods: and surely
you ought to pay for them, you know'. It is there-
fore considered almost a sin, and little short of an
attempt to defraud, when anyone seeks a conviction
in a truck case.
Quoted in D. Philips The Black Country Magistracy
p.183
Even when magistrates could be found to try cases under this
Act, they were often reluctant to convict and, when they did
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convict, the penalties were usually light.(13) Further
evidence of the way in which industrial magistrates were able
to use their position to protect their own interests is
provided by Marx in his discussion of the workings of the 1844
Factory Act which was supposed to limit the working day of
children. Marx shows that the Factory Inspectors continued
their legal proceedings against the use of the relay system
whereby children were employed beyond the legal limits:
But what was the good of summoning capitalists when
the courts, in this case the county magistracy -
Cobbett's 'Great Unpaid' - aquitted them? In these
tribunals, the masters sat in judgement on them-
selves. An example. One Eskrigge, cotton spinner, of
the firm of Kershaw, Leese and Co., had laid before
the Factory Inspector of his district the scheme of
a relay system intended for his mill. Receiving a
refusal, he at first kept quiet. A few months later,
an individual named Robinson, also a cotton spinner,
and if not his man Friday, at all events related to
Eskrigge, appeared before the borough magistrates of
Stockport on a charge of introducing the identical
plan of relays invented by Eskrigge. Four Justices
sat, among them three cotton spinners, at their head
was the inevitable Eskrigge. Eskrigge aquitted
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Robinson, and was now of the opinion that what was
right for Robinson was fair for Eskrigge. Supported
by his own legal decision, he introduced the system
at once into his own factory.
K. Marx Capital Vol.I, p.274
However, although the above evidence reveals that the
bourgeoisie used their judicial powers to further their own
interests, we cannot leave our analysis here. The class nature
of the Cl9th magistracy did not lay simply in the abuse of
magisterial power. Rather, the nature of this power was itself
transformed in the mid-C19th and in order to fully understand
magistrates' judicial role, we must examine the new form taken
by the magistracy.
The Reform Of Court Procedure 
In the first half of the Cl9th central government strength-
ened its control over magistrates' courts by clarifying their
jurisdiction and regulating their procedures. During the first
half of the Cl9th legislation was passed to distinguish the
jurisdiction of Quarter Sessions from that of the Assizes.
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This was a process that had been started by Peel in the 1820s
but the most important measure came in 1842 with the passing
of the Jurisdiction of Justices Act. This Act stated that
certain special offences likely to lead to local excitement -
cases arising out of combinations amongst trades, the
Municipal Reform Bill, and the Parliamentary Reform Bill -
should be tried by jury at the Assizes. It also transferred a
number of non-capital offences from the Assizes to the Quarter
Sessions. Perhaps most importantly though, it stated that all
offences punishable by death or transportation were to be
dealt with by the Assizes.(14) In fact, magistrates had, in
practice, already stopped trying the more serious cases and
they had not normally tried capital offences for about 200
years.(15) Nevertheless, the Act is important because it
clarified the legal limits of magistrates' jurisdiction and
because it is indicative of central government's intention to
impose stricter controls upon the administration of magist-
rates' justice.
Of far greater significance in this respect was the legis-
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lation introduced in 1848 governing the procedures of Petty
Sesions. This consisted of four Acts: one of which dealt with
the powers of J.P.s to deal with people charged with
indictable offences and was concerned simply with their power
to issue warrants(16); another was concerned with protecting
magistrates from prosecution for anything done in the course
of their duty unless malice could be proved(17); and a third
Act (passed in 1849) enabled (but did not compel) the erection
of purpose built courtrooms(18). The most important of the
four Acts though was the Summary Jurisdiction Act which dealt
with the manner in which magistrates conducted their affairs
within the courtroom. The Act states that:
the room or place in which such Justice or Justices
shall sit to hear and try such Complaint or Infor-
mation shall be deemed an open and Public Court, to
which the Public generally may have Access, so far
as the same can conveniently contain them; and the
Party against whom such Complaint is made or Infor-
mation laid shall be admitted to make his full
Answer and defence thereto, and to have witnesses
examined and cross-examined by Counsel or Attorney
on his behalf; and every Complainant or Informant in
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any such Case shall be at liberty to conduct such
Complaint or Information respectively and to have
Witnesses examined and cross-examined by Counsel or
Attorney on his behalf.
11 & 12 Vict. cap.43
These four Acts did not constitute a complete reform of the
procedure inside magistrates' courts - Justices still did not
have to hold their sessions in prescribed buildings and clerks
were still paid a fee rather than a salary(19) - but they,
nevertheless, provided the basic framework of the modern
magistrates' court.(20) The Summary Jurisdiction Acts mark the
end of magistrates autocratic power in the courtroom(21) by
making magistrates' courts formally open and giving them the
appearance of an independent judicial body.
A number of the conventional histories have identified this
legislation as being of paramount importance in the history of
the English magistracy and the English legal system but they
have made no attempt to explain it. Rather, as we have seen in
our discussion of Osborne's account (See Chapter Three) they
have tended to see it as an inevitable stage in the evolution
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of the ideal legal system that is assumed to exist in modern
Britain. For example, Tobias, when concluding his chapter on
Cl9th law and criminal courts, says:
The criminal law of England and Wales, in the period
of which we have been speaking, undoubtedly had some
defects; but even at the beginning of that period it
can be said to have been a system worthy of a free
country.
J. Tobias Crime And Police In England 1700-1900 
p.138
The idea that the reform of court procedure was inevitable
receives some support from the Parliamentary Debates (or to be
more precise, the lack of debate) on these measures. Thus,
when asking for leave to bring in the Bills, the Attorney
General said:
Though there might be difference of opinion in the
House as to the expediency of intrusting to the
unpaid magistracy the large powers they now
possessed, all must agree that it was the bounden
duty of the Legislature to afford all possible
assistance to gentlemen who discharged such duties
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as were devolved upon them.
Parliamentary Debates Vol.96, 3/2/1848, c.4
The fact that no opposition was voiced at this stage and that
the Bills passed their second and third readings with no disc-
ussion at all,(22) may appear to lend weight to the assump-
tion that they were part of the inevitable march of progress.
However, this does not explain why the change occurred at this
time. Unfortunately, the lack of debate on these measures in
Parliament makes it difficult to identify the precise
positions of the gentry and the bourgeoisie on this issue.
Nevertheless, it should be clear from the previous two
chapters that this period was characterised by the conflict
between these two groups and it is possible to explain the
Summary Jurisdiction Acts in these terms. Thus, what Osborne
sees as an 'incomplete' stage in the evolution of the modern
magistrates' court can be better explained as a compromise
reflecting the balance between bourgeois and gentry interests.
On the one hand, the restrictions that were placed on the
administration of magistrates' justice reflect the bourgeois
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principle of regulation through a formally neutral state and,
on the other hand, Pakington was able to thank the Attorney
General for 'his most praiseworthy effort' in introducing a
measure which did not constitute a serious challenge to the
authority of the gentry but enabled them: "to execute their
various functions without being subject to various prosec-
utions and actions in the honest performance of their
duty."(23)
The Growth of Magistrates' Summary Jurisdiction
Regardless of the precise nature of the compromise between the
gentry and the bourgeoisie, the Summary Jurisdiction Acts
established the broad framework of the modern magistrates'
court. However, although the incorporation of the magistracy
into the state apparatus appeared to guarantee the operation
of due process in magistrates' courts, this was only one side
of the transformation that occurred. At the same time as their
procedures were regulated by central government, magistrates'
judicial function was also expanded enormously by the exten-
sion of their summary powers of jurisdiction which involved
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the abandonment of the principles of due process involved in
jury trials.
This was not an entirely new development. As we have seen,
magistrates had powers to try minor offences summarily in
Petty Sessions in the early Cl8th (eq. under the Game Laws and
the Vagrancy Laws). In the latter part of the Cl8th, following
largely from the recommendations of Henry Fielding, these
powers were extended further.(24) Radzinowicz notes that a
multiplicity of Acts gave magistrates powers to hear and
decide, sometimes without appeal, an ever-growing number of
cases:
And notably cases relating to Customs and Excise;
stamps; the Game Laws; pawnbrokers; friendly soci-
eties; highways; hackney coaches, carts and other
carriages; hawkers and pedlars; Quakers and others
refusing to pay tithes; appeals of defaulters in
parochial rates; misdemeanours committed by persons
unlawfully pawning property which was not theirs;
bakers for short weight, and coal merchants;
labourers not observing their agreements; alehouse
keepers keeping disorderly houses; nuisances under
several Acts of Parliament.
L. Radzinowicz A History Of English Criminal Law
And Its Administration From 1750 Vol.2, p.270, fn.2
However, for the most part, the extension of magistrates'
summary powers in the Cl8th was based upon an expansion of
their traditional involvement in county administration and
peace keeping. It was not until the late Cl8th and early Cl9th
that the net of summary jurisdiction was thrown more widely to
include minor property offences which had previously been
dealt with in the higher courts. The early moves in this
direction were a direct result of the abolition of capital
punishment which began in the late Cl8th and early Cl9th
through the campaigning of Samuel Romillyk25) and reached a
climax during Peel's term as Home Secretary in the 1820s. Peel
passed a number of Acts which extended the scope of magist-
rates' summary powers. An Act of 1826 made the stealing of
deer, hares, dogs, fish, beasts and fruit trees (in certain
circumstances) summary offences. Another Act of 1827 made
damaging trees, fences, etc. (in certain circumstances)
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summary offences and, in 1828, he passed another Act making
common assault and some other assaults summary offences.(26)
The most important of his measures, though, was the Criminal
Law Consolidation Act (1827) which abolished the distinction
between grand larceny and petty larceny. This Act not only
abolished capital punishment for the former but, more
importantly, made all larcenies summary offences triable by
two J.P.s sitting in Petty Sessions.(27)
This legislation passed by Peel has an important place in the
history of criminal law because of its role in the abolition
of capital punishment(28) but it was also important in so far
as it broke new ground for the magistracy. He:
transferred a vast volume of crimes from the juris-
diction of the assizes to that of quarter sessions
and from quarter sessions to the justices of the
peace.
L. Radzinowicz A History Of English Criminal Law
And Its Administration From 1750 Vol.1, p.573
By giving magistrates summary jurisdiction over a wide range
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of petty thefts he took the first steps towards the
development of the modern magistracY as a summary judicial
body. However, at this time it would appear that this was
largely a side effect of the abolition of capital punishment
and it was not until later in the Cl9th that conscious efforts
were made to transform the magistracy in this way. Between
1839 and 1855 a series of Bills were introduced proposing to
extend magistrates' summary powers of conviction. The major
proposals of each of these measures are summarised in Table
One.
TABLE ONE 
SUMMARY JURISDICTION BILLS 1839-1855 
Summary Jurisdiction Bill(1839) - proposed to give
magistrates summary jurisdiction over felonies.
Metropolitan Police Courts Bill(1839) - main
proposal was that stipendiaries should be barristers
who had served at least 7 years. It also proposed to
give them summary powers to deal with petty larc-
enies - theft of anything valued at less than 40
shillings would be punishable by a fine of up to 7E5
or 3 months in prison. This clause was thrown out by
the Lords.
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Juvenile Offenders Bill(1840) - proposed to give
magistrates summary jurisdiction over misdemeanours
by children aged 12 or younger.
Infant Felons Bill(1840) - proposed to give Lord
Chancellor power of transferring children who had
been convicted of felonies to the care of benev-
olent persons who would undertake to educate and
provide for them.
Petty Sessions Bill(1841)	 proposed to give
magistrates summary powers over juvenile offenders.
They would have been able to issue fines up to £5 in
such cases.
Special Petty Sessions Bill(1842) - proposed to
give magistrates summary powers over all defendants
who pleaded guilty, regardless of age.
Juvenile offenders Act(1847) - allowed two magist-
rates sitting in Petty Sessions to try larceny
offences by juveniles under the age of 14 where the
goods stolen did not exceed 40 shillings in value.
They were empowered to issue a maximum sentence of 3
months imprisonment but they could order a whipping
as an alternative.
Juvenile Offenders Bill(1849) - proposed that a
large number of larcenies by juvenile offenders in
which the value of the goods stolen was less than 5
shillings should be triable summarily by J.P.s. Also
proposed to extend magistrates' powers to issue a
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flogging as an alternative to imprisonment to 16
year olds.
Juvenile Offenders Act(1850) - initially intro-
duced as the Larceny Summary Jurisdiction Act
proposing to give magistrates summary powers over
all petty larcenies below the value of 1 shilling
The House of Commons rejected this proposal but
agreed to extend the provisions of the 1847 Act to
juveniles up to the age of 16 with the exception
that the power to order whippings was not extended
to 14 and 15 year olds.
Juvenile Offenders Bill(1850) - proposed the
establishment of reformatory schools to which
magistrates might send juvenile offenders and
vagrant children.
Juvenile Offenders Bill(1853)	 - As Juvenile
Offenders Bill(1850).
Public Prosecutors Bill(1854) - proposed to create
public prosecutors to take the responsibility for
prosecution away from the police and private indiv-
iduals.
Criminal Justice Act(1855) - gave magistrates
summary powers over all cases of simple larceny in
which the value of goods stolen was less than 10
shillings and, in certain cases in which the value
of goods stolen exceeded 10 shillings but the defen-
dant pleaded guilty. They were empowered to issue
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sentences of up to 6 months imprisonment, or up to
12 months in those cases in which the defendant had
pleaded guilty to stealing goods worth more than 10
shillings.
Although most of these Bills were unsuccessful, three Acts
gave magistrates extensive new powers to try cases of petty
theft summarily in Petty Sessions. The Juvenile Offenders Act
(1847) enabled magistrates to try juveniles under the age of
14 for theft offences where the value of the goods stolen did
not exceed 40 shillings, the Juvenile Offenders Act (1850)
extended the provisions of this Act to juveniles up to the age
of 16 but the Criminal Justice Act (1855) broadened magist-
rates summary powers a good deal further.
It was an enormous extension of magisterial power
for it had been estimated that, at the least,
larcenies of up to five shillings constituted six
out of ten of all cases that had been dealt with at
Quarter Sessions.
L. Radzinowicz A History Of English Criminal Law 
And Its Administration From 1750 Vol.5, p.622
This Act greatly increased the volume of business handled by
the magistrates' courts. Between 1854 and 1857, the number of
prosecutions for previously indictable offences increased
tenfold.(29) Thus, although subsequent Cl9th legislation
extended their summary powers still further,(30) the modern
function of magistrates' courts as lower courts of summary
justice was clearly established in 1855.
Those conventional histories that have referred to the exten-
sion of magistrates' summary powers have portrayed it,
together with the general reform of the system of prosec-
ution, as a triumph for common sense and humanitarianism.
Thus, they frequently point to the inconsistencies resulting
from defendants being acquitted because courts insisted on
strict precision over the details of indictments. For example,
Tobias cites the case of John Puddifoot who in 1830 stole a
sheep.(31) The indictment accused him of stealing a ewe and he
successfully fought the prosecution on the grounds that they
were not the same thing. In a similar vein, Radzinowicz cites
the case of Bartholemew Browne who was acquitted on a charge
of forging a cheque because he had signed it Bartw. Browne and
the indictment read Bartholemew Browne.(32) Some of the
implicit assumptions of the conventional histories emerge in
the following passage.
In the first half of the nineteenth century a long
series of Acts improved the criminal law by tidying
u2 the tangle of complicated forms and procedures
and relaxing their strictness. Most of the changes
were technical matters which are probably not fully
understood by anyone today, for it would be hardly
worthwhile to pick one's way through the old law
books and determine the exact meaning of all the
out-dated expressions. It is, however, easy to see
the importance of such changes as allowing juries to
find someone accused of an offence guilty merely of
attempting to commit it, if the evidence as the
trial proceeded showed that the full act had not
been completed. Another similar improvement was
allowing a prisoner found in possession of stolen
goods to be charged in the same indictment with
alternative counts of stealing and receiving goods;
it was obviously easier for the prosecution if this
could be done, and it could hardly be considered
unfair to say to a prisoner in effect, 'You have
possession of something which you must have known
did not belong to you, so you must have stolen it
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yourself or bought it knowing it to be stolen.' This
process of simplification was begun by Robert Peel
when he was Home Secretary in the 1820s, but there
was still some important work to do as late as
1861, in which year five major criminal law
consolidation Acts were passed.
J. Tobias Crime and Police in England 1700 - 1900 
pp.135-136 (my emphasis)
In this passage, Tobias portrays the reform of the system of
prosecution as an unproblematic, purely 'technical matter' - a
'process of simplification' to remove the anomalies which
'obviously' had to be eliminated. We will see shortly that the
process was, in fact, more complex than Tobias implies but let
us first look at the second major element in the conventional
accounts which arises in discussions of the abolition of
capital punishment.
This can be seen most clearly in Radzinowicz's history of
criminal law. He points out that, between 1805 and 1810 petty
juries acquitted 1 in 4 defendants accused of capital
offences(33) and he suggests that this was due to the fact
that juries were often reluctant to prosecute for minor
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property offences if they knew that the offence was subject to
capital punishment. He makes the further point that court
officials were prepared to engage in "pious perjury" to avoid
capital punishment and he cites the following example from a
speech by Thomas Fowell Buxton to illustrate the point.
Martha Walmsley was indicted for stealing 1 pair of
silver shoe buckles, 2 pairs of leather shoes, 3
shirts, 3 other ditto, 3 aprons, a frock, a gown, a
bedgown, 2 pair of hose and 2 curtains, with many
other things, value f 3 10 shillings; in the house of
Henry Gruling. Court to prosecutor: "if you can fix
the value under 40s. you will save the prisoner's
life." Prosecutor: "God forbid I should take her
life! I will value them at 8s". Guilty 8s.
Quoted in L Radzinowicz A History of English 
Criminal Law And Its Administration From 1750 Vol.
I, p.95
Radzinowicz's account of these phenomena, together with his
explanation of criminal law reform, suggests that they were
the product of the growth of humanitarian feeling against
capital punishment. Thus, he says:
Both the history of the English legal system and
English constitutional as well as political exper-
ience show that the essential prerequisites of the
success of any important reform are first that the
social need for it should assert itself, and
secondly that it be supported by an overwhelming
section of public opinion. ... In the eighteenth and
the beginning of the nineteenth centuries the
generous exercise of the royal prerogative of mercy
helped to redress the balance between the anti-
quated criminal law and the modern notions of guilt
and punishment then beginning to take shape. As such
it performed a valuable and markedly humanising
function.
L. Radzinowicz The History of English Criminal Law
And Its Administration From 1750 Vol.1, p.137
Both elements of the conventional accounts point to signif-
icant developments but neither of them provide a sufficient
explanation of the changes that occurred in the criminal law
and the system of prosecution. Because they adopt a consen-
sual model of Cl9th society, the conventional histories fail
to consider the political formation that enabled the creation
of new legal forms and, thus, understate the importance of
what appears to have been a more decisive dimension - i.e.,
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the protection of property.
Legal Reform and the Protection Of Property
Thus, although the early reformers stress the inhumanity of
capital punishment, their arguments were by no means limited
to the purely moral issues. Another important strand in the
case that they presented was their argument that capital
punishment was inefficient. They argued that, although it
punished certain offenders severely, a much larger number
escaped the net of punishment entirely which reduced its
deterent effect. The reformers therefore argued for a system
of punishment which, although less harsh, would provide more
certainty of punishment.
So evident is the truth of the maxim that if it were
possible that punishment, as the consequence of
guilt, could be reproduced to an absolute certainty,
a very slight penalty would be sufficient to prevent
almost every species of crime, except those which
arise from sudden gusts of ungovernable passion.
S. Romilly quoted in L. Radzinowicz A History Of 
The English Criminal Law And Its Administration From
1750 Vol.I p.330
In pointing to this dimension of the discourse of reform, we
are not suggesting - as Foucault does(34) - that Romilly and
the other reformers were without humanitarian motives.
However, it was the arguments in terms of the inefficiency of
traditional punishments that evoked the necessary support to
obtain success in Parliament. Where legislation was passed it
was because it was supported by the industrial bourgeoisie
looking for more efficient methods of punishment in order to
afford better protection to their property. Thus, one of
Romilly's few successes - an Act passed in 1811 removing
capital punishment for thefts from bleaching grounds in
England - was passed because it was supported by a petition
signed by 150 proprietors of bleaching grounds in Ireland and
a large number of calico printers in England, saying:
That your petitioners property is much exposed,
especially while lying out to bleach, and great
depredations are annually committed on your
petitioners.
That the laws which punish the offence with death
have been found ineffectual to restrain these
depredations, for that owing to the lenity of
prosecutors, the unwillingness of juries to convict,
and the general leaning to the side of mercy, when
the punishment is by common opinion of mankind
considered as disproportionate to the offence, very
few convictions take place, and consequently
offenders mostly escape, and are encouraged in the
commission of crimes, which are multiplied from the
probability of escape being increased, and from the
impunity which lax prosecutions frequently afford.
That your petitioners are strongly impressed with
the sentiment, that by certainty of punishment being
substituted for severity of punishment, the number
of crimes would be diminished, and your petitioners
property better secured.
Quoted in L. Radzinowicz A History Of The English 
Criminal Law And Its Administration From 1750 
Vol.I, Appendix 4, p.727
Again, in 1830, Peel's proposal to retain capital punishment
for forgery was abandoned following opposition from bankers
who petitioned the House of Commons, saying:
That your petitioners, as bankers, are deeply
interested in the protection of their property from
forgery, and in the infliction of punishment on
persons guilty of that crime.
That your petitioners find by experience, that the
infliction of death, or even the possibility of the
infliction of death, prevents the prosecution,
conviction and punishment of the criminal and thus
endangers the property which it is intended to
protect.
That your petitioners, therpfore, earnestly pray
that your honourable House will not withold from
them that protection to their property which they
would derive from a more lenient law.
Quoted in L. Radzinowicz A History Of The English
Criminal Law And Its Administration From 1750 
Vol.I, Appendix 4, p.730
Similar concerns can be seen to underly the extension of
summary justice. As we have seen, conventional histories have
suggested that the problems with the existing machinery lay
primarily in the anomalies resulting from legal technicalities
and reluctant juries. Tobias, for example, sees the reform of
the system of prosecution as a 'common sense' development to
eliminate these anomalies but this fails to explain why it
became problematic in the early Cl9th. If we examine this
development more closely, we see that it was not as obvious as
Tobias suggests. In fact, we find that he misrepresents the
nature of the existing system. Although the anomalies that he
and others have pointed to formed part of the inadequacy of
this system, there was another, more serious, problem for the
majority of prosecutors which lay in the inconvenience and
expense that accompanied prosecutions. This problem has been
summarised by Philips in his study of the Black Country.
If the prosecutor could ensure that he or some
police officers found and apprehended a suspect, he
would then have to gather witnesses who could
testify to the offence. He and the witnesses would
have to appear before the magistrate at the prelim-
inary examination, for which they might have to
travel some distance; the examination itself, plus
the travelling and the waiting for other cases to be
taken first, would mean that most of a working day
would be taken up this way. If the magistrate
committed the accused for trial, the prosecutor and
his witnesses would have to be bound over for sums
of money - -£40, -C20, flO - which they would forfeit
if they failed to prosecute or give evidence. There
would also be fees to be paid to the magistrates'
clerk for issuing the warrant of arrest, taking the
recognisances, and often for furnishing copies of
the depositions.
The prosecutor and his witnesses would then have to
travel to the county town at the time of the Quarter
Sessions or Assizes. The relevant county towns for
the Black Country were Stafford and Worcester;
Stafford was between fifteen and twenty-five miles,
and Worcester over thirty miles, from any Black
Country town. They would have to find accommodation
in the town, and stay there several days so as to be
present at both the Grand Jury hearing (which took
place at the beginning of the Assizes or Sessions)
and the trial itself (which might be heard at any
point in the Calendar - a crowded Sessions or
Assizes could last for ten days). If the prosecutor
made use of legal assistance for the case, he would
have to pay for the services of a solicitor and/or a
barrister. And there would be more fees - to the
Clerk of the Peace (at Sessions) or Clerk of Indict-
ments (at Assizes) for drawing up of the indict-
ment, to the clerks and bailiffs for attending
witnesses, swearing them in, etc. Even after the
sentence, if the prisoner was found guilty, the
prosecutor had to pay a fee to the Clerk of the
Peace or Assize for the order committing the
prisoner to imprisonment or transportation; if he
was acquitted or discharged, the prisoner had to pay
a similar fee himself.
D. Philips Crime And Authority In Victorian England 
p.111
In fact, as Philips points out(35), there was some provision
to pay expenses: "prosecutors and witnesses in felony cases
were reasonably well provided for, in terms of recovering
their expenses incurred: during the trial, in preferring the
indictment, and in appearing before the Grand Jury" but "there
was no provision at all for prosecutors and witnesses in
misdemeanour cases - even though these included offences such
as: uttering base coin, obtaining property under false
pretences, assaults, perjury, and most forms of riot".
Moreover, "even for felonies there was no allowance for
expenses incurred before the actual drawing up of the indict-
ment."(36) The latter problem was largely remedied by the
Criminal Justice Act (1826) which extended the area of
recoverable expenses -r.o include the cost of attending the
committing magistrates' preliminary examination and allowed
these expenses to be awarded for certain misdemeatliour§
However, this Act did not cover all misdemeanours and, mgTe
importantly, if the suspect was not committed for trial
neither prosecutor, witnesses nor constables could reco7r-
their costs.(37) In addition, there was always some uncert
ainty as to whether prosecutors and witnesses would recellr
compensation: "people would sometimes find that for sane
technical reason they could not recover what they had pea&
out" and "a great deal depended on the attitudes of the jjudges
and magistrates" - there was considerable variation in themir
willingness and generosity in granting expenses.(38
Thus, despite the various attempts to remunerate pro	 ©r
and witnesses and the fact that the new police force were
to detect and apprehend more offenders, it was still daffactnatt
to prosecute them because, the old system of plmscmatamim
difficult to negotiate, expensive and subject to uncertaamitE
These difficulties had not prevented the gentry from pumasAllamA3
transgressors against their property because these offemze
were largely dealt with under capital statutes in the hzsirizT
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courts but they constituted a major obstacle in the prtcic.
tion of the property of manufacturers and industrialists. Thls
does not mean that working class prosecutors did not also
benefit from the new system of summary justice, but rather
that it was the bourgeoisie who were instrumental in getting
legislation passed.
Debates On The Extension Of Magistrates' Summary Powers 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, in the eir-ly castt
the bourgeoisie were not sufficiently strong to challenge the
legal and political forms that had been developed hy the
gentry and changes were restricted to relatively mancor
modifications to the existing system, such as the aholitmom of
a few capital statutes and the improvements mentioned azove rm
the remuneration of prosecutors' and witnesses emTemaes
However, by the middle of the Cl9th, the relationsnap hetvvai
the bourgeoisie and the gentry had altered. So to 	 had tNe
nature of the protection offered to gentry property. lilt
the combination of these two factors which underlay the eNtem
sion of summary justice between 1847 and 1855.
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Once again, we should emphasise that, in stressing the import-
ance of the protection of property, we are not denying the
existence of a humanitarian discourse. The early attempts to
extend the scope of magistrates' summary powers appear to have
been founded upon genuinely humanitarian concerns. For
example, when Davenport introduced the Juvenile Offenders Bill
in 1829 - proposing to give magistrates powers of summary
jurisdiction in certain cases where juveniles were accused of
petty larceny - he justified the measure on the grounds that
the existing system necessitated the confinement of juveniles
awaiting trial with hardened older criminals and that, as a
result, many juveniles were initiated into vice. (39) Sir
Eardley Wilmot also stressed this point in his evidence to the
Select Committee on Criminal Commitments and Convictions in
1828(40) and, again, when speaking in the debate on the
Summary Jurisdiction Bill(1839). After expressing his agree-
ment with many of the objectives of the Bill, he said:
But with respect to that part which gave magist-
rates the power to inflict a fine of 5 for certain
offences which were now felony, he thought it
necessary for the object of the Bill. There had been
a great increase in crime, and it was found that
that increase was very much owing to the early
imprisonment of children in gaols with convicted
felons. To avoid this, the present bill proposed, in
some cases of juvenile offenders, virtually to
convert what was a felony into a misdemeanour.
Parliamentary Debates Vol.47, 4/6/1839, c.1304
A second major strand in the humanitarian argument concerned
the injustice of the fact that many defendants were detained
in prison whilst awaiting trial for periods in excess of the
appropriate punishment for their crime. This argument was
presented by both Hawes and the Earl of Devon in support of
the Metropolitan Police Courts Bill (1839). Speaking in this
debate in the Lords the latter said:
as under the present state of law, persons might be
committed to prison for four or five months before
trial, it would be an act of justice to them to have
their guilt or innocence decided at once without
waiting so long in gaol; and that as persons might
now be summarily convicted, even for going into a
garden and pulling up a carrot, or for taking an
apple, it would only be consistent with common
sense, that summary jurisdiction should be given to
magistrates in other trifling cases of theft.
Parliamentary Debates Vol.50, 12/8/1839, c.189
In the early parliamentary debates concerning summary juris-
diction the humanitarian arguments were paramount and they
also recurred on several subsequent occasions in later debates
including those Bills which eventually became laws.(41) We
should, nevertheless be wary of accepting them uncritically.
We will see shortly that the humanitarian arguments were not
the only, or even the decisive, arguments in the extension of
magistrates' summary powers but we must also examine the
humanitarian arguments themselves more closely. When Foucault
discusses the criminal law reforms of the late Cl8th and early
Cl9th, the debate is posed in terms of humanitarian motives
versus attempts to exert new forms of control.(42) He suggests
that the former are little more than a cloak to disguise the
attempt "to insert the power to punish more deeply into the
social body."(43) Apart from understating the significance of
humanitarianism(44), Foucault also misrepresents it. In the
debates on the extension of magistrates" summary powers, the
humanitarian arguments outlined above are inextricably inter-
twined with arguments reflecting a desire to exert a more
effective control over the working class.(45)
This emerges in the speeches of Sir Eardley Wilmot (one of the
leading "humanitarians"). When introducing the Juvenile
Offenders Bill (1840), he says that he did not believe that
juvenile offenders were driven to crime by distress. He
attributed it instead to a general ignorance, and:
more especially to ignorance of moral and religious
duties, and to the absence of that sound discipline
and control, without which, in early life, it would
be vain to hope in any country for a well-ordered
population.
Parliamentary Debates Vol.52, 26/2/1840, c.654
Thus, he argued that his Bill was not a Bill of punishment:
It was a bill to invest magistrates, not with an
arbitrary power to inflict punishment, but to give
them an authority similar to that which a master has
over his apprentice, or a father over his son - a
moral authority, which would enable them to bring
juvenile offenders under a course of moral training
and discipline which should have the effect of
reclaiming them to the paths of honesty and
industry.
Parliamentary Debates Vol.52, 26/2/1840, c.653
Similar concerns were expressed by Milnes in the debate on the
Juvenile Offenders Bill (1849), when he argued that, rather
than mixing with undesirable company in prisons, they could be
sent to special institutions based on Parkhurst which would be
concerned with "improving the heart and awakening the
conscience" of offenders.(46) And again by Adderly, when
introducing the Juvenile Offenders Bill (1853). This Bill
proposed to give the counties and boroughs the option of
establishing reformatory schools to which young criminals
could be sent:
...thus introducing a new treatment to a certain
extent for such young criminals, namely, that of
industrial training, and applying the principle of
parental care and home influence to criminal
children, instead of subjecting them to the process
of imprisonment in gaols.
Parliamentary Debates Vol.129, 1/8/1853, c.1099
The effects of all of these proposals would have been, and
indeed eventually were, to exercise a much closer control o%.-,-r
poor juvenile offenders. This does not mean that this motive
was more important than the concern about the 'contamination'
of juveniles in prisons which usually accompanied the aoove
arguments but rather they were different strands of the same
argument. Although the effects of these proposals might have
been to increase control over working class juveniles, the
motives of these men are best described as 'paternalist". For
Eardley Wilmot and the others mentioned above this increased
control was seen as part of a genuine attempt to improve the
quality of life of juvenile offenders. Nevertheless, in the
same way that Foucault is wrong to dismiss the humanitarian
arguments as a veneer for the introduction of new forms of
control, we can see that Radzinowicz and others are equally
mistaken in their portrayal of the 'humanitarian' discourse.
More importantly, though, it is clear from the Parliamentary
Debates that the 'humanitarian' arguments were not decisive in
the extension of summary jurisdiction. Although the humanit-
arian discourse dominated the early debates, none of these
Bills even came close to being passed into law. It was only
later (in 1847, 1850 and 1855), when new arguments began to
dominate, that legislation was forthcoming. At first glance it
may appear that support for these measures was based on a
concern to improve the workings of the criminal law. Thus,
when seeking leave to introduce the Juvenile Offenders Bill
(1847), Pakington refers to the Criminal Law Commission of
1837 which recommended that the most salutory mode of
diminishing juvenile crime would be to entrust magistrates
with certain discretionary powers. He points out that the
reason for this was that the slightness of the offence and the
youth of offenders coupled with the fact that they had already
been to prison meant that they were usually rendered objects
for compassion rather than fit subjects for punishment which
meant that juries often acquitted or recommended mercy
resulting in purely nominal sentences. Pakington continues by
arguing that a similar problem existed amongst magistrates
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who, when receiving an information, might act leniently in
anticipation of the evils that lay ahead.
He would wish to remind the House what was the
practice followed under the present law. Why, that
magistrates were so impressed with the disadvantage
and, he might say, cruelty, of sending those infants
to gaol for long periods before their trial, that
many of them felt it to be their duty to refuse
receiving informations, though if they could deal
summarily with the cases, they would not suffer the
offenders to escape. On the other hand, other
magistrates, entertaining a more strict sense of
duty, felt bound to commit these offenders for
trial. He need not point out to the House the incon-
venience which must result from the inequality thus
produced where the inequality ought not to exist,
and of the extremely bad moral effect of humane
magistrates appearing to hold out an impunity for
crime.
Parliamentary Debates Vol.90, 23/2/1847, c.436
In a similar vein, when speaking in favour of the Criminal
Justice Bill (1855), Lord Brougham said:
It was bad enough that the Lord Chief Justice should
be called upon, when he went on circuit, bearing the
Queen's Commission, with all the pomp and circum-
stance of the highest judicial authority, to adjud-
icate solemnly with the help of grand and petty
juries upon larcenies to the amount of ld or 2d; it
was bad enough that all the parties should be put to
great and unnecessary expense, both of time and
money; but the worst evil of all - it might indeed
be called an evil that surpassed all the rest put
together - was, that persons were detained for many
days, perhaps weeks in prison; and when they came to
be tried were either acquitted, after being punished
more severely than they would have been had they
been convicted, and then it became impossible to
award even an apparently just amount of punishment
to them for this offence of which they had been
found guilty, because the Judge would feel that they
had already undergone, secretly and unknown to the
public, a greater punishment than was due to them
upon their conviction; and the consequence was, that
often people saw with surprise that for an offence
which properly deserved a greater punishment, a
prisoner was dismissed with a day's imprisonment.
Parliamentary	 Debates	 Vol.136,
	
26/2/1855,
cc. 1874-1875
Although, in the above speeches both Pakington and Brougham
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allude to the humanitarian arguments, their concern Aire
different. They are not concerned so much with the injwyttice
of the system of prosecution as its inconsistencies, ina6P
quacies and inefficiencies. Given the prominence of tnese tAlo
men and the importance of their support, it might be tempting
to suggest that the extension of magistrates' summary powers
was part of a process of rationalization of the machinery of
the criminal law. This is the conclusion that Tobias reaolaes,
but a closer examination of the Parliamentary Debates reveaas
a baser concern with the protection of property interests
underlying these arguments.
Immediately proceeding the introduction of the Juvenaaa
Offenders Bill (1847), Brougham introduced a petition from tlbe
magistrates of Liverpool. In his speech he refers to the hard-
ening of attitudes amongst juvenile recidivists and tblye
expense of prosecuting them. Then he says:
When they considered the immense extent of manuf-
acturing districts at present, they could not now go
on with the same system of legislation they clizd
formerly; they could not proceed in the same coursz
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of punishment, with a view to reform offenders, that
was pursued in former times. Since the days of the
invention of Arkwright, the importation of cotton
had increased eighty two fold. Instead, therefore,
of having only a few thousand operatives employed,
there were now 800,000; some said 1,500,000. There
were at present, 300,000 hand-loom weavers. Why did
he recite these facts? For this reason, that
machinery was constantly invaded by manual power;
there was a perpetual struggle going on between
both. God forbid that he should object to machinery,
because the more machinery carried the day, the more
men would get employment, and that in the end would
be an advantage to the factories and the workmen.
Ay, but not immediately; there would be an interval.
When the power looms threw 100,000 hand-loom weavers
out of work, and when a single boy or girl could do
four times as much as the strongest man by the power
loom, there was of necessity an interval, until the
effects were allowed time to subside, and there was
now going on the same struggle between those two
powers, the power of machinery and that of manual
power. What was the consequence of that struggle
before? Those who were thrown out of employment were
prone to get into bad practices, for it was a
grievous consideration that those who were employed
in the factories, at the rate of 25 shillings or 30
shillings a week, made no provision for the 'bad
day"; and the consequence was, when thrown out of
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employment, they fell into bad habits. But such
conduct on their parts, so far from being an apology
for their Lordships to dispense with their duty, was
a reason why it should be sedulously and diligently
performed; and therefore he asked that the criminal
law should be so modified as to make it subservient
to the reformation of criminals.
Parliamentary Debates Vol.90, 18/2/1847, cc.200-201
Brougham phrases his arguments in terms of the struggle
between 'manual power' and 'machine power' but what he is, in
fact, describing is industrial capital's attempt to impose the
discipline of factory production. Moreover, although he does
not express it in quite these terms, he clearly relates the
need for criminal law reform in general, and the reform of the
system of juvenile justice in particular, to the growth of
industrial capitalism and the consequent increase in 'bad
habits'. Brougham's speech is interesting because he relates
the need for an extension of summary jurisdiction to the wider
development of industrial capitalism. However, he appears to
be alone in taking such a broad view and there is no evidence
to suggest that this was an important argument in the
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extension of magistrates' summary powers. The decisive argu-
ments in the passing of legislation between 1847 and 1855
appear to have been based on a more immediate concern to
protect property. Thus, when introducing the Larceny Summary
Jurisdiction Bill (1850) (which eventually became the Juvenile
Offenders Act), Pakington argued for an extension of magist-
rates' summary powers of jurisdiction on the grounds that it
was necessary to deal with the theft of coal.
One class of offences that was more particularly
adverted to in this part of the Bill, was that of
the offence of coal stealing. In some counties the
offence was very common; but offenders were brought
to trial at great cost, and on account of the
insignificant nature of these charges, justice was
frequently dispensed with altogether. In and near
Dudley, where there were many coalworks, offences of
this kind were either passed over and forgiven, or
the persons were tried at the Worcester quarter
sessions, twenty six miles distant. A coalowner told
him that he was plundered of many tons of coal per
week, owing to the difficulty of prosecuting
offenders.
Parliamentary Debates Vol.108, 20/2/1850, c.1130
- 362 -
Pakington was supported in this debate by Sir John Jervis (the
Attorney General), who said:
There were many good reasons why they should give
two magistrates the power of summary jurisdiction in
the case of smaller offences. Take the case of coal-
owners. They were subjected to great loss by the
theft of coal, and they submitted from time to time
to the injury rather than prosecute; till, at last,
they found themselves compelled to prosecute against
some person for theft of an article amounting
perhaps, to no more than a penny in value. If,
however, the magistrates had the power of summary
jurisdiction in such cases the evil would have been
put an end to.
Parliamentary Debates Vol.108, 20/2/1850, c.1133
The above extracts from the Parliamentary Debates offer an
interesting insight into the extension of summary justice in
the mid-C19th because we can see that the support from
prominent figures such as Pakington and Brougham was not based
simply on a desire to rationalise the system of prosecution
(see above) but that, underlying this argument, was a concern
to provide a more efficient method of prosecution to afford
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better protection to capitalist property. However, we should
be careful to avoid oversimplifying the process through which
this legislation was passed. We have already seen that a
humanitarian discourse was also present in the Parliamentary
Debates and we should not overlook the fact that, throughout
the debates, there was continual opposition to the extension
of magistrates' summary powers. Sometimes the arguments put
forward were idiosyncratic(47) and there were also a special
set of arguments which applied to stipendiary magistrates(48)
but otherwise this opposition can be grouped into three
categories. Firstly, there was opposition on the grounds that
it would necessitate more petty sessions which, in turn, would
impose an additional burden of expense on the county
rates.(49) Secondly, it was opposed on the grounds that
magistrates were not to be trusted with any increased powers.
This emerged in the debate on the Juvenile Offenders Bill
(1840) when Hume said that:
He objected to summary punishment. Magistrates had
frequently oppressed the poor, and might do so
again.. .. Magistrates had enough power in their
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hands and he was unwilling to increase it.
Parliamentary Debates Vol.53, 29/4/1840, c.1137
Hume was followed by Wakley who said that:
He had seen a great deal of justices, and he would
say that a more incompetent body of men could
nowhere be found. A body of men more characterised
by ill-temper, faction and the most besotted
ignorance, could not be found than the justices of
the peace of the country.
Parliamentary Debates Vol.53, 29/4/1840, c.1138
Similar sentiments were expressed again by Roebuck when
opposing the Juvenile Ofenders Bill (1847). He objected that:
The proceedings were to be in secret; there was no
responsibility attached to the uninstructed party
who was to judge and determine the nicest points of
law. He might act as he pleased; and who was to
determine whether he decided rightly or wrongly?
These extraordinary powers were to be given, not to
a learned judge, but it might be to a fox-hunting
justice; and the trial might be conducted in such
privacy that private passions, particular interests,
and sinister motives might be put into motion to
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carry out the wishes of particular parties.
Parliamentary Debates Vol.91, 28/4/1847, c.34
The third category of opposition which ran throughout the
debates on this issue was to the very principle of summary
jurisdiction because it involved the loss of the right to a
trial by jury. This was voiced by Darby when the issue was
first raised in the Summary Jurisdiction Bill (1839). He
thought:
that the principle of the Bill was a very extra-
ordinary one to come from the other side of the
House. In the Quarter Sessions, they were not
content with a full bench of magistrates, an
experienced chairman, a jury, and a bar attending,
as securities for the proper administration of
justice, but they must also have a barrister
presiding; whereas in this summary jurisdiction they
would have no bar, no barrister, no jury - but leave
the decision of a felony to two magistrates.
Parliamentary Debates Vol.47, 4/6/1839, c.1304
The same point was made during the debate on the Metropolitan
Police Courts Bill (1839). Firstly, by Law:
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But when great political and civil powers, and
public and personal liberty are concerned, when tl(1
spirit of our ancient constitution, and the trial by
jury, that great bulwark of purity of justice, were
concerned, those who had promoted the Reform Bill
had not been found wanting to abridge freedom, and
place at the disposal of arbitrary functionaries the
rights and liberties of the people. A more arbitrarl
measure than the present could not have emanated
from the most despotic Power and Government tnat
ever existed.
Parliamentary Debates Vol.49, 19/7/1839, c.533
And, again, by Lord Lyndhurst.
Trial by jury was to be taken away, and the power of
trying and convicting solely rested in an indivaddiall
appointed by the Crown, and removable at th
pleasure of the Crown. But this was not all- at was
to be left to the magistrate to say whether he weulE
try the prisoner or not; therefore they would ©m
the door to delay and partiality, and every speczes
of mischief by adopting the clause.
Parliamentary Debates Vol.50, 12/8/1839, c.1SS
This argument was repeated again in the debate on the Zlimeollirml
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Offenders Bill	 (1840) by General Johnson and Sir G.
Strickland. The latter thought that:
the bill ... was of the most objectionable kind. It
would, in fact, take the right of trial by jury from
those who most needed that protection, and who could
not be expected to be able to plead their own cause
as well as those more advanced in years. He thought
the magistrates were rightly trusted with the powers
they had, but he was not inclined to extend their
powers further, and to take away from the people the
right to trial by jury.
Parliamentary Debates Vol.52, 26/2/1840, c.658
Even after the principle of summary jurisdiction had been
accepted by Parliament with the passing of the Juvenile
Offenders Act (1847) - which gave magistrates widespread
summary powers to deal with juvenile offenders under the age
of 14 - this argument persisted. It was repeated by Torrens
M'Cullagh in the debate on the Summary Jurisdiction
Bill (1850)(50), by Atherton in the debate in 1854 on the
administration of criminal justice(51) and, by Chambers in the
debate on the Criminal Justice Act (1855)(52).
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It can be seen that the political alignments on this issue
were complex. Not only were there a number of different facets
to the discourse both in support and in opposition to the
extension of magistrates' summary powers but also both the
bourgeoisie and the gentry were divided. Thus, although a
large section of industrial capital lent their support, it was
opposed by the radical elements of the bourgeoisie (Hume,
Wakley and Roebuck). The split amongst the representatives of
the gentry is particularly interesting in view of their solid-
arity in opposition to the loss of magistrates' local govern-
ment function. We have seen that on this issue Pakington acted
as the leading spokesperson in defence of the traditional
principles involved in the rule by gentry magistrates but on
the question of summary justice he was instrumental in
replacing the system of prosecution based upon the tradit-
ional principle of the right to a trial by jury which many of
his gentry colleagues continued to defend. The fact that the
extension of summary jurisdiction granted magistrates new
powers rather than withdrawing them as in the case of the
County Councils Act would perhaps explain why there was less
- 369 -
opposition on this occasion but it does not explain why
Pakington and a section of the gentry were prepared to
actively support and canvass in favour of a new system of
prosecution. We would suggest that the answer to this question
lies in the changing position of the gentry.
By the middle of the Cl9th, most of the capital statutes for
thefts had been abolished and, thus, the gentry were no longer
able to benefit from their ability to grant pardons. Moreover,
with the rise of industrial capitalism, the gentry had itself
changed. Whereas, in the Cl8th, their property had been almost
exclusively in the form of land and their incomes derived from
rents, during the Cl9th some sections of the gentry became
increasingly involved in more industrial enterprises and they
were suffering from the same depredations as the industrial
bourgeoisie. This would explain why Pakington supported the
extension of magistrates' summary powers despite the fact that
it entailed the erosion of trial by jury. He was representing
the interests of that section of the gentry which were
beginning to "industrialise" through the development of the
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mineral resources on their land. Thus the fact that they chose
to support their argument with reference to the interests of
coalowners is particularly significant because this was the
major industrial enterprise in which the gentry engaged.
Moreover, it reflects the struggle between property rights and
use rights. During the Cl8th access to coal had been
considered a perquisite of miners and their families but, with
the advent of industrial capitalism, coalowners began to think
in terms of private property and attempted to redefine tradit-
ional use-rights as theft. Miners (like other workers)
resisted such attempts to deprive them of their traditional
rights and continued to exercise their "right" to use
coal.(53) The existing system of prosecution was an imped-
iment in the enforcement of the legal ownership of coal and
the extension of magistrates" summary jurisdiction meant that
offences could be dealt with in magistrates' courts which made
prosecutions cheaper which, in turn, enabled them to protect
their property rights and thus intensify the exploitation of
mineworkers. (54)
Summary
In this chapter, we have seen that, although magistrates'
courts were placed under the stricter control of central
government, the scope of their legal function grew enormously
with the expansion of summary justice. As with the other
changes that occurred in the position of the magistracy during
the Cl9th, this development was closely linked to the rise of
industrial capitalism but, once again, we have seen that it
was mediated by the political relations between the
bourgeoisie and the gentry. Thus, although the Summary Juris-
diction Acts could be interpreted as the instalation of the
framework for a bourgeois legal form and the Criminal Justice
Act afforded better protection to bourgeois property, this
transformation was not a simple reflection of bourgeois
interests.
We have seen that the bourgeoisie were not sufficiently strong
in the mid-C19th to impose new legal and political forms and
that change was only possible because of the support of an
influential section of the gentry. However, the role of the
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gentry was not simply to influence the timing of the legis-
lation that was passed but, more importantly, to affect the
nature of the transformation that occurred. The system of
summary prosecution in the hands of what was still a predom-
inantly gentry magistracy was a continuation (albeit modified)
of a form of "justice" that had emerged in earlier historical
periods under the rule of the gentry. It reflects the compro-
mise between the bourgeois principle of indirect rule through
an autonomous, "impartial" state and the relatively direct
form of control that had been developed by the gentry. Thus,
although magistrates' courts were incorporated within the
legal system, they emerged as a form of crime control
concerned with efficient punishment rather than a legal form
based upon 'due process'. This contrasts, for example, with
the creation of county councils where the intransigency of the
gentry, not only delayed reform but also, led to change being
imposed in a period when the bourgeoisie were dominant, with
the result that a more clearly 'bourgeois' form of local
government was established. The fact that an influential
section of the gentry supported reform of the system of
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prosecution meant that change came at a slightly earlier date
when the industrial bourgeoisie were still not the dominant
force in Parliament and the opposition of Hume, Roebuck and
Wakley had less impact than similar voices had upon the legis-
lation that was passed in 1888. In other words, the contra-
dictory nature of the modern magistrates' courts as a system
of crime control with some of the trappings of due process
reflects the compromise that was reached in the mid-C19th
between the interests of the bourgeoisie and the gentry.
CHAPTER NINE 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Our examination of the historical development of the English
magistracy is now complete. In this chapter, we will summarise
our major arguments and draw out the importance of this
historical analysis for an understanding of the way in which
justice is administered in modern magistrates' courts.
We began by looking at a number of empirical studies and found
that, both of the two main traditions, contain inherent limit-
ations which have prevented them from addressing structural
questions about the role and functions of the magistracy. In
the case of positivist studies, the weaknesses in their
methodology were so debilitating that they are able to tell us
very little beyond the fact that there is a wide discrepancy
in the sentencing rates of different courts, and between
different magistrates within the same courts. Interactionist
studies have generally fared better in that they have been
able to offer convincing accounts of the importance of
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informal criteria, based upon their detailed observations of
the complex social drama that is enacted in court. Moreover,
through their presence in the courtroom, they have drawn our
attention to a wide range of characteristics of the nature of
magistrates' justice which could only be revealed through
observation.
Observational studies have offered a thorough description of
the manner in which justice is administered in the magist-
rates' courts. However, their implicit commitment to methodol-
ogical individualism has rendered them unable to provide an
adequate explanation of why it has taken this form. By
focussing exclusively upon events inside the courtroom, they
have taken for granted the structure of the legal system in
which the courtroom drama is played out. This has led to
several equally mistaken positions. A number of interact-
ionists have totally ignored the structural dimension, with
the result that they implicitly present the legal inequal-
ities that they document as the product of the exercise of
discretionary powers by magistrates and other court personnel.
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Other, more eclectic, observational studies,(1) which have not
shared the same commitment to the individualist position of
symbolic interactionism or ethnomethodology, have made
attempts to explain the judicial system that produces a fast,
'conveyor belt justice', resulting in a high proportion of
guilty pleas and convictions. Their accounts have invariably
drawn upon the work of Blumberg and Packer(2) to portray
magistrates' courts as a form of 'administrative justice'. The
essential argument is that regular court personnel develop
informal, routine arrangements to enable them to handle the
enormous volume of work confronting magistrates' courts. This
sub-species of observational study, with its references to
models of the legal system (Due Process, Crime Control and
Liberal Bureaucratic) and its portrayal of magistrates' courts
as a bureaucracy, appears to locate interpersonal interaction
within a structural analysis of the legal system. However,
their explanations are founded upon their unquestioned assump-
tion that the British legal system embodies the principles of
due process. They take it for granted that this is how the law
is intended to be administered and they, therefore suggest
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that the crime control characteristics of magistrates' courts
are 'deviations' or 'irregularities' that arise solely from
the actions of court personnel.
The falsity of this implicit dichotomy between 'the law in
action' and 'the law in the books', or crime control and due
process, has been convincingly demonstrated by Doreen
McBarnet. Her work stands out amongst studies of magistrates'
courts as a pioneering attempt to locate the findings of
observational studies within a genuine analysis of the British
legal system. However, although she has shown that many of the
supposed departures from due process are a product of legal
policy, she does not offer an explanation of why this should
be the case. Our study has provided the historical analysis of
the development of the magistracy that McBarnet has often
acknowledged the necessity for,
	 but which she has not
produced.
The modern magistrates' court was forged in the middle part of
the Cl9th but we have also looked further back to the earlier
stages in the development of the English magistracy. In doing
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this, we have been able to understand the later changes more
fully. In particular, it has enabled us to analyse the nature
of the existing legal and political forms centred upon the
magistracy and their importance in the rule of the gentry.
An appreciation of this relationship between the gentry and
the magistracy is helpful because it underpins the transform-
ation of the English magistracy that occurred during the
Cl9th. Although the creation of the modern magistrates' court
was closely related to the growth of industrial capitalism, it
was neither an inevitable product of the logic of capitalist
development,	 nor	 a	 straightforward victory	 for	 the
bourgeoisie. Rather, it was the outcome of the class struggle
that arose from the particular social formation of nineteenth
century British capitalism. The industrial bourgeoisie were an
important component of this formation but, the gentry main-
tained a good deal of political strength until late in the
Cl9th which they used to attempt to protect their traditional
power base in the county magistracy.
The legal and political forms that emerged during this period
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reflect the series of compromises between these two sections
of the ruling class. In our discussion we have focussed upon
the three major dimensions in the transformation of the
magistracy - the replacement of the unrepresentative administ-
ration of the counties by elected county councils, the
(partial) replacement of the traditional system of order
maintenance by the new police and, changes to the system of
prosecution resulting in a massive expansion of magistrates'
powers of summary jurisdiction. The proposals contained in the
various measures that were introduced on these issues const-
ituted a direct challenge to the authority of the gentry or to
principles to which they held firm, but they affected the
gentry differently and this, in turn, altered the nature of
the compromise reached.
In the case of local government reform, the retention of the
existing system did not constitute a problem either for the
maintenance of order or the protection of property and the
representatives of the gentry in Parliament were able to offer
a solid resistance, until a change in the composition of the
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Commons forced them to concede. Ironically, this resulted in a
greater victory for the bourgeoisie. By the time that legis-
lation was finally passed in 1888, the industrial bourgeoisie
were a far stronger force and they were able to impose
democratically elected county councils, with the magistracy
retaining only their limited role on police committees. The
creation of the new police reflects a different set of circum-
stances. Here, the threat of an organised working class, which
was at least as great to the gentry as it was to the
bourgeoisie, highlighted the common interests of the two
groups and a compromise was reached fifty years earlier. This
enabled the gentry, in their capacity as magistrates, to
retain a significant degree of control over the administ-
ration and deployment of county police forces.
The political formation on the issue of reform of the system
of prosecution was more complex, with sections of both the
bourgeoisie and the gentry on both sides of the divide.
Whereas they had been forced (for different reasons) to
accept both elected county councils and the creation of county
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police forces, a section of the gentry, not only supported
but, were instrumental in the extension of summary justice.
This active support, particularly from coalowners, meant that
the system of prosecution was reformed at a time when the
gentry retained their political dominance. This had an impor-
tant effect on the nature of the legal form that was created
in its place. The system of summary justice in magistrates'
courts can be seen as a continuation of the legal forms devel-
oped by the gentry in earlier historical periods. This is not
to say that the transformation of the magistracy into courts
of summary justice was simply a reflection of the interests of
the gentry - as we have seen, the bourgeoisie also supported a
reform of the system of prosecution. Rather, the form that
emerged was a compromise between these two groups. Thus, the
Summary Jurisdiction Acts provided some of the trappings of an
'impartial' legal form within the orbit of the modern state,
but "justice" was still to be administered by an unrepres-
entative, largely gentry, magistracy without the benefits of
the protection of the principles of due process that had
disappeared with the erosion of the right to a trial by jury.
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The particular nature of this compromise has a direct bearing
on the question of why magistrates' justice diverges from the
principles of due process and exhibits so many charac-
teristics of a form of crime control. What we have shown is
that it results from the nature of the particular formation of
British capitalism in which the modern magistrates' court was
forged. The English magistracy was transformed, during the
Cl9th, into a lower court of summary justice precisely to act
as an efficient means of crime control. Although court
procedures were reformed to remove the worst excesses of
magistrates' authoritarianism within the courtroom, the clear
purpose behind the extension of summary jurisdiction was to
create an efficient system of punishment which consciously
eroded the due process of law by abolishing jury trials for
minor property offences. Thus, the false dichotomy that
McBarnet has pointed to, between crime control and due
process, is not simply the product of recent legal policy
initiatives but rather it is inherent in the nature of the
form of the modern magistrates' court. Although their
structure has not remained static since 1855, modern magist-
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rates' courts still operate within the broad framework that
was laid down in the mid-C19th. Thus, the characteristic
features of the modern magistrates' court (such as, the lack
of due process, the speed of trials, the intimidation of
defendants and, one might want to add the undemocratic nature
of selection) result from the compromise that was reached
between the bourgeoisie and the gentry in establishing the
system of summary prosecution that still exists in its
essentials today.
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